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 Living Without Why  
 
An Exploration of Personal Muslim Authenticity 
 
By Stephen D.Trevathan 
 
Abstract 
This work aims to look into the question of authenticity and inauthenticity within the 
Muslim discourse.  How muslim can Muslims really be ?    
 
Within the Muslim world the concept of authenticity is usually coupled with 
questions of adherence to the canonical and historical.  Despite the fact that the 
Qur’an addresses the individual in a very direct manner, little emphasis seems to be 
focused on personal authenticity within contemporary Muslim circles. Muslim 
societies are understood to be communally based with less emphasis on the individual 
(Lewis : 2007) and yet inner searching has been very much a part of Muslim culture 
though this may now have shifted significantly in engaging with, what is argued here, 
as the increasing mundanization (Drane : 2000) and rationalist approaches to religion 
generally and specifically to Islam. This work sets out to explore what, if any, 
inauthenticities have arisen within the Muslim discourse that might have given rise to 
this.  In	  attempting	  to	  think	  through	  these	  questions,	  various	  contemporary	  manifestations	  of	  global	  management	  culture	  are	  explored,	  the	  development	  of	  rationality	  within	  Muslim	  intellectual	  history	  and	  contemporary	  theological	  positions	  within	  Islam	  are	  brought	  up	  for	  examination.	  Throughout	  these	  enquiries	  any	  resulting	  connection	  with	  inauthenticity	  and	  rationalism	  is	  sought	  out.	  Has	  this	  management	  paradigm	  reached	  the	  religious	  sphere?	  Has	  there	  been	  a	  McDonaldization	  of	  Islam?	  How	  can	  these	  be	  effectively	  countered?	  Much 
of the analysis and discussion that takes place is through a dialectical perspective 
between classical Islamic and existentialist thought. 
 
One of main aims of this research is to demonstrate ways of thinking through to 
potential personal authenticity despite the obstacles mentioned. This is a personal 
exploration orientated towards a personal authenticity in the context of the individual 
Muslim. It is not meant to be prescriptive nor exclusive but provide an example of 
working intellectually through to some form of authentic Muslim ‘beingness’.  
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 1 
Without Why 
 
An Exploration of Personal Muslim Authenticity 
By Stephen D.Trevathan 
 
Because there are Heaven and Earth 
the ten thousand creatures are born; 
because there are sun and moon  
Heaven and Earth have light; 
because there is the Sage  
enlightening teachings arise. 
To hear the teaching of the Sage 
is to deepen knowledge and perception, 
to know the past, 
clearly to understand the future and the present, 
to grasp the origin of Heaven and Earth 
and the source of the myriad creatures, 
to attain to celestial principles 
and to see into the hearts of men; 
it shows us the road we have come by 
and demonstrates the return to Reality; 
                 
         The Three-Character Rhymed Classic on the Ka’bah 
         Early 18th Century Chinese Muslim Poem 
                                                                               (Anon) 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis sets out to demonstrate the process of arriving at an existential theology 
for a Muslim individual, namely myself, the author of this work. What is put before 
the reader makes no claim to be the way of authentic muslim ‘beingness’ but is rather 
an undertaking of a way among other possible ways.  Though stemming from the 
subjective, any assertions are constantly examined against an objective critique. It 
attempts to demonstrate a Muslim reasoning towards authenticity, within the context 
of a bewildering plethora of positions vis a vis the Divine, the Prophet, Divine law, 
society, the other and finally the self.  Despite personal affiliation to Islam and active 
participation within British, Dutch, Spanish and Moroccan Muslim communities for 
over forty years as well as extensive travel across the Muslim world, the balance 
between the emic and etic is held. The researcher is well aware of the dangers of the 
 2 
‘Candid Ethnographer’ dilemma (Fine :1993) entailing the researcher working under 
the illusion that, situated within the field of study, rather than an outside observer, 
what is reported is the unmitigated truth. No such illusion was present during the 
compiling of this work.  
 
In referring to existential theology, what is indicated here is a path undertaken, lived 
and experienced with immediacy rather than adherence to overly conceptualized 
systematizations of belief and learnt ‘truths’. This is based on the assertion that 
religion solely acted out through a rational knowing is quite distinct to that which 
‘….is not with the reason only, but with the will, with the feelings, with the flesh and 
the bones and with the soul and with the whole body (Unamuno 2011 : 28). An 
underlying assumption is that a personal existential theology directly relates to the 
notion of authenticity. In Muslim discourse, authenticity is frequently limited to 
interpretations validated by textual or canonical sources. In this study, it refers to an 
intellectual process towards inward integrity mirrored naturally in outward action, 
rooted in an authentically determined historical praxis yet situated in the ‘now’.  
 
This work is an enquiry into the binary opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity 
within a Muslim context.  Are there inauthenticities within the contemporary Muslim 
discourse? How have they originated? What paths to authenticity exist and what could 
they consist of? These questions are addressed through the application of social 
theory, historical review, theology and philosophy. Much of this is explicitly or 
implicitly housed within classical Muslim thought and existentialist perspectives, 
though not neccesarily in comparative mode but to see what comes forth from the 
encounter of these two distinct philosophies of Being. 
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In conclusion, this research project is carried out demonstratively, outlining one 
possible path of thought towards Muslim authentic beingness. Along the way, matters 
arise that may stimulate further thought and novel interpretation and it is intended for 
sharing with anyone of similar concern. Many of the themes raised will have 
implications beyond its immediate Muslim focus and it is hoped that the reader will 
engage with what follows and is motivated, even if in disagreement, to consider some 
of the issues set out here below in a manner particular and relevant to them.  
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Chapter One 
Rationale  
Western attention is usually drawn toward Islamists and less often to the 
efforts among Muslims to theorize more authentically about their own 
existence.  
                                                                                      (Heyking : 2006: 76) 
 
The impetus for embarking on this research came about as a result of a niggling 
uneasiness that arose over a period of time. In the early 70s, as a young man, I was 
confined to a small Moroccan hamlet due to illness for several months. There I was 
able to witness a culture embodying a primordial living out of everyday life 
permeated by a sense of the Divine. As a non-Muslim at the time, I never feel 
excluded from that. It seems unavailing to categorize a numinous experience; yet 
retrospective experience signifies that the ‘lived’ theology of the village was one of 
Sunni orthodoxy imbued with the tenets of Tasawwuf (Sufism). As a result of this 
experience and upon returning to northern Europe some months later, I converted to 
Islam and with little knowledge of the multifarious positions within the Muslim 
community, was initially brought into association known with a movement known as 
the Tablīghi Jamāt. For a new convert to the faith, it was an impressive display of 
human equality imbued with the spiritual, manifested in people of all social class, race 
and nationality literally eating from the same plate whilst seated on the floor, living, 
praying and learning together. Upon leaving this movement some months later, the 
wider Muslim community reflected the same whole-heartededness.  It was the time of 
the World Festival of Islam (1976) backed and supported by many Muslim countries 
with various exhibitions and presentations that had an open, artistic and intellectual 
aura (Sabini : 1976; Beesley : 1978). There were no signs of any theological tensions, 
such as controversies over representational art or the legality of music, all of which 
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featured highly in the exhibition, whereas such frictions are highly characteristic of 
the contemporary Muslim discourse. The festival was well received by the general 
public and general apprehension of Islam was something akin to the current 
popularity of Buddhism. Sadly, it is not unreasonable to surmise that in all probability 
such a festival could not take place now without a great deal of controversy.   
 
In the early 80s, a gradual but discernable change became evident and in place of 
fraternal acceptance of other Muslims, a tendency of initially inquiring into the 
‘aqīdah (literally ‘creed’) of the other became common with the identification of 
themselves as belonging to a particular group adhering to a particular ‘aqīdah to the 
exclusion of others. As Lapidus states, ‘…since the 1970s latent Muslim 
identifications have begun to assert themselves in a worldwide Islamic revival’ 
(Lapidus : 2002 : 823). Bid’ah, a concept of innovation usually used in its negative 
sense to indicate a deviation from the pure teachings of Islam, was in common usage 
for those did not share one’s ‘pure’ ‘aqīdah.  All that was non-Muslim was 
increasingly demonized and conspiracy theories abounded, staged by a background of 
increasing upheaval and violence on a local and global scale.  Indications of this are 
seen in the events surrounding Imam Khomeni (1902 – 1989), Colonel Ghaddafi 
(1942 – 2011), the shooting of a British policewoman from the Libyan Embassy (17th 
April 1984) and the Rushdie affair (1988). Retrospective investigation revealed that 
the seeds of this apparent turmoil had been historically germinating for some 
considerable time, stretching back to the 18th -19th century. What I experienced in the 
village may have been the remnants of a classical Islam, defined as the ‘sophisticated 
classical consensus which was worked out over painful centuries of debate and 
scholarship’, (Winter : 2009).  In the early eighties, it seemed that the perception of 
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many Muslims was that Islam consisted of a moral code with socio-politico 
implications providing a clear identity. This is reflected in the following:  
The entire experience of Islamic work over the past fifteen years has 
been one of increasing radicalization, driven by the perceived failure 
of the traditional Islamic institutions and the older Muslim 
movements to lead the Muslim peoples into the worthy but so far 
chimerical promised land of the 'Islamic State’.                        
                       (Winter : 2009 : 302 ) 
 
This hardening theological positioning, especially in light of my experience in the 
Moroccan village, has been perplexing and has largely motivated the undertaking of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, it is not intended as any plea for a return to unity nor a 
nostalgic glance at the past but is rather an attempt to establish whether such changes 
have resulted from an inauthentic apprehension of Islam and if so, whether an 
individual path can be found out of this.  
 
A View of the Contemporary Situation and the Muslim Classical Tradition  
Examples of the deep seated changes within the Muslim world referred to above can 
be seen in the shifting away from the traditional means of transcending the self, 
afforded within what is sometimes referred to as the Prophetic way, (As-Sufi : 1975; 
Winter : 2009) and laid out in the classical canon, now largely overshadowed by a 
social and political ideology. There has been a widely documented move from the 
diversity of locality based Muslim cultural expressions, (Akbar : 2002)  to a 
monolithic pan-Islamic outlook. Within the last fifty to seventy years, for different 
socio-historical reasons, such as colonization, secularism and materialism, (Arkoun : 
1994), an alleged shift has occurred from regional, sapiential Muslim traditions,  to a 
globalized, political ideology, (Bone : 2007; Brown : 1996;  Nasr : 1987; Otayek : 
1993; Akbar : 2002). The classical tradition has been sidelined by being deemed as 
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irrelevant in the contemporary age, coupled with the dying out of those with classical 
knowledge (Eickelman : 1978). Indeed, traditional scholars were frequently the first 
to be restricted and oppressed during colonial times and after the ensuing national 
independence were then deemed as outmoded and irrelevant, especially in light of the 
push for modernization reforms (al-Murabit : 1982; Eickelman : 1978).  
 
As a result many Muslims have been severed from the root principles of the 
traditional classical mode, (Lewis : 2007; Malik et al : 2007; Samad : 2004) and filled 
the vacuum solely with ideologies of Islam as the heroic underdog challenging an 
oppressive western hegemony. Traditional praxis was directed mainly to bringing 
about a transformation of the self and in the understanding that if engaged upon on by 
society as a whole this has its effects on the outer social realm (Nasr : 1987; Winter : 
2009; Lings : 1993; Burckhardt : 2008, 1992). The initial individual concern was a 
striving for ikhlās, usually translated as sincerity but probably more effectively 
defined as authenticity, the desire for the inner and the outward aspects of the 
individual to correspond. In contrast, contemporary responses are directed in the 
opposite manner, outwardly derived, with a hoped for inward effect (Roy : 1996; 
2007) and usually depicted as adherence to a moral code. As Roy says, ‘ The magical 
appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in 
terms of the social reality’ (1996 : 71).  The response to the modern world within the 
Muslim homelands has lain in a propensity of social ideologies and reform, (Hourani 
1972,  Binder : 1988; Tamimi : 2001; Tibi : 1991 and Enayat :1982; Brown : 1996, 
Esposito : 1998, Esposito : 2010 ; Heykring : 2006; Nasr : 1987 : Roy : 2007). Despite 
frequent demonization of the western developed nations, many such reforms and 
ideologies ironically demonstrate that there has been more of an ‘….interaction 
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between western discourses of secular modernity and Muslim reformist discourse in 
the latter part of the twentieth century’ (Bruinessen & Howell : 2007 : 7) than one 
would imagine. The focus and stress within reformist expressions of Islam generally 
tend to create a social context wherein there exists no other cultural expression other 
than itself, positing this as the original and sole archetype of Muslim culture, when in 
fact it is itself an expression of one particular type of Arab culture, (Alam : 2012; 
Rosen intro to Akbar : 2002). Hence, the idea of grand schemes of national 
development have been prioritized over the idea of any personal inner transformation. 
Whether due to Western-style schemes of ‘development’, Marxism, 
nationalism, secularism, or Islamism, the Islamic world has suffered 
its share of ideological activism. What these ideologies share is a 
“big idea”, or ideology, that purports to transform the Islamic world 
into a post-industrial economy, Marxist utopia, collection of nations, 
liberal democracy, and caliphate, respectively.                       
(Heyking : 2006: 76) 
 
Contemporary trends in the wake of the Arab spring have brought forward the 
Islamicist agenda in Turkey, Eygpt, Morocco and Tunisia. However, should the 
claims and promises of such political ideologies ever prove ineffectual, this could 
prove extremely turbulent, with either a drive to extremism or dangerous mass 
disorientation created by a vacuum of meaning. Such modernist Islamic ideologies are 
frequently characterized by grouping around the idea of Islamic identity through 
identifiable social conformities. This is well depicted in Orhan Pamuk’s novel, Snow 
(2004) wherein the main character is confronted with the process of Islamization in a 
Turkish town wherein Islam is depicted as an ideology demanding overt displays of 
pietas and conformity. This clashes with the sacred Muslim tradition, which for 
centuries had unselfconsciously permeated the life of the town in its own Turkish yet 
regional manner allowing for individual diversity and views. As the Iranian 
theologian and philosopher Soroush says, ‘We [had] communal actions and rituals, 
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but not communal faiths. Expressions of faith are public but the essence of faith is 
mysterious and private’ (Soroush : 2000 :140).  
 
It is hoped that this thesis will in some small measure attempt to readdress this 
balance, not in the notion of some return to a golden age but for those who still wish 
to be nourished by the rich spiritual tradition of Islam and who feel pain in its 
diminishment. It is intended to be an expression of the possibility of a reinvigoration 
of a ‘method of interpreting meaningful behaviour’, (Blattner : 2006 : 4) central to an 
existentialist outlook and embedded within the classical Muslim tradition, a major 
component of which is comprised of embarking upon a path of authentic self-
observation and an ensuing self knowledge. As Soroush suggests, ‘Islam also has a 
spiritual side. I think it is so powerful and so important that it has to be reintroduced 
in modern times’, (cited in Leezenberg : 2007 : 2).   
 
Relevance of Existentialism to Muslim Classical Tradition  
                                                      
Large parts of this study work from a comparative philosophical / theological base 
afforded through a juxtaposing of what some have called the ‘summoning philosophy’ 
(Frankl : 1986) and classical Muslim theology. In justifying this it is appropriate to 
consider the following; ‘The Greco-Roman-European classical tradition of thought 
and being is humane before it is Western. The truth captured and expressed by this 
tradition belongs to man as such, and not to Greece or France or Germany or 
America’, (Malik cited in Malik et al, 2009 : 44). For the sake of legitimization from 
the Muslim side, the following Hadīth is proffered; ‘Abu Huraira reported: The 
Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said, “Wisdom is the lost property of the 
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believer, so wherever he finds it then he is more deserving of it’, (Tirmidhi : 2007 : 
Hadīth 2687).  
 
It is hoped that by a process of identifying similarities and differences between the 
conceptual domains of western existentialism and the Muslim sacred traditions, a 
meaningful framework for approaching the matter at hand is created. Advantages can 
arise when working in this comparative manner; for example, when corresponding 
elements are identified, with perhaps one tradition placing greater or emphasis, this 
serves to bring out the nuances more fully in the other. Likewise, for Muslims, who 
for one reason or another, are unable to fully access the accumulated wisdom of 
classical Islam (Lee : 1997), may find that existentialist concepts allows them deeper 
access to the Muslim spiritual tradition.   
 
The ‘summoning philosophy’ indicates the summoning of actualization of the 
singular and the unique, insofar that it refers to the singularity or uniqueness of each 
person and each moment. This corresponds with Safranski’s (1998) calling the 
existentialists ‘Philosophers of the Moment’1. Bearing in mind this ‘singularity’ 
amongst existentialists, there is an aversion to codification and theorization and a 
prominent motif of authenticity. Thought is directed more directly to the ordinary 
lives of individuals confronting the enormous challenges of the modern age. It should 
be seen in contrast to the more abstract cognitive and theoretical constructions of the 
speculative philosophical tradition.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Safranski’s reason for this lies in identifying these thinkers, (what others commonly call 
existentialists) as  
 being concerned with temporality in some form or other as opposed to theoretical constructs. It also is 
a much looser description than the label existentialist which most of these thinkers would reject 
outright.    
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By ‘classical Muslim theology’ what is generally meant is Sunni classical orthodoxy 
(naql) and tradition (tūrath) and in conjunction with this, what this is what is meant 
henceforth by ‘traditional’ or ‘traditionalists’ except where indicated otherwise. The 
word ‘tradition’ implies ‘…the sacred, the eternal, the immutable Truth, the perennial 
wisdom, as well as the continuous application of its immutable principles to various 
conditions of space and time’ (Nasr : 1994 : 13 : emphasis added).  Part of this 
historical evolvement is Tasawwuf  (Sufism) though there are some that would argue 
against this, claiming that it is not part of a genuine and ‘pure’ Islam in that it 
incorporates elements unfamiliar and alien to Islam. However, the reverse could be 
argued; those who make such arguments such as the salafīs2 are ‘pseudo-
traditionalist’ movements, according to Nasr (1994 : 13) and in reality comprised of 
‘modernist’ paradigms which are anathema to sacred traditions. For the purposes of 
this thesis, such counter allegations are considered to have come about originally 
through misunderstandings promulgated avertly or inadvertently by ‘modernist’ 
elements within the Muslim world (Cornell : 2004; Nasr : 1994; Keller : 1995a).  
 
In terms of Sufism, the element of this tradition known as ‘Akbarian’3 will be the 
general backdrop in this thesis. As with existentialism this does not refer to any 
sharply defined school of thought or movement but to noted figures inspired by the 
Andalusian, Muhiydin ibn al-‘Arabi (1165 – 1240) frequently given the title, Sheikh 
al-Akbar, (the great master) and hence the label, Akbarian. Ibn ‘Arabi, (as he is more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This a term used to describe early the early Muslim community but which now refers to a modern day 
movement of the Muslim community and is often related to the school of thought known as 
‘wahabism’. The word ‘salaf’ refers to the people and practices of the early Muslim community 
considered to be closer to the original Divine message and the Prophet and hence regarded as models to 
emulate. The modern day movement is puritanical and literalist by nature and is understood by many as 
having arisen in reaction to the European colonialism and ideas. They perceive the Sufis to have 
deviated from the ‘true’ Islam and this is reciprocated by the Sufis in regard to the Salafīs. 
 
3 The more concise name of ‘Ibn’Arabi’ will be used in the text except in relation to to quotes where 
the fuller name of ‘Ibn al-‘Arabi’ will be used.  
 12 
commonly known) expounded a perspective that has greatly influenced the Muslim 
world, though this goes frequently unrecognised, to the extent that many 
contemporary detractors of Ibn ‘Arabi often espouse views linked directly to his 
thought without realizing it, (Chodkiewicz : 1991). The Akbarian perspective is 
difficult to summarize quickly but suffice it to say at this point that it is characterized 
by an emphatic and pervading sense of the unicity of all existence, (wahdat al- 
wujūd), consisting of the idea that the minutiae of everyday occurrences have 
significant meaning in other unseen dimensions in ascending order leading up to the 
ultimate cause of all things, the Divine Essence. These corresponding manifestations 
of the Divine within temporal and infinite dimensions signify that ultimately there is 
nothing but God.  Placed within the context of imagio dei, the human individual is 
seen as possessing innumerable possibilities and opportunities to transcend personal 
limitations. Though clearly other-wordly, it is not especially esoteric in that it is not at 
the expense of the exoteric. Thus in Ibn ‘Arabi’s world-view, religious 
manifestations, rather than being in contrast to the inner, are mutually enhanced in the 
joining of the outer and inner and are seen as one and the same.  The outer law 
(shari’ah) is adhered to and yet seen in light of its inner essence and principles and 
applied to the context and conditions of the moment.  The Tasawwuf referred to in 
this work to comes with specific but not sole reference to the al-Qadīriyyah ash- 
Shādhilīyah tradition4 which is strongly placed within the Akbarian perspective,  
(Cornell: 2004). The combined way of thought and action derived from the Akbarian 
and Qadīri-Shādilīan sources includes known figures, amongst many others, as al-
Qūnawī (d.1274 CE), al-Mursī (d.1296 CE), Ibn ‘Ata’illah (d.1309 CE), al-Qaysari 
(d.1351 CE),  al-Jīlī (d.1428 CE), Mulla Sadrā (d.1640 CE), ad-Darqawi (d.1823 CE), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Based on the combined seminal influence of Abdul Qādir al-Jilani, (1077–1166) and Abul Hasan ash-
Shadhili, (1187-1259 CE) 
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Ibn ‘Ajiba (d.1809), az-Zarruq (d.1493) and al-Alāwī (d.1934 CE),  al Bouchichi 
(b.1922 - ) amongst others.  
 
While on the surface some fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable differences 
between the existentialist and Muslim perspectives seem to exist, appearances can be 
deceptive and striking affinities, similarities and nuances are also there to be 
identified. Notwithstanding, though Burckhardt may have seen compatibilities 
between various faiths and forms of thought as ‘a coincidence of spiritual vision’ or 
‘only a question of differences in perspective or mode of expression’ (1976 : 10), 
dissimilarities must also be acknowledged. Primarily, in this case, because inherent to 
existentialist thought, is the reluctance to accept universal theories or any systematic 
categorization, even to the extent of rejecting the label of ‘existentialism’. Islam, on 
the other hand, starts from a very clear metaphysical premise. A possible area of 
contention could be the question of whether the Qur’an can be subjectively and 
individually interpreted. Others might argue for the Qur’an as the embodiment of 
existentialist choice and immediacy such as Cantwell-Smith (1978) and Bruns reflects 
the paradoxical ring of existentialism when he asserts:  
The whole movement of reading as an appropriation or 
internalization of the text is reversed. Here there is no grasping and 
unpacking and laying the text bare. On the contrary, reading is 
participation. To understand the Qur’an is to disappear into it.  
                                                                              (Bruns : 1992 : 126)    
 
Notwithstanding, the relationship between existentialism and religion has been close 
though perhaps not always comfortable.  The complexity of this is seen in one 
existentialist theologian stating that, ‘….one of the perils inherent in the existentialist 
influence upon theology is that existentialism might prove to be the gnosis of the 
twentieth century’, (Macquarrie 1980 : 228).  
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Existential resistance to universal theorization can be seen in the following remarks of 
Foucault’s ; ‘….Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same : 
leave it to our bureaucrats and the police to see that our papers are in order. At least 
spare us their morality when we write’, (1972 : 17). It is also evident in Heidegger’s 
Letter on Humanism (2004), refuting Sartre’s sympathetic endeavour to categorize his 
magnus opus, ‘Being and Time’ (2008) as a humanism.  In contrast, the tenets of 
Islam are based on a priori assumptions of the existence of God and at the very least, 
the historical role of the Prophet as the ‘Messenger’ of God. The reaction of some 
‘Philosophers of the Moment’ could be to see this as the arbitrary codification of the 
abstract, the ethereal, even the illusory, in the same way that any other universal 
theory in philosophy is challenged by them. Yet, ironically, mystics might also have 
an aversion to the codifying of the Divine and therefore may have some empathy with 
this existentialist view. Despite these notions, it would be a shallow to immediately 
brand the likes of Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) and Heidegger with the tag of atheism. In 
the case of Nietzsche, popularly associated with ‘the death of God’, recent research 
shows that it not may not be the case that he was atheist (Young : 2006) and that, in 
fact he had some sympathies with Islam (Jackson : 2007). The ‘father of 
existentialism’, Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855), certainly demonstrated a visceral 
opposition to the theologians of his time but was motivated to oppose what he saw as 
a mundanization of Christianity, likewise Unamuno (1864-1936), existentially 
Catholic as Buber (1878 – 1965) was existentially Jewish.  There is now clear 
evidence of Heidegger being strongly influenced by Zen Buddhism and Daoism 
(Parkes et al : 1987 ; May :1996; Caputo : 1986), as well as being irrefutably inspired 
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by the Christian mystic, Meister Eckhardt5, (Caputo : 1986).  Malik (2009) cites the 
Egyptian philosopher Badawi as saying: ‘Heidegger, for example, uses most of the 
Christian doctrinal categories: sin, fall, elevation, personhood, etc, but he empties 
them of all religious content in order to render them pure and general existential 
concepts’, (2009: 55 ). Despite seemingly contradictory statements over time; the 
possibility of finding compatibility with other cultural forms of thought is not totally 
abandoned by Heidegger. Though referring to Buddhism and the Far East, Heidegger 
asks  ‘……whether ultimately the thinking experience can be reached by a being of 
language that would ensure that Western European and East Asian can enter into 
dialogue in such a way that there sings something that wells up from a single source’, 
(Heidegger cited in Parks :1987 : 1). Yet it is also understood that none of these 
figures provide direct answers to the question of Islam, despite the fact that Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard, Foucault and Derrida all made references to it in varying degrees.  
 
Given all of the above, it is apt to borrow from Malik, (2009) to stress that this work 
is not a ‘Heideggerizing of Muslim theology’ but more of a ‘Muslim theologizing of 
Heidegger’, (Malik : 2009 : 43). Affinities are acknowledged, yet there can be no 
losing sight of the differences between existentialist and religious approaches to the 
question of authenticity.  
 
That commonalities do exist between the ‘Philosophers of the Moment’ and Akbarian 
perspectives has come to light primarily through increasing academic and literary 
interest. Such links may previously have remained unexamined due in large measure 
to the eclipsing of the classical hermeneutical tradition by modernist Muslim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 (1260 – 1327) 
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interpretation, on the one hand, and the effects of western orientalism on the other, 
(Heykring : 2006, Nasr:1987, Said : 1979).   However, in recent years considerable 
academic and literary endeavour has been carried out in the field, largely in English 
and French but also in Arabic, Farsi and Turkish idioms. A notable example is seen in 
the work of a coterie of Iranian scholars,  (Bouroujderi : 1997) or through the auspices 
of Shi’a  theology and philosophy, which seems to have originated with the work of 
Henry Corbin6, (Cheetham : 2003) Analogical studies comparing Heidegger with such 
Muslim thinkers such as Mulla Sadra7 and Ibn ‘Arabi, (Akbarian & Zamaniha: 2011; 
Corbin : 1971; Kamal : 2006, 2010; Acikgenc : 1993 ). These deal mainly with the 
question of ontological difference and metaphysics. Interestingly, these theologians / 
philosophers alluded to here, have been deemed by some as as ‘anti-western’ and ‘neo 
conservative’ by some critics, who perceive a basic incompatibility between these and 
mysticism, (Mehru : 2007:1). Soroush (2006) has also been highly critical of 
Heideggerian ideas within Iranian academic, religious and political arenas, 
interpreting these as fascist elements, probably in reference to Heidegger’s flirtation 
with Nazism.  
 
In the Arab world, the Egyptian philosopher, Abdul Raman Badawi, (1917-2002) 
particularly stands out as having identified common themes between Muslim thought 
and European existentialism. He identified ‘anxiety’ and ‘falleness’ as something 
strongly evident within the Muslim psyche, (key themes within European 
existentialism), especially within the mystical tradition of Islam, as Badawi says, ‘Je 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Henry Corbin, (1903-1978), Professor of Islamic studies at the Sorbonne, Paris, France. Particularly 
focused on the Iranian mysticism and the Illuminist School of thought of Mulla Sadra.  Heavily 
influenced by Kierkegaard and especially Heideigger 
 
7 Mulla Sadra, (1572 – 1640) was an Islamic Philosopher, theologian and ‘alim of Iranian origin who is 
the founder of what is known as Transcendent Theosophy (al-hikmah al-muta’liyah), heavily 
influenced by Ibn ‘Arabi. 	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trouve chez les coufi une définition de l’angoisse qui réassemble trait pour trait a celle 
de Heidegger’ 8 (Badawi cited by Mikhail : 1992 : 29). In Badawi’s seminal book, Al 
Insaniyya al Wujudiyya fi al-Fikr al-Arabi, (1947)9, he concludes:  
We maintain with confidence that the connection between 
contemporary existentialism and Kierkegaard does not exceed by 
much the similar connection between Islamic Sufism and the 
existential philosophical persuasion. Arabic Sufism can play the 
inspirational role that Kierkegaard has played for European 
existentialism.  
                                                      (Badawi cited in Malik : 2009 : 54) 
 
While the identification of these commons ground between western and Muslim 
understanding may have occurred recently, the elements themselves, (i.e. anguish, 
anxiety, angst, falleness, etc.) is no recent thing.  Arab and Turkish philosophers and 
novelists may consciously expound on Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian themes 
within a Muslim context, (Malik : 2009; Armaner : 2009;  Jahanbegloo : 2009), but 
the Sufi themes distinguished by Badawi, can be said to stem back to fundamental 
aspects of Islam and to early semitic culture itself wherein the individual had an 
‘…..existential awareness of the tensions and paradoxes that are constitutive of his 
being as one who knows in himself freedom, finitude, guilt, and the possibility of 
death’ (McQuarrie: 1972 : 36). Such nuances have existed within all the Abrahamic 
faiths, indeed perhaps within all human experience and religious expression.  
 
Therefore, in acknowledging Badawi’s work, Mikhail comments, ‘That existentialism 
finds a place in modern Arab thought and modern Arab fiction is therefore 
appropriate’, (2009 : 30).  Malik (2009) identifies numerous examples of existential 
persuasion in the literature of two well known Egyptian novelists, Najib Mahfouz 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Translation - ‘With the Sufis I find a point by point definition of anxiety that correlates with that of 
Heidegger’ 
   
9 ‘Humanism and Existentialism in Arabic Thought’ (1947), only available in Arabic.  
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(1911-2006) and Yusuf Idris, (1927-1991).  Mahfouz engaged with Sufism for a 
period of his life, (El Shabrawy : 1992) and frequently uses overt Sufi references 
within his work, as seen in The Thief and the Dogs, (Mahfouz : 2008). Yusuf Idris 
also writes around clear existentialist themes also making frequent reference to 
Sufism within the plots of his stories, (Mikhail :2009), to be seen particularly well in 
his Lughat al ‘Ay’ay. (The Language of Pain :1990). The main character of Al Hadidi 
has several epiphanies leading to an eventual realization that he has spent most of his 
life conforming to the norms of society and despite his material success is deeply 
unfulfilled.  
 
Heyking (2006) in describing the work of the Turkish novelist, Orhan Pamuk suggests 
that he  ‘……[experiments] with mysticism, not as an escape from the ideological 
furnace, but as a means of recapturing a more authentic experience of reality 
characterized by existential openness’ (Heyking : 2006 : 73). In Pamuk’s Snow 
(2004), the character of Ka, strives to retain his authentic self, amidst an increasing 
globalized world and a plethora of conflicting ideologies. Pamuk’s novel seems 
ultimately to suggest that the Muslim community would benefit more in focusing on 
the every day and plain common sense rather than devote time and energy to grand 
ideologies and that more self-knowledge is gained through interacting with the 
concrete experiences of the everyday than through the theorietical.  
 
Summary 
In this Chapter a rationale has been presented based on personal observation of the 
apparent effects of modernism within the Muslim discourse and the desire to address 
the question of individual authenticity in relation to this. In justification of and 
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proposing to use a comparative approach between classical Islam and existentialism 
in approaching these questions, coinciding and differing elements between both of 
these have been explored. 
  
Having established a rationale and a general context, the next chapter moves on to 
discuss hypotheses and methodology.  In keeping with the general theme, some space 
is allocated to establishing an overall authentic basis to the methodologies employed 
in seeking out inauthenticties within the Muslim context, becoming embodying 
something of ‘a play with a play’.  
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Chapter Two 
‘…..qualitative researchers inhabit the ‘lived border between reality 
and representation’ (Gubrium and Holstein : 1997: 102).  
 
Hypotheses and Research Methods 
Hypotheses 
The ontological assumptions and assertions upon which this work is based are 
presented here to reveal something of the subjectivity, interests, biases and 
inclinations of the researcher and thereby provide the reader with some background 
and framework to approach this thesis. It will also allow both the reader and the 
researcher to address and critique these assumptions. According to Mayring (2004) 
this should entail the following; a) that the general direction of the research and the 
possible inferences that might be drawn from any text analysis are determined but 
without compromising objectivity; b) that the researcher clarifies their own position 
and approaches undertaken in regard to that which is being researched; c) that the 
historical and social background, i.e. the subjective contexts of the texts to be 
analysed are also presented; d) that the researcher highlights aspects of the material 
and text interpretations and the refers these back to the research question.  In doing so, 
adaptations and revisions taken as a result of the continuing process of analysis must 
be also be recorded and e) that a criteria of reliability and validity are maintained by 
linking to and providing justification through other subject areas and knowledge 
rendering the research easy to validate and checked for reliability.   
 
In this vein, therefore the over arching presuppositions within this work are based 
upon the following hypotheses: 
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a) Mundanization of the Sacred 
That there is a human propensity to codify and mundanize the numinous and 
seemingly unexplainable, or in another sense, shift from mythos to logos. Religious or 
‘metahistorical’ narratives usually, though not always, start out with some mystical 
experience of divine origin or some other inspirational event; which upon being 
experienced by an individual is then compelled into action. Such a person may 
subsequently be depicted as either founder, leader, prophet or saint who in turn 
inspires others through their teaching. Rightly or wrongly, perhaps in the desire to 
sustain and maintain the teaching with the passing of time, these inspired teachings 
are prescriptively codified and conceptualized leading to essentialist doctrines which 
at times seem counteractive to the original inspiration.  
A loose set of dichotomies illustrating this can be seen in the oppositional polarities of 
form vs. essence, static vs. dynamic, private vs. public, creativity vs. formalism, 
mystical vs. dogmatic, puritan vs. indulgent and passive vs. active. Such tensions 
might also be discerned historically in the broadly conflicting approaches of Lao Tse 
vs. Confucius, Jesus vs. Pharisees / Saducees, and Moses vs. Pharoah, (Shen : 1994). 
Islam is no exception to this general rule and perhaps affords a contemporary context 
of a historic shifting of paradigms.  
The religious sphere seems to have been as greatly effected by this over-
rationalization and systematization as the ‘profane’ world and the Muslim world 
presents no exception to this. The basic mode of thought within the religious arena 
would seemingly have an inherent rejection of the primacy of human rationalization 
as opposed to the concept of Divine will and yet this does not appear to have withheld 
against this influence. 
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Though not exclusively so, self-knowledge and personal authenticity were some of 
the primary concerns of the religious project. Within the Muslim world, there has 
been a paradigm shift away from this towards seeing Islam as a social and political 
ideology. 
b) The predominance of Rationalism 
May suggests that there is ‘…the tendency on our culture to be preoccupied with 
“rational” mechanical phenomena and to suppress “irrational” experience and that this 
has held increasing sway since the Renaissance (1996b : 21). In the seventeenth 
century, it is possible to detect what has been termed ‘mathematical rationalism’ 
wherein understanding of human nature could be appropriated through the same type 
of rational certitude present in mathematical concepts. This involved a separation of 
mind and body, stemming in large dimension to the Cartesian dualism, itself a product 
of seventeenth century thinking (Descartes 1596 – 1650) which we deal with further 
on. This had engendered the belief in the rational control of the emotions.  Pascal 
(1623 – 1662)10 felt it important to distinguish rationalism from reason for the latter is 
a distinctive characteristic of human nature, posing a dignified human contrast in the 
face of uncaring and thoughtless nature.  Nonetheless, he felt that reason is limited in 
that it is ultimately subjective and can be tied to things like vanity and self-interest 
and used to rationalize things like injustice, rendering rationality ultimately irrational. 
Ritzer’s use of the Holocaust is relevant here, as exemplifying modern social 
engineering and a supremely methodical system for dispatching vast numbers of 
people - rationality gone mad.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Even though one of the prominent seventeenth century intellectuals Pascal was exceptional in 
considering there to be enormous limitations to rationalism. Some consider him to be the father of 
existentialism.   
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In the nineteenth century, there was a shift which Tillich (1944) termed ‘technical 
reason’.  
During the last hundred years the implications of this system have 
become increasingly clear; a logical or naturalistic mechanism which 
seemed to destroy individual freedom, personal decision and organic 
community; and analytic rationalism which saps vital forces of life and 
transforms everything, including man himself, into an object of 
calculation and control. 
                 (Tillich : 1944 : 67) 
 
One of the main characteristics of this was a compartmentalization within theories, 
science and culture itself. Mind and body were also further delineated and what was 
previously a rational control of the emotions evolved into the repressing of the 
emotions. The rawer aspects of human nature like sex or hostility were foresworn and 
outwardly subdued on a widespread basis.  On both an individual and social level, the 
result has been psychological alienation and inauthentic beingness (May : 1977 : 20-
55).   
 
The existentialist view is that rationalism has evolved to such an extent that it 
predominates the human project as a whole and has evolved into systematics and 
codified perceptions of the world resulting in tidy universal theories constructed to 
explain the world. The primacy of pursuing universal and ultimate truths through the 
means of pure objectivity is understood to be at the expense of, and resulting in the 
denigration of lived experience and praxis. This also implies that everything has a 
reason and a reason for everything is demanded – the ‘truth’ is out there somewhere 
and just needs to be discovered. The role of thinking is directed solely towards 
proving or disproving the reason or veracity for every phenomenon encountered and 
in order to do so a sustained mindset of sceptical doubt is constantly maintained. 
Rather than being a thinking tool at the service of human endeavour, appropriately 
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applied in certain but not all aspects of lived experience, rationality has become the 
ontological paradigm of the modern world.  
 
 
c) A false dichotomy of Authenticity versus tradition 
That seeking personal authenticity does not need to automatically necessitate negation 
of the traditional or classical modes of tradition (in particular the religious). While 
there may be a popular misconception of personal authenticity as necessitating a 
rejecting of tradition, this is strongly argued against. Much rests on what is meant by 
‘tradition’, ‘classical’ or the ‘sacred’.  For the purposes of this work, it is argued that 
classical Islam can be lived authentically or inauthentically, as one chooses. 
 
The Path of this Research  
Now having presented the basic hypotheses underlying this study, the research path, 
in very broad terms, lies in the following sequence: 
a) Enquiring into what ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ means through a general 
philosophical and theological approach.  
b) Broadening out the question of inauthenticity by exploring its connectivity 
between rationalism and ‘global management culture’. Ritzer’s (1996) theory of 
McDonaldization and Cantwell Smith’s (1978) theory of the reification of 
religion are examined and critiqued and whether elements of these are detectable 
within Islam are also looked into.   
c) An examination is taken into aspects of Islam that naturally run counter to 
reifying tendencies. A distinction is made between mysticism and the origins of 
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religion, and its position vis a vis rationalism occurring within the religious 
sphere.   
d) The role of rationality within Muslim intellectual history and any consequences 
or effects this may have had is examined briefly, culminating in a discussion 
concerning the naqli (transmitted tradition) and aqli (intellectual) approaches. 
The themes raised here are pursued further and are used to identify a very loosely 
defined fault line argued as the one side, a Western / Maghrebian / Andalucian / 
naqli position and on the other, an Eastern / Turkish / speculative theological 
stance. The intellectual and methodological characteristics of the maliki, hanafi 
and hanbalī madhabs are also placed within these groupings. Ending with the 
different characteristics of the Qaidiryya and Naqshabandi Sufi orders also 
placed within this dichotomy.  
e) Having established some basic precepts, a more detailed and philosophical 
comparison between existentialist thought and Sufism is conducted in regard to 
rationalism, mysticism vs. esotericism, knowledge of the self and ‘the moment’ 
thereby affording a deeper understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity.  
 
Research Methodology  
Due to the nature of the subject and circumstances, this work consists mainly of a 
qualitative hermeneutic approach and therefore is generally humanistic, deductive, 
interpretivist and anti-positivist with aspects of social and historical research, some 
analysis of texts, critique and philosophical and theological enquiry. The review of 
appropriate literature or theories are brought to bear on the questions raised through 
an analysis of philosophical and theological textual content and the evaluating, 
critiquing and interpreting of these will be the foremost method used in this work. It is 
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primarily based on drawing from initial personal and phenomenal experience and 
thinking through particular aspects of these, resulting in the setting up of an enquiry to 
explore the issues raised in the preceding section. 
 
In terms of this research, ‘methodology’ implies not so much a systematic framework 
but rather a way of approaching the subject matter and what is presented was not 
methodologically led. This was a conscious choice and any eventual opting of 
methodology evolved through an appropriately chosen method. For example, in 
examining rationalism within a Muslim context it was thought that tracing the 
historical presence of rationalism through Muslim intellectual history would be a 
fruitful course of action. Identifying particular theoretical critiques was carried out 
retrospectively and even rather reluctantly and some sympathy was felt for Hughes 
and Starrock’s observation that some contemporary researchers, ‘do not worry about 
epistemology and ontology but about the particular problems they confront from their 
theories and investigations’ (1997 : 94). It is considered that even the links between 
philosophy and research methods are contentious;  
Since the nature of philosophy, and its relationship to other forms of 
knowledge, is itself a major matter of philosophical dispute, there is, 
of course, no real basis for us to advocate any one view on these 
matters as the unequivocally correct conception of the relationship 
between philosophy and …..research.               
                                                                              (Hughes & Starrock : 1997 : 13)  
 
Supposedly, such difficulties are compounded when different methodologies are 
employed as is the case with this thesis.  Providing a distinct basis for several 
intertwining theoretical frameworks was difficult but what is presented here should be 
seen as embodying what Mason calls a ‘parallel logic’ methodology wherein each 
section of the research is regarded as a ‘mini-study’ (2006 : 5) in its own right and 
within its own terms but with a consistent aim, which later offers ‘a secondary 
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analysis that cross cuts all of them at a later stage’        (2006 : 5) offering the chance 
to traverse methodological boundaries.  
 
Breakdown of Methodology by Chapter 
Chapter Three begins with a philosophical and theological exploration of the concept 
of authenticity and inauthenticity. Chapter Four moves on from this to expand upon 
the concept of inauthenticity through employing a critical theory approach in 
addressing the phenomena of McDonaldization, global management culture and 
rationalism as prevailing social and cultural trends in a manner more ‘critical than 
affirmative’ (Horkheimer citied in Hanssen : 2004 : 282). In Chapter Five, the  
 concept of reification is used to augment the social theories examined previously, 
particularly the idea of the reification of religion, carried out on the back of Smith’s 
seminal work, The Meaning and End of Religion (1978). Recourse is taken to an 
objective and quantative method in bringing in considering data from research and 
word count surveys undertaken by Cantwell Smith in examining historically 
determined reifying tendencies within Muslim hermeneutics. Mason (2006) says that 
research that is primarily qualitative and ‘which focuses on social processes in rich 
and proximate detail, the inclusion of some background quantitative material, perhaps 
in the form of local or national demographic data, can help in making the research 
part of a bigger set of observations. Now having built a case for McDonaldization and 
reification within the religious sphere, Chapter 6 surveys current trends and positions 
within the Muslim communities and the theologies they employ and critiques them. 
Chapter Seven explores the countering of reification within Islam, initially by 
carrying out a brief historical analysis of European counterculture and its relationship 
to Islam and secondly by a philosophical and theological analysis of mysticism and its 
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role in relation to religion in exploring whether any claim could be made to its being 
the antithesis of reification. Having established that the underlying feature of some of 
the different manifestations of inauthenticity that had been explored in previous 
chapters, lay in rationalism, a further historical analysis is also used in Chapter Eight 
to undertake a brief survey of rationalism within the development of Muslim 
intellectual history. From here, building upon some identified trends within Muslim 
thought, two particular typologies are identified and loosely linked with certain 
geographical areas in Chapter Nine. The implications of these typologies and the 
approach to the practice of Islam are discussed from cultural, theological and 
philosophical perspectives. Also from what has preceded in the previous chapter, a 
comparative and critical theory approach is used for the study of the various juridical 
schools of thought and the differing methodologies deployed lending a particular 
characteristic to each one of these.  These are represented insofar as they constitute a 
possible ‘abode’ or framework for personal authenticity within traditional modes. 
Chapter Ten moves onto a deeper existential and ontological analysis on the back of 
Heidegger and Ibn al ‘Arabi in critiquing rationalism and the foundations upon which 
it is based, i.e. modernist metaphysics. Having established the critique of rationalism 
and metaphysics, in Chapter 11 the question of authenticity and inauthenticity are 
raised again yet a deeper level in regard, again, to the respective thought of  Ibn 
‘Arabi and Heidegger enquiring into the aspect of inauthenticity as a ‘falleness’ or 
being distracted from Reality, (i.e. Allah). The nature of certain aspects of 
authenticity as being clearings and openings for ultimate Reality to come into the 
everyday is also discussed from existential and sufic perspectives. In the same vein, 
an enquiry into immediacy and ‘being in the moment’ as opposed to the planned and 
reasoned response to life is also undertaken in Chapter 12, this time more in regard to 
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Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Ibn al ‘Arabi.  The general question of time is delved 
into from a philosophical  and theological perspective and the idea that the way we 
perceive time enframes our existence is presented and that such an enframing can 
result in the inauthentic.  The final Chapter concludes the research and examines the 
changes in the researcher’s thinking brought about by the work and suggests areas of 
research that could be undertaken that have arisen as a result of this work.   
 
Critical Theory 
 One of the primary approaches is critical theory, evolving from Kant’s critique of  
‘reason’ in that it;  
………….specifies the object of critique, that is, what critical theory 
operates upon. Kant’s critical philosophy directs itself upon 
‘reason’. One of Kant’s leading themes is that reason has an inherent 
tendency to seek application regardless of cognitive context, and it is 
the job of critique to circumscribe reason’s epistemological 
application to what Kant considers to be the bounds of knowledge.  
                                                                                            (Rush : 2004 : 10) 
 
 The idea that critical theory takes into account an awareness of the self within the 
 act of critique, aligns itself well with the ambience of this research in its self-
reflexivity and awareness of the personal limitations. Rush says, ‘Critical Theory is 
also concerned to explicate conditions upon rationality and regards this task as 
implicating its assessment of its own rational limitations’ (2004 : 10).  
 
In tracing the developmental history of critical theory, Rush (2004) 
determines that one of the initial founders of the ‘Frankfurt School’,11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A loosely grouped collection of philosophers, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse amongst others, 
who founded the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt who sought alternative 
social development as opposed to both Capitalism and Soviet style communism but yet who were 
Marxist and believed that Marxist had been misused and misunderstood. Later critical theorists move 
away from this position though Marx remains a central reference for critical theory. 
 30 
Horkheimer (1895 – 1973) identified two contrasting forms of critique 
dichotomies as 1) ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’ and 2) ‘rationalism’ and 
‘irrationalism’. Horkheimer, while critical of what he calls ‘irrationalism’ as 
an idealist overreaction to ‘rationalist idealism’ and which he identified with 
the hermeneutical phenomenology of Heidegger and Nietzsche. While 
acknowleding the quality of the critique of ‘rationalist idealism’, he perceived 
them as seemingly oblivious to their own idealism. In relation to the 
preconscious appropriation to life and existence, ‘irrationalism’ had 
‘…replicated the supernatural ground of existence’ of idealism (Rush : 2004 : 
23), which accords with Horkheimer’s Marxist perspective. Yet it is precisely 
these elements which has an affinity with this thesis, i.e. the penetrating 
‘irrationalist’ critique of rationalism and the hint of something indefinable. 
Critical theory is employed in viewing the prevalence of  a global scale 
management culture, in particular Ritzer’s (1996) social theory of 
‘McDonaldization’ and its application to contemporary religion and Islam in 
particular. Critical theory is also used in relation to the question of reification. 
 
Content Analysis 
Another methodology used is Content Analysis which Krippendorff (2004) 
understands as comprising a technique for analysing texts allowing for ‘replicable and 
valid inferences’ (2004 : 19). In order to do so effectively, it is essential that the 
material fits into some framework. Krippendorff summarises three different 
conceptual frameworks within this methodology : a) definitions that take content to be 
inherent in a text.  Krippendorff cites Berelson who states that Content Analysis is a 
‘research technique for the objective, systematic and quantative description of the 
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manifest content of the communication’ (2004 : 19).  Krippendorff questions the 
‘quantative’ in that while that it has its place – yet that reading is more of a qualitative 
process as interpretation cannot be avoided. Krippendorff’s main criticism is reserved 
for the phrase, ‘description of the manifest content of the communication’ (2004 : 20). 
Krippendorff sees this as implying that content is contained or resides within the 
message. The reader’s participation is inactive and passive and he argues that content 
also lays with the reader. 
 
The second approach is b) content has the priority of the source of a text, i.e. the 
issues and general ideas of the text. Yet also important in this approach is the 
contextual analysis of the text so that one may make, ‘….specific inferences from text 
to other states or properties of its source.’ (Krippendorf : 1969 : 103) This may refer 
to the historical or personal circumstances under which the text was created and 
recorded.  However, this is not always available as we may not have access to any 
details of people involved.  The emphasis here is on the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘to whom’ 
which again fails to allow a role for the contemporary researcher and the relevance 
their interpretation has on the question at hand..  
 
Another approach is c) wherein content is taken to emerge during the process of a 
researcher analysing a text in relation to a particular context. This approach is the one 
which Krippendorff sees as the most comprehensive and acceptable for the following 
reasons; Texts have no objective qualities – they are meant to be read – they are 
subjective by nature and they invite reader interpretation.  Books are not generally 
written to be unto themselves, just as any work of art or presentation of any sort are 
for audience participation. The general the role of literature, art, philosophy and 
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theology is to shared and reacted to and therefore texts do not have singular meanings, 
they are by necessity interpreted in a variety of ways, with no singular meaning. A 
question arises as to the rights of the author/instigator of a text and arbitrary 
interpretations of their work.  It is understood that completely subjective 
interpretations that consciously or unconsciously refuse to take into account 
something of what may have been inferred by the writer is flawed. Particularly if the 
author has made an effort in attributing and clarifying a particular meaning, whereas 
with work such as that of Samuel Beckett, (1906 – 1989 ) this may not be the case.  
Yet even a clearly attributed meaning can be understood differently when the 
meaning is approached through different disciplines. Essentially, the argument lies 
between the idea that the researcher goes off on a complete tangent to it being 
understood that no text will ever be agreed to upon every detail.  If the researcher is 
not allowed to interpret a text in a way that is indicated to them, then content analysis 
will be pointless and critical scholarship would be jeopardised if not allowed to go 
outside of the accepted norms of the accepted interpretation. Nevertheless, some 
acknowledgement of popular or accepted opinion has to be referred to in some way. 
Textual meanings can address things outside of the immediate content of the text 
itself and communication of meaning can and is frequently developed further. How do 
others use the text?  What ideas do the texts stimulate in others and what does that 
further indicate are all questions that must be allowed to rise and should be the 
concern of content analysis and indicative of a qualitative approach to research.  
 
Use of Translated Works  
The analysis and interpretation of a variety of texts will be utilized in this research, 
many of them will be translations from several different languages and this throws up 
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some complex issues. In the first instance, how faithful to the original works are the 
translations? Secondarily, will any interpretation of these translated texts further 
compound the distance from the original text? If so, does this render the findings of 
the research as unviable? Can research be compromised by the presence of other 
languages and required translations? The following section will deal some aspects of 
translation theory eventually leading to a justification as well as shedding further light 
on some aspects of methodology used in this research. 
  
Even in the original language, the reading of either Heidegger or Ibn ‘Arabi, to 
mention but two of those whose work is presented here, could be challenging for the 
vast majority of native speakers, as readers may not have immediate access to the text 
by dint of the complex subject matter. Not surprisingly, translation into other 
languages does not render the inherent complexities any easier than the original. 
However, without translation the work of these seminal thinkers would have remained 
within a relatively small group of people for whom these works were comprehensible 
and the significant influence of some of the written work referred to in this research 
would have been minimal had they remained in their original languages. Some may 
argue that translations have gone beyond being considered translations and are, in a 
sense, works in their own right. Benjamin (1992) argues that ‘Translatability is an 
essential quality of certain works’ and that ‘…..by virtue of its translatability the 
original is closely connected with the translation; in fact, this connection is all the 
closer since it is no longer of importance to the original’ (1992 : 72). It is interesting 
to note the following comment concerning the Macquarrie & Robinson translation of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (2008), ‘It has even been remarked by German students 
that Heidegger becomes more comprehensible when read in this translation’ 
 34 
(Ferguson: 2007). While what makes something translatable may be another matter, 
yet a translation of a text itself could itself be a foregrounding of ideas and a thing 
worthy of consideration itself, independent yet related to the original text. If it is the 
means by which others understand and given access to a text and its general focus 
then this could be said to be something that stands on its own merits. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that within a translated work the obvious uncertainty is that the content 
as formulated by the original writer may somehow deviate from or be corrupted in 
some way through translation, perhaps supplementing the meaning of ‘lost in 
translation’. In Translation Theory (or the Philosophy of Translation) this is the 
‘Problem of Equivalence’ and is the central debate at the core of the differences 
between Language Relativism and Language Universals, two major perspectives from 
which translation is considered.  
 
Linguistic or Language Relativism translation theory argues that different languages 
are in effect different ways of looking at the world and therefore translation from one 
culture to another cannot be literal or word for word translations but rather that the 
‘sense’ of the text is translated, though of course, as faithful to the original text as 
possible.  The weakness of the Relativist approach to translation would lie in 
questioning whether the nuance and concepts considered indirectly translatable would 
deviate from that of the original author’s intentions and thus, to a greater or lesser 
degree, deviate from the original work. Relativism would argue that British cultural 
perspectives are quite distinct from that of Germans and Arabs and that a word for 
word translation would not allow for a true and full understanding. For example, ‘a 
warm welcome’ in English does not translate well into Arabic, as ‘cool’ would be 
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considered the more affable.  The American expression, ‘tickled to death’ indicating 
delight also does not translate well into other languages.   
 
Noam Chomsky would be considered a primary proponent of Language Universals or 
Universal Rationalism, as he argues for language constituting a common and integral 
part of human nature. As he points out there is an amazingly similar syntax within 
over 4,000 different spoken languages. What this suggests is that translating a text 
from one language to another can be accurate enough so that the reader will imbibe a 
major aspect of the intentions of the original author.  The translator takes the concepts 
expressed in the ‘host’ language to the ‘guest’ language. As the reader of the 
translation shares common and innate human characteristics with the reader of the 
host text, the original writer’s intentions are understood. From this viewpoint the 
translation is more of a linguistic and rational exercise; any different cultural contexts 
encountered in the translation will be overcome by the shared human potential for 
rationalization – where differences occur rational thought processes can analyze and 
weigh up the situation arriving at a conclusion or understanding of what is being said.  
 
Bruns (1992) elucidates upon these differences in observing that while it might be 
possible for everyone to understand something like geometry it will not necessarily be 
possible to understand the geometrist’s mind. People of different cultures may 
understand a geometrical formula of Euclid’s yet we do not understand Euclid 
himself.  Other concepts however are less easier to define and Bruns suggests that 
while everyone understands a shovel to be a shovel, the concept of ‘justice’ may be 
more difficult to agree on. However, we would not drastically fall short of some 
general conceptual consensus of what constitutes justice and that ‘we know what it 
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would be for the concept of justice to be fully intelligible’ (Bruns : 1992 : 3). 
However, while Universal Rationalism perceives translation as an act of rationality 
and objectivity, Bruns believes that ;  ‘…the question of how far one can do this is 
controversial. What are the limits of reduction? Can one understand the world by 
repressing one’s involvement with it?’ (Bruns : 1992 : 4). Nietzsche is also cited in 
saying ‘that there is no way to adjudicate among rival versions of anything, because 
everything is internal to interpretation’ (Bruns : 1992 : 4). However, while we may 
take this as an indication of some truth and not dismiss it outright, we must resist the 
idea of a total impasse of endless conflicts of interpretations. 
 
Another aspect of equivalence is afforded by an understanding between temporal 
cultures, which is also an act of translation (Bruns : 1992) and relevant to this thesis. 
While there are profoundly differing conceptions of love between the medieval and 
the modern era there is a central concept of love by which it is possible for the 
modern reader to understand the medieval troubadour tradition through the behaviour 
of the lovelorn or the infatuated as being related to this central concept of love. 
Equally, if it were feasible, the medieval person would be able to grasp something of 
the modern discourse of love. Yet it is the outcome of this approach, which should be 
questioned. For the sake of argument; what would occur were a translator 
theoretically able to completely transcend their world, to such an extent that all 
subjectivity was reduced to the barest minimum and the objectivity increased to the 
point of presenting the closest possible rendition of Ibn ‘Arabi’s thought from Arabic 
to English?  Would there not be a danger of simply presenting a historical document, 
a rendition of the world that Ibn ‘Arabi inhabited and would the degree of relevance 
for the here and now been reduced significantly? Would one be engaged in an act of 
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preserving rather than translation? Perhaps more significantly, to what degree is the 
modern reader emotionally touched by the tales of unrequited love, which was surely 
the objective of the troubadour as he sang?  Do non-German and non-Arabic speakers 
engage and respond to the translated works of the likes of Ibn ‘Arabi and Martin 
Heidegger? Certainly. Are German and Arabic speakers agreed as to the conclusions 
arrived at by either one of these?  Certainly not.   
 
A further perspective from anthropology can also shed light upon the matter for it too 
is a question of translation. One observes the practices of a particular culture and then 
communicates these back to a different cultural grouping. This is depicted in a 
manner enabling the eventual ‘foreign’ audience to contextualize and process these 
through their own cultural conceptual frameworks. William Foley (1997) argues that 
if there was no possibility of comprehension between cultures then anthropology 
would be devoid of purpose and the same could be said of translation. In his view, the 
act of translation denotes the existence of similarities between different worldviews. 
The role of the translator is to locate these similarities and exploit them enabling 
comprehension in the target audience. Yet we must take into account the debate 
within anthropology as to whether its objective lies in knowing more about ourselves 
and our respective societies or whether it is simply an act of description of the other 
and any value thereof, which seems vaguely akin to the Rationalist and Relativist 
arguments of translation and also something raised initially in this research; i.e. the 
commitment to knowledge based in the experiential and not merely the academic. 
 
Ultimately, it is felt that a full justification for the use of translated texts in this 
research cannot be housed within either the Rationalist or Relativist arguments. When 
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considering the complexity of thought from various sources featured in this research it 
seems wrong to assume that the ‘problem of equivalence’ will be met adequately in 
stressing the similarities in human comprehension on the one hand and on the other 
concentrating on the differences. Neither theory seems to deal adequately with the 
‘gap’ to be translated between complexity of thought and wider accessibility for the 
purposes of application, a matter particularly relevant in conjunction with the various 
texts that will be referred to in this work. Relativist and Rationalist theory may argue 
over the means of understanding the concept of medieval court love yet the idea of 
individual perception seems to be left out of the equation. This suggests that perhaps 
there is another approach beyond either one of the major approaches to translation, 
indicating something more of a question of perception and interpretation.  
 
The question of perception is postulated by Putnam in his accepting that human 
beings have the capacity to share concepts because of common human characteristics 
yet they may not share the perceptions of concepts.  Lenclud presents an example of 
this, wherein the phrase ‘slobbers his food all over his shirt’ is technically a 
description devoid of value judgment but nevertheless has a ‘strong negative emotive 
force’ (1996 : 7) and the perception overrides both the concept and the rules of 
grammar.  When perceptions are spoken of then it is impossible to ignore the 
idiosyncratic subjective perception of the specific individual something that until now 
has not been referred to directly but has been lurking around the perimeters of the 
arguments presented until now, though touched upon in an earlier reference to 
Nietzsche.  
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Hermeneutical Approaches 
Gadamer (2007) concurs with the idea that a purely objective translation or 
interpretation is impossible as the reader is too bound by their own ‘facticity’ and 
cultural and personal conditioning to ever be able to understand the original as is. If 
we consider the act of interpretation in a wider sense we see that objectivity is quite 
unattainable, as Laing says, ‘I see you, and you see me. I experience you, and you 
experience me. I see your behaviour. You see my behaviour. But I do not and never 
have and never will see your experience of me’ (1967 : 17 - 18). However, in 
Gadamer’s view, the difficulties of interpretation are not just situated in the sphere of 
time, place or individual but in language itself. There is a constant shifting flux in our 
moods and perceptions reflected in the language we use and understand with. The 
boundaries of language are constantly altering in such a manner that even the writing 
of a note or memo may not be understood by the very same author in the same way as 
it was originally written.  In this way language acts in a counter balancing manner in 
pulling in two ways, a) it holds back our interpretive ability and b) provides a limited 
access to texts and in effect brings about what Gadamer calls a ‘fusion of horizons’ 
(2007 : 180), a dialogical and creative intercourse between the reader and the text (not 
the author), which is the basis of the interpretive process.  These ‘horizons’ can be 
cultural , time bound and historical, ethnic, traditional as well as lingual. As with 
interpretation, these horizons can be arenas of thought yet also limiting it. In the 
‘fusion of horizons’, ‘….the past and the present meet, in which what is alien is 
appropriated and otherness is overcome, though only as a process and a task that 
never comes to an end (Mehta : 1971). However, Gadamer (2007) believes that this 
‘fusing’ needs to be raised to the level of philosophy and that it is actually the heart of 
the philosophical endeavour. Gadamer and Ricouer are usually identified with this 
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moderate hermeneutical stance (Gallagher : 1992) and critics such as Betti (1962) and 
Hirsch (1977) of both this centrist and the more radical hermeneutics see an inherent 
danger of subjectivism and relativism in believing that  ‘The interpreter’s primary 
task is to reproduce in himself the author’s “logic”, his attitudes, his cultural givens, 
in short, his world’ (Hirsch : 1967 : 242-243; my italics).  However, Hirsch later 
makes the point that even a supposedly valid interpretation does not automatically 
infer that this is the ‘correct version’ but that it is likely to be the closest one 
achievable on the evidence available. Hirsch differentiates between the meaning of a 
text, which in his view doesn’t change and the significance of a text, which can and 
may change.  
 
However, what neither the Rationalist, (a position that Betti and Hirsch would 
probably be indirectly identified with); or Relativist theories incorporate is the wider 
apprehension of translation and interpretation.  From the point of view of radical 
hermeneutics, even the act of the original creation of a text is a translation, for as 
Johnson says it is, ‘precisely the way in which the original text is always already an 
impossible translation that renders translation impossible’ (Johnson : 1985 : 146). 
Derrida (1985a), eminently identified with radical hermeneutics, articulated the idea 
that philosophy is nothing more or less than translatability. Furthermore, translation in 
Derrida’s terms has wider implications as :  
….an operation of thought through which we must translate 
ourselves into the thought of the other language, the forgotten 
thinking of the other language. We must translate ourselves into it 
and not make it come into our language. It is necessary to go toward 
the unthought thinking of the other language. 
                                                                                  (Derrida : 1985a : 115) 
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The ‘unthought thinking’ is the non rational, pre-conceptual and unspoken context, a 
de-distinguishing of the dualism of the presence or absence of a thing, (Nancy : 
2000).  
It does not refer to explicit, thematic or conceptual knowledge but that which is 
deeply embedded; a preconscious interpretation unformulated into any conceptual 
form and this is the aspect that one should delve into to understand another culture. 
One should be open to ‘feeling’ the quintessence of another culture without 
theorization. Interpretation, like understanding, is something that we “always already” 
posses’ (Caputo : 1987 : 69-70). This is the unformulated and preconceptual thought 
which ‘cuts across the distinction between understanding and interpretation’ (Caputo : 
1987 : 70) and it is here that one must extract something of the core meaning of the 
text through enquiry. Yet this is not a rational based questioning; as in; ‘Does this 
exist and what is the proof?’ In this manner, a translation of the original text is not 
recollected but rather undergoes repetition in the Kierkegaardian sense (1983); a 
repetition of the initial act of creating the original text yet now transformed and 
supplemented. Derrida should not be misunderstood as saying that translation should 
discard the original text and make free play upon it; whereas in reality he speaks of a 
creative tension between the ideal of flawless translation and the impossibility of this 
ever happening, (Derrida : 1985b) and yet we must persevere with translation for 
these tensions are what constitutes language itself. It demands reflecting and dwelling 
on matters of meanings and how this is communicated and which can bring forth 
something akin to the original text perhaps even going beyond. ‘Fidelity’ to the 
original text here means a journey of enquiry to the heart of the matter, yet one is also 
bound to the conventions of language and there is no choice but to accept this, it is an 
unavoidable reality. The focus is not upon the preservation of the text but the creation 
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of meaning, not ex nilhio but based in and around the original text. The appropriation 
of that translation is necessary but equally important is to transcend it, thus 
constituting a transcending towards the original text’s ultimate possibilities 
(Gallagher : 1992). It can be an ambiguous exchange with the original text’s 
meanings functioning as both a constraining and liberating force.  
 
Derrida claims that the idea that one could translate from one language into another 
faithfully is a fruitless pursuit for as he says, ‘Une 'bonne' traduction doit toujours 
abuser.’ (Derrida : 1997 : 273 ).  Significantly, this does not translate well into 
English, literally meaning ‘A “good” translation should always abuse’. What is really 
suggested is that the act of translating cannot help but contort the original meaning 
but interpretation can be both innovative and imaginative (Robinson : 1997). The 
term ‘abuse’ must be understood not to refer to its English usage as negative or 
violent but seen as opposed to what Lewis (1985) calls the us-system which refers to 
the common usual, the useful and normal linguistic usage. Derrida’s deconstruction 
theory stipulates that translated concepts should be ‘ab –used’ The prefix ‘ab’ means 
‘away from’ so that the interpretation is presumably away from the original and the 
us-system. In extrapolating further upon the interplay of the tensions referred to 
above, Lewis speaks of an ‘abusive fidelity’ (1985 : 56) in regard to the original text. 
The possibility of appropriating the core meaning that emerges indicates that the 
meaning may not be far from the original but yet going beyond.  
 
Translingual Approach 
There also lies the possibility that theories as whole entities are more effectively 
translatable than texts. Lydia Liu (1995) draws from Edward Said (1983): ‘Said 
introduces a concept of literary practice that emphasizes creative borrowing, 
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appropriation, and the movement of ideas and theories from place to place in an 
international environment’ (Liu : 1995 : 20). Liu uses the term ‘Translingual’ 
whereby she defines the process by which languages interrelate.  New theories, 
discourses and meanings and words are derived from other languages, which may 
bear more proximity than translated blocks of text between the very same set of 
languages. These theories and the discourses that consequently arise are not 
‘transformed’ by finding place within another language context but are rather created 
within the new language itself through the various types of debate that take place.  
Additionally, these new concepts and meanings can be re-appropriated by the original 
language community.  
 
The overall perspective that is taken in this thesis concerning use of translations and 
secondary texts extends further back prior to the act of translation from one language 
to another; in fact, taking place when the thoughts for the original texts where first 
recorded. In this manner, the use of translations and secondary texts are seen each as a 
work in their own right, related to the original yet independent of it as a work in its 
own right, up to and including the interpretations and perceptions arrived at in this 
work. In addition Liu’s idea that conceptual theories as entities may actually be more 
easily translatable than blocks of texts is also taken as having merit. In general the 
principles of Radical Hermeneutic principles are taken on in this thesis to engage with 
and within the phenomena around the body of ideas engendered translated and 
secondary texts. The publication of these in English will be how they are understood 
in the Anglo Saxon world, not forgetting the element of individual perception and 
interpretation and the possibility that such translations will be at great variance with 
the original is highly improbable.  
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The Use of Texts  
This research is not text led. As a result of life experiences and reflection thereon, 
with vaguely self-directed reading around some of the issues involved, any use of 
texts is through an initial line of thought based on memories of accumulated readings. 
In this thesis this has served to amplify and provide justification for arguments or to 
refute previously held lines of thought or argument and bring on a change of thinking 
to open new pathways to follow.  However, such texts are to be seen as Foucault says 
:  
Mais un livre est fait pour servir à des usages non définis par celui 
qui l’a écrit. Plus il y aura d’usages nouveaux, possibles, imprévus, 
plus je serai content. Tous mes livres ... sont, si vous voulez, de 
petites boîtes à outils. Si les gens veulent bien les ouvrir, se servir de 
telle phrase, telle idée, telle analyse comme d’un tournevis ou d’un 
desserre-boulon pour court-circuiter. 12 
                                                                         (Foucault : 720 : 1994 )  
 
Consequently, there are many texts that have been referred to and it is difficult to 
establish ‘main texts’. Nevertheless, a few do protrude above others as having had a 
seminal effect on this work. These are : 
Abbas, C., (1993), Quest for the Red Sulphur – The Life of Ibn al-‘Arabi, (Translated 
from the French by P. Kingsley), Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society 
 
Afary, J. & K.B. Anderson, (2005), Foucault and the Iranian Revolution- Gender and 
the Seductions of Islamism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
 
Ad-Darqawi, Sh. A., (1981), The Darqawi Way, (Translated by A. Bewley), Norwich, 
Diwan Press 
 
Al-Habib, Sh. M., The Diwan of Shaykh Muhammad ibn al Habib, Norwich, Madinah 
Press 
 
As-Sufi, A.,(1975), The Way of Muhammad, Berkley and London, Diwan Press 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ‘…but a book is to be used for purposes not defined by the one who wrote it. The more new uses, 
unexpected uses, they can be used for, the happier I will be. All my books ... are, if you want, small   
toolboxes. People can open it and use such and such a phrase or idea or an analysis like a screwdriver 
or a wrench..’ 
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Burckhardt, T., (1992) Fez, City of Islam, (Translated from the German by W. 
Stoddart), Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society  
 
Burckhardt, T., Introduction to Sufi Doctrine, (Translated from the German by D.M. 
Matheson), Wellingborough, Northamptonshire, Thorsons Publishers Ltd. 
 
 
Cantwell Smith W., (1991) The Meaning and End of Religion, Minneapolis, First 
Fortress Press 
 
Caputo, J. D., (1978), The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, New York, 
Fordham University Press 
 
Coates, P. (2002), Ibn al-‘Arabi and Modern Thought- the History of Taking 
Metaphysics Seriously, Oxford, ANQA Publishing 
 
Cornell, V. J., (1996), The Way of Abu Madyan: Doctrinal and Poetic Works of Abu 
Madyan Shu’ayb ibn al Husayn al-Ansari, Cambridge, Islamic Text Society 
 
Ibn al-’Arabi, (1972), ‘Al Futuhatal Makkiya’, Edited and Translated from the Arabic 
by O. Yahya, Vols. 1 – 5, Cairo, Al Hay’a al Misriya al ‘Amma li’l Kitab  
 
Ibn al-‘Arabi, M-I. (1980), Ibn al’Arabi - The Bezels of Wisdom, Translated form the 
Arabic by R.W.J. Austin, Mawah, New Jersey, Paulist Press  
 
Foucault, M., (1972), The Archeology of Knowledge, translated from the French by A. 
M. Sheridan Smith), New York, Pantheon Books 
 
Heidegger, M., (1962), Being and Time, translated from the German by J. Macquarie 
and E. Robinson), Oxford, Blackwell 
 
Heidegger, M., (2002), Basic Writings, edited by D.F. Farrell, London, Routledge 
 
Izutsu, T., Sufism and Taoism, Berkley, Los Angeles, London, University of 
California Press 
 
Kierkegaard, S., ( 2004), Sickness Unto Death, London, Penguin Books 
  
Lings, M. (1971), A Sufi Saint of the Twentieth Century – Shaikh Ahmad Al’Alawi – 
His Spritual Heritage and Legacy  
 
Macquarrie, J., (1994), Heidegger and Christianity, London, SCM Press  
 
Michin, J-L., (1973), Le Soufi Marocain Ahmad Ibn Ajiba (1746-1809)-Glossaire de 
la Mystique Musulmane, Paris, Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin 
 
Nietzsche, F., (2004) Human, all too Human, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
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Press 
 
Nishtani, K., (1982), Religion and Nothingness,  Translated from the Japanese by  
J.Van Bragt, Berkley, California University Press 
 
Rahman, F., (1979), Islam, London and Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
 
Sachiko, M., (1992), The Tao of Islam – A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in 
Islamic Thought, Albany, State University of New York 
 
Winkel, E., (1997), Islam and the Living Law - The Ibn al-‘Arabi Approach’, Karachi, 
Oxford University Press 
 
Previous and Current Research around the Subject 
More recent and academic western endeavours identifying correlating themes 
between existentialism and Islam are to be found in Almond (2004) who incisively 
counterpoises Derrida’s thinking with that of Ibn ‘Arabi and Sufism generally to 
address questions of the constraints of rational thought, mystery, perplexity and 
confusion, all of which can be brought to bear and directed to the question of 
authentic selfhood. In a later published work, Almond (2007) brings together the 
perspectives of diverse thinkers and writers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Borge, 
Pamuk and Baudrillard to make postmodern representations upon the question of 
Islam. The topics cover a range of issues from a critique of modernity, the 
multifarious forms of Islam, postmodern, existential and philosophical theory in 
conjunction with the Muslim world, all of which are relevant to the matter at hand.  
 
Coates (2002) makes a short but seminal contribution by making a specifically 
Akbarian comparison with European existentialism.  He identifies parallel ideas in the 
contrast of facticity or stark ‘givenness’ of the world, wherein individuals find 
themselves, with the simultaneous and paradoxical encounter of the sheer complexity 
of primordial existence and inherent possibilities thereof.  Coates also remarks upon 
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the shared notion of the ‘immediacy of the moment’ corresponding with elements of 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard, which will be further examined in the concluding 
chapter.  The underlying link with European existentialism, Coates believes, lies in 
the primacy of existence over thought; existence first and foremost and not as a result 
of thought.   
 
Some focus on personal authenticity is to be found in Khwaja (1987) in a work 
entitled Authenticity and Islamic Liberalism. The definition of authenticity given is as 
follows :  
An authentic Muslim / Christian / Hindu is a person, who inwardly 
accepts, for its own sake, the system of beliefs, values, obligations 
and behavior patterns deemed to be the central core of the religion, 
and acts accordingly. If, however, the person inwardly dissents from 
some feature of the system but freely, that is, without any extraneous 
motive of fear or reward, opts to defer to the system (because of the 
overwhelming depth appeal of the system as a whole) and also 
moulds his actions accordingly, he too may be said to be an 
authentic believer. If, however, such a person remains in a state of 
inner doubt, tension and indecision or ignores the conflict between 
his inner responses and some feature of the system, or tries to 
rationalize the stipulated ‘higher wisdom’ of the system by 
arguments which he (in his heart of hearts) rejects, he would cease to 
be an authentic believer.  
                                                                              (Khawaja :1987: 33) 
 
This is a fairly comprehensive definition of personal authenticity at some level. 
However, Khawaja does not make direct links between inauthenticity and the effects 
of reification and rationalism though there are passing references; ‘If you think that 
religious truths are just like other propositions and are to be viewed in the logic of 
truth or falsehood, then I don’t agree with you’, (Khawaja : 1987 : 3). The concept of 
inauthenticity in Khawaja’s work is situated chiefly around questions of social 
pressure and conformity.  
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A highly significant work to be considered in light of this research is that of R. D. Lee 
(1997) who directly addresses the question of Muslim authenticity from a variety of 
perspectives. Lee succinctly and effectively identifies seven characteristics of 
authenticity in European thought such as; particularity, radicalism, autonomy, unicity, 
group action, equality, and institutionalization and applies these to the thought and 
writing of four well known Muslim figures, namely Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Qutb, 
‘Ali Shari’ati and Muhammad Arkoun. Lee identifies a basic similarity arising in their 
search for Muslim authenticity, reflected more widely within the Muslim world, as 
residing somewhere beyond both tradition and modernity.  
 
Some criticism could be leveled at this idea primarily because it seems an over 
simplification and secondarily because there is little exposition of what is meant by 
traditionalism or any discussion of the classical. Throughout the book the traditional 
is depicted as an outmoded form of thought unsuitable for the age seen in such 
comments as ‘Tradition suppresses human choice and saps human initiative’ and ‘The 
issue of authenticity cannot arise in traditional society’ (1997 : 16) both of which 
seem rather sweeping statements. While Lee does mention at one point that the search 
for authenticity leading to original and creative frames could include  ‘….even the 
“traditional” which is no longer traditional by virtue of having been examined and 
reconstructed’ (1997 : 16).  Certain presumptions are made here regarding the 
traditional and a pathway to authenticity does not require rejection of the worldly, nor 
the traditional, nor modernity, though it may do. 
 
One cannot help feeling that Lee’s perspective is one entirely stemming either from 
‘counter tradition’ or ‘modernism’ both of which are the antithesis of tradition. Lee’s 
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depiction of tradition is not surprising, as the positioning of the four people chosen for 
the analysis, though at variance with one another, can all be firmly placed within the 
‘modernist’ or at best the ‘psuedo-traditionalist’ (Nasr : 1994) category and it would 
have been perhaps more equitable and comprehensive to have had two traditionalists 
and two modernists, (Said Nursi comes to mind though some may dispute the degree 
of his traditionalism). Despite this and especially in the opening chapters, Lee deals 
comprehensively with aspects of individual and personal authenticity, yet his main 
focus moves from the direction of the individual to wider society; which again is 
understandable when considering the general outlook of those that Lee examines in 
his work. This work will, to some extent, try to readdress some of these imbalances.  
 
Most of the discourse on personal authenticity in the Muslim world has been 
articulated around an a priori rejection of western influence. From an Iranian 
perspective but probably equally applicable across the Muslim world, Boroujderdi 
comments that :  
The common denominator between many contemporary Iranian 
thinkers and the Western existential philosophers referred to ……is 
their preoccupation with the problematic of authenticity. Both 
groups believe in the telos of living a moral, sensible, passionate and 
authentic life. …….For the prototypical Iranian intellectual this has 
translated into a rejection of the apish imitation of the West on the 
grounds that mimicry and submission are fraudulent and counterfeit 
states of being. 
                                                            (Adib-Moghaddam :1997 : 27) 
  
 More populist reformist tendencies are rooted in the idea of authentic legitimacy in 
concurring with the interpretation of values and actions of the salaf, (the earliest 
Muslim community around the Prophet). However, this is less about the authentic and 
more about authentication and is usually associated with the religious, social and 
political aspirations of revivalist movements such as the ikhwan Muslimin, Wahhābi 
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and Salafī movements but can also be also linked with notions of Arab nationalism 
and populism, (Saktanber : 2002; Al Azmeh : 2009; Esposito : 2010). This 
authentication is frequently pursued in thought, word and deed and is of the reforming 
type mentioned previously in Pamuk’s novel (2004) and situated within a desire to 
return to a perception of the customs and actions of the salaf.    
 
Leonard Binder’s work, Islamic Liberalism - A Critique of Development  Ideologies 
(1989) provides both examples and a critique of this legitimizing authenticity within 
the Muslim discourse. Binder conducts his attention chiefly to historicity and 
interpretation of the turath, (legacy - heritage) and focuses on the question of how the 
individual and the collective reflects and enacts out the values and beliefs of the 
earliest community, (salaf). Binder understands that : 
The task of the phenomenological hermeneutic is to distinguish 
between inauthentic or unacceptable historical manifestations of 
Islam and authentic manifestations, between the inauthenticity of the 
decline and the authenticity of the salaf [the early community]. The 
renaissance of Islam is, consequently the reassertion of the historical 
truth of the earliest period of Islam as the true being of Islam and the 
authentic being of the Muslims of today. The Muslims of today are 
to reaffirm that authenticity by choosing to live their lives in 
accordance with their “own most being”.  
                                                                             (Binder : 1988: 294) 
 
 
In the two extracts above there two basic tensional binaries that may not be 
immediately apparent but which within the Muslim discourse can be seen in the above 
extracts, consisting of the dahir (external) and the batin (interior) and the concept of 
the salaf  (ancestors or in this sense the earliest Muslim community) and khalaf, 
(succeeding generations - Blinder : 1988; Esposito : 2011).  Consciously or 
unconsciously, these polarities play a significant role within this authenticating 
process in contemporary Muslim social and private discourse. The first set refers to 
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the social and outward positioning of the individual vis a vis the internal, private 
world of the individual. When these concepts are extended to a wider social arena it 
can indicate the dichotomy of the collective and the individual. Other essential 
tensional binaries could be said to lie in; din and dunya, religious and worldly, diraya 
and riwaya, critical understanding of traditions and unexamined acceptance of 
tradition; ijtihād and ijma, independent interpretation and authoritative consensus; 
khawas and awam, elite and mass; shari’a and haqā’iq, law and reality all of which 
bear relevance for the Muslim individual self.  Despite Biner’s allusion to the ‘own 
most being’, his focus centres mainly on the dahir, (outward), the hermeneutics of 
authentication and the obvious problematic involved.  The batin, (inward) or personal 
element comes into play only in response to how the individual conforms to the 
collective interpretation of its societal traditions.  Some of the underlying tensions and 
dynamics thrown up by this will be present in much of this research. To be clear, the 
balance of focus in this present work is orientated more to the individual as a self, 
building upon and starting more from their ‘own most being’ yet not devoid of the 
social context.  It will attempt to deal with the batin of the individual and the degree 
and manner in which they engage or commit to dahiri positions within contemporary 
Islam.   
 
This concludes a survey of previous and relevant research and literature carried out in 
regard to shared existentialist themes in Muslim and European thought in regard to 
the subject of Muslim personal authenticity.  While what has been presented feeds 
into and provides relevant theoretical background to the subject of Muslim personal 
authenticity, as far as can be ascertained, besides Lee (1997) and Khawaja (1987) 
there is little else that appears to have been written directly in regard to the question 
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of Muslim authenticity.  Nor does any tangible and existing discourse on this within 
Muslim communities appear to be happening and the reasons behind Heyking’s 
assertion that, ‘Western attention is usually drawn toward Islamists and less often to 
the efforts among Muslims to theorize more authentically about their own existence’ 
(2006 : 73) may lie more with the Muslim community than anything other. There can 
be no denying of tensions between thought and piety in the Muslim world rendering 
any philosophical discourse as problematic. As Shayegan says: 
The problem of the Islamic world resides in its cumbersome 
atavism, its defensive reflexes, its intellectual blockages and above 
all in the illusory pretensions that it possesses ready made answers to 
all the world’s questions. We need to learn a certain humility, a 
certain understanding of the relativity of values. 
(Shayegan : 1992: 29) 
   
At the same time there are profound noetic themes concerning the self within the 
Qur’an and within classical orthodoxy, which might demand a different thinking, 
perhaps a thinking more akin to the European existentialist, wherein the starting point 
begins and ends with the human being rather than objects or subjects outside of the 
self.  
 
In summary, the rationale and the hypotheses for this research have been presented. 
The methodology framework utilized to address the research question and 
exemplarize a more authentic theorizing about existence within the Muslim sphere 
has also been provided. Now, in setting out upon the path as outlined above, the next 
chapter consists of delving deeper into the question of authenticity and its obverse and 
extending these to the social and religious realm.  
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Chapter 3 
Existential Authenticity 
 ‘Therefore existential authenticity is possible only with reference to  
the transcendent ideals.’ 
              (Pruett : 1973 : 577) 
 
‘The search for who “we” are as opposed to what “they” would want us to be.’                   
                                                                                                 (Lee : 1997 : 14) 
 
In determining whether and how inauthenticity or its inverse exists within the 
religious realm of Islam, the first step taken in this chapter is to attempt a more 
specific definition of authenticity. This is not an easy task as the concept is both 
nebulous and indeterminate. Nevertheless, despite this, there is some general 
consensus as to what is referred to by the term. For example, most people would 
accept that it entails a lack of pretence and an honesty and integrity with the self in 
thought, word and deed. Yet absolute definitions will not be forthcoming and any 
analysis taking place can only be perceived as a partial apprehending of the subject of 
authenticity and the self, (Wittgenstein : 2002). Therefore the aim here is to arrive at a 
definitive ‘theory’ but is more directed towards enquiring into authenticity. 
 
The complexities of answers to the following questions demonstrate the 
indeterminateness of the term; Can one lie or withhold information and remain 
authentic? Is it inauthentic to speak to an elderly person differently than one would 
speak to a close friend? Is ‘impression management’ inauthentic? One may argue that 
social interactions are a means wherein different norms and narratives are mediated, 
which goes towards shaping meaningful experience and which would seem to negate 
the exigency of an authentic self. Is a pursuit of authenticity carried out solely for 
personal fulfilment itself an authentic thing? Is personal authenticity tied to autonomy 
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and breaking free from social, religious and cultural conditioning? Could it actually 
signify the very opposite; embracing such conventions consciously?  
 
The concept of authenticity defies easy description as it has neither an objective 
quality nor is it a predicate that can be easily used to describe a person, as would be 
the case with other associated words like ‘honesty’ or ‘sincerity’, (Golomb : 1995) 
and indeed, authenticity needs to be clearly distinguished from these. Trilling believed 
authenticity to be ‘a more strenuous moral exercise than “sincerity”, a more exigent 
conception of the self and of what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the 
universe and man’s place in it and a less acceptant and genial view of the social 
circumstances of life’, (Trilling : 1972 cited in Golomb : 1995 : 10).  
 
Mircea Eliade (1907 – 1986) 
Eliade believed that human existence was essentially a striving for authenticity and 
that religion was the main vehicle and means of expression in achieving this end, 
(1965:10; 1975:12-13), in other words, religion as the mode of being human in the 
world.  As a biographer of Eliade later stated, ‘Religion is the most profound and 
meaningful way of interpreting the story of human existence’ (Girardot 1982 : 8). 
Eliade perceived the ‘Real’ (Ultimate Reality) as non dualist, free of all attributes, 
definitions and limitations; an Ultimate Reality, (the ‘Real’) which lays at the core of 
all religious manifestations and the sacred, (1965 : 28) as well as the source of human 
authenticity. The role of myth and ritual is to act out and make manifest the real and 
authentic as something correspondingly existing outside and inside human beings. 
Human inauthenticity, Eliade believed, had come about as a result of humans no 
longer understanding their human origins, yet it is precisely this understanding that 
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makes them human. In understanding Eliade we must comprehend ‘religion’ here in 
the widest sense of the word and not in any denominational sense, (yet not excluding 
these) but referred more generally to human perception of the sacred in everyday 
existence, irrespective of any organised religion.  Eliade believed that authenticity lay 
in the human search for liberation from the limitations of the temporal and spatial 
through transcending these. Human inauthenticity had come about through a 
truncation from the ‘archaic ontology’ of our authentic human nature. This ontology 
is the standpoint from which the ‘Real’ could be perceived on one hand and the 
temporal world / human existence on the other, yet imbued with the ‘Real’ both 
within and beyond it, as something tangibly experienced yet incapable of being 
conceptualized, (1965 : 202-03). This approach is what Eliade called a ‘traditional’, 
‘pre-Socratic’ and ‘authentic’ philosophy (1975:124-25) and echoes the work of 
Heidegger, for whom Eliade held considerable and lasting regard, (Wasserstrom 
:1999). The inauthentic lies in the non-religious and the profane as being neither real 
nor eternal.  Eliade believed that modern man had become diverted by the temporal 
and spatial; embroiled in ‘the terror of history’ with a corresponding loss of 
primordial immediacy, natural wisdom and the depletion of primal concern with 
existential human experience, (1965:49). Vis a vis the ‘Real’, the impermanency of 
history and the flux of the temporal and spatial indicates that the pursuit of knowledge 
of things of the world as less worthy; in order to act authentically in the world more 
meaningful and sustainable values are needed.  
  
With this view in mind, it seems possible that any given tradition could be considered 
inauthentic when it curtails the amplitude and effervescence of the original message, 
rendering it possibly in contravention to that tradition as it was at its inception. Even 
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this is a delicate thing; for the holding true to original teachings can itself become yet 
another type of stultification and an inappropriate responses to a constantly changing 
world. 
 
Soren Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855) 
Soren Kierkegaard’s contribution to the questions of authenticity and the self are 
crucial to any understanding of authenticity and the self. ‘The human being is spirit. 
But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which 
relates itself to its own self.’  (Kierkegaard : 2004 : 43). In simpler terms this implies 
that the self consists of that which recognizes itself as a self and also in relation to 
others. Kierkegaard understood selfhood as consisting of the process of coming to the 
perception of one as a genuine individual and the awakening and search for this is the 
most important human undertaking possible, an ethical imperative. According to 
Kierkegaard, the alternative is living with partial recognition of the self, overwhelmed 
by triviality and sensuality and the imitation of others resulting in a drifting through 
life devoid any meaningful purpose.  
But the only life wasted is the life of one who so lived it, deceived 
by life’s pleasures or its sorrows, that he never became decisively, 
eternally, conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or, what is the same, 
he never became aware-and gained in the deepest sense the 
impression-that there is a God there and that ‘he’, himself, his self, 
exists before this God’  
                     (Kierkegaard : 2004 : 57) 
 
There are three evolving aspects to Kierkegaard’s approach to the self; the first lying 
in what has just been referred to above, the ‘relating to the self’. However, this is not 
the self being defined by that relationship but rather is defined by that which does the 
relating so that in a necessarily dynamic ongoing movement the self is always in a 
fluid process of becoming.  Secondarily, in claiming that this self is that which 
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consciously relates itself to itself, in doing so, also naturally encounters that which 
created the self, i.e. the Divine. For without this divine element we would have the 
conundrum of a self-created self. Kierkegaard does not delve deeply into this beyond 
stating, ‘Such a relation which relates itself to its own self, must either have 
established itself or have been established by another’ (Kierkegaard : 2004 : 43).  
 
Returning to Kierkegaard, anxiety is the human reaction to non-being as opposed to 
being. This non-being is not just a question of annihilation or physical death but also 
of meaninglessness. The self is aware of the ‘beingness’ of itself in correlation to non-
being in a way that animals are not and thus posseses ‘a relation which relates to 
itself’.  
Kierkegaard speaks of levels of selfhood, the highest of which would be the 
recognition of the Divine, seemingly not inferring religious or doctrinal belief but 
simply some conception of a force majeur. The implication of this is that the self has 
to have originated from something that is even more basic than the self.  The self 
stems from and is created by another and is therefore related to it. The alternative to 
this divine element would be the idea of having the choice or ability to create one’s 
own identity, something that Kierkegaard sees as an unstable conceptual grounding. 
So the second aspect of the self, as understood by Kierkegaard, lies in coming upon 
an innate spiritual potentiality, (this perception of the Divine), discovered within 
during the search and recovery of the self.  It is interesting to note that Ibn ‘Arabi 
bases much of his thought on a hadith, ‘He who knows himself knows his Lord’ (ibn 
‘Arabi quoted by Chittick: 1989 : 312) which he establishes as one of the main 
objectives of the mystic path. According to Kierkegaard, one resulting behaviour of 
the individual who comes upon this Divine element within the self, is a predisposition 
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for seeking solitude away from the masses. Nevertheless, authenticity can be achieved 
simply through the self’s consciousness of its self, with or without the appropriation 
of the Divine, though Kierkegaard see this as a lower form of authenticity. The third 
element is synthesis; which is the relation between two entities with the relationship 
itself as a third entity. There it is the self that does the relating and the self that is 
discovered, (in the highest level the discovery of the Spirit / Divine) and then there is 
the relationship between the two which constitutes a third entity, all three of which 
when put together, constitutes a process of authenticity. It is important to understand 
the individualism implied by this selfhood as not equated with contemporary notions 
of independence and autonomy but rather ironically, a being of selflessness, 
(Kierkegaard : 2004) and there will be more on this later.  In religious terms, a general 
overview of Kierkegaard’s approach should not be seen to be at the expense of, nor 
devalue, the exoteric; as it neither implies an individualized or arbitrary interpretation 
of such, nevertheless, it does make the point that impersonal knowledge, (i.e. the 
exoteric), should not gain ascendancy over personal knowledge. 
 
Kierkegaard also stressed the primacy of subjectivity and that the truth of something 
is not limited to objective facts though they may play an important part. The most 
important aspect of truth is how one acts in regard to objective facts. From an ethical 
vantage point, living or acting out one’s subjective truths carries far greater weight 
than bare objective facts so that truth lies all the more in subjectivity, not objectivity. 
Authenticity lies in the acting out of one’s subjective truth and conviction, which 
frequently may conflict with the status quo.  
The moment I take Christianity as a doctrine and so indulge my 
cleverness or profundity or my eloquence or my imaginative powers 
in depicting it, people are very pleased. I am looked upon as serious 
Christian. The moment I begin to express existentially what I say, 
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and consequently to bring Christianity into reality, it is just as 
though I had exploded existence - the scandal is there at once.’  
                  (Kierkegaard : 2003 : 343)  
 
For Kierkegaard the search for the self is the precursor to the religious path and 
religious authenticity. For the search itself is transformative though perhaps not 
always conclusive and gives priority to transcending the self rather than accumulating 
external religious knowledge. ‘God in heaven surely knows best what is the highest 
that a person can aspire to and complete. Scripture only asks if you were a trustworthy 
servant’ (Kierkegaard : 1992:148). Kierkegaard believed that meaningful truths do not 
emerge from dispassionate objective truths but from a visceral subjectivity. While a 
moral code is relatively easy to adhere to, one could argue that the altering of the self 
is what religion ultimately asks for, something which creates an extraordinary 
individual, perhaps one not always adhering to the accepted norms of socially 
conditioned behaviour or even common patterns of human behaviour.  Rather than 
being directed from an outer morality, authenticity lies more in the knowledge of 
whether the individual is living up to the ideals of the self.  Relatedly, the ‘despair’ or 
‘falling’ of the self lies in the degree to which it covers up or conceals inconsistencies 
from itself, (Kierkegaard : 2004 ).   What is depicted here is an actual, subjective and 
existential search for self-transformation as opposed to a preoccupation with living 
out and maintaining theories and appearances. This is a movement from mindless 
conformity to mindful autonomy, (but does not necessitate automatic rejection of 
tradition), to transforming to freely chosen values and meanings rather than 
encultured ones. In the final movement, committing one’s life to a way of being so 
that one is what one pursues.   
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Inauthenticity 
Everyone is the other and no one is himself.. 
                                (Heidegger : 1996 : 120) 
 
As we have seen, authenticity suggests some type of fulfillment vis a vis genuine 
human existence and experience but it is perhaps best understood in absentia, i.e., 
inauthenticity, something considered an integral part of the human condition 
occurring through different pressures with an ensuing loss of the self, sacrificed by 
compliance and acceptability to others. A corresponding loss of genuine relationships 
with others can take place as neither the individual or the other is authentically related 
to with both parties functioning by the dictates of conventional norms. Fortunately, 
transformation is possible and a life given over to inauthenticity can be overcome and 
the self regained, albeit with difficulty in proportion to the degree of adherence to 
social expectations and the strength of motivation and energy to dispel this. This 
element of recovery is well gleaned from the German word for authenticity; 
eigentlich, a literal translation of which would be ‘own self’. In this way, regaining 
authenticity is the retrieving of one’s true self or wresting one’s identity from the 
inclinations of  the many. A thorough and honest evaluation of the self is required 
wherein the individual recognizes personal inauthenticity and grappling with who one 
really is. The illusions of the self that are cultivated are mostly situated in the realm of 
language, through the descriptive labels accepted as the reality of the self . Therefore 
the self can be something created mainly in language swamping the one with self 
delusion and heedless impulsivity.   
Through words and concepts we are continually misled into 
imagining things as being simpler than they are, separate from one 
another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself. A philosophical 
mythology lies concealed in language that breaks out again every 
moment, however careful one may be otherwise.  
        (Nietzsche : 1996 : 306) 
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Heidegger used several different terms to describe inauthenticity before actually 
rounding it off and employing the word and concept in ‘Being and Time’ (2008) often 
referring to the same phenomena as ‘lapse’, ‘decline’, ‘collapse’, falling’ and 
‘ruinance’, the latter of these defined as ‘…the movedness of factical life which it 
“enacts” and is in itself, as itself, for itself, and, in all of this, against itself’ 
(Heidegger : 2001: 98).  All of the proceeding language, seemingly rather dramatic 
when we come upon Heidegger’s later definition of all this in ‘inauthenticity. What is 
most striking, is that the these largely match with Heidegger’s overall view of the 
human self. Significantly, selfhood is a process rather than some sort of station, 
referred to in the use of the word ‘movedness’. What can be concluded from this is 
that inauthenticity (or ruinance as above) is a way of being and that all ways of being 
are an ongoing process.  
 
In ‘Being and Time’ (2008) Heidegger explicitly states that inauthenticity does not 
mean that one is ‘no longer a being-in-the-world’ but that on the contrary it is a 
particular type of being-in-the world, that is, nonetheless, overwhelmed or benumbed 
by the ‘world’ and the other beings in that ‘world’ in ‘being-with-one-another’ 
(Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94) indicating a giving over of the self to the 
‘world’ and the ‘other’. As Crowe paraphrases Heidegger, ‘…an inauthentic life is 
one that is not lived by itself’ (2006 : 72) for ‘authentic potentiality’ lies in ‘being its 
own self’, (Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94). Despite this Heidegger remains 
unjudgemental of this, insisting that we should not see this as a failure of the human 
quest. 
Dasein has in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for being its own self. It has fallen into the 
‘world’. ‘Falleness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-
with-one-another, insofar as the latter is guided by idle talk, hunger 
 62 
for novelty and ambiguity…On no account however do the terms 
‘inauthentic’ and ‘non-authentic’ signify ‘really not’, as if in this 
mode of existence Dasein was altogether to lose its being. 
‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like no-longer-being-in the 
–world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the 
–world.  
                                                               (Heidegger  : 2008 : 220) 
 
Outward conventions of tradition or modernity can conflict with individual choice and 
may involve rejection through seeking personal authenticity. The authentic life can be 
situated between the dichotomy of accepting one’s existential condition yet without 
resignation to it, (Lee : 1997). On the other hand, resignation to one’s situation can be 
profoundly authentic, as in Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Resignation, 
(Kierkegaard : 1983) though leading eventually to the Knight of Faith. As such, one 
can only be authentic in relation to some context or in relation to something else. It is 
difficult to imagine how someone would be living authentically in a social vacuum. 
What would constitute personal authenticity on Mars? One’s authenticity is situated 
within the context one is placed in; the historical and personal epoch, the customs, 
geographical location, language, culture and religious background.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to arrive at a more detailed interpretation of 
authenticity and inauthenticity on the back of different viewpoints of various thinkers. 
Certain motifs have emerged; authenticity involving a process of coming to integrity 
with the self and an awareness of personal choice (freedom) and responsibility.On the 
other hand, inauthenticity involves a living out of one’s life through others and not in 
or of itself. 
 
In the next Chapter we broaden out the question of inauthenticity by examining any 
connectivity it may have with rationalism, globalization, homogeneity, 
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standardization, and institutionalization. In doing so, a social phenomenon known as 
McDonaldization will be reviewed. Going further, Ritzer (1996) argues that all areas 
of human interaction have been effected by McDonaldization including religion and 
Beyer (2006) describes modern religion as an ‘institutional “reification”’, utilized in 
the packaging of a globalized image and social identity, (Beyer : 2006  : 185).  In the 
next chapter we will examine these claims, ultimately looking into whether the 
McDonaldization theory can be extended to Islam.  	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Chapter 4 
The Iron Cage of Rationality – Global Management Culture and 
McDonaldization 
 
‘McDonald’s is a place to fill their stomachs with lots of calories and 
carbohydrates so that they can move on to the next rationally organized 
activity’ 
           (Ritzer : 1996 : 61) 
 
‘This discourse is so widespread that it seems difficult to escape from its grip.’ 
                                                     (Schuerkins : 2004) 
 
 
A wide spread phenomena of the latter part of the 20th century has been the emergence 
of management as a primary social technology but has now developed on a global 
scale. This ‘global discourse of management’, (Schuerkins : 2004) features as a key 
aspect within entities like state administrations, corporations, leisure industries, labour 
unions, schools, education, religious institutions and catering industries but has also 
become evident in the everyday life of the individual, many of whom have 
consciously or unconsciously, rightly or wrongly ‘contributed to the creation of a 
world controlled by managers’, (Schuerkins : 2012). 
 
A prime example of this global management discourse lies in ‘McDonaldization’, a 
theory originally conceived of by George Ritzer (1996) and later taken up by many 
other writers and commentators. Ritzer claims that the foundation of 
‘McDonaldization’, lies upon the primacy and dominancy of rationalism : 
I have been thinking about the process of rationalization for many 
years. It has long been believed that bureaucracy represents the 
ultimate form of rationalization. However, it gradually began to 
dawn on me that something new was on the horizon, something 
destined to replace the bureaucratic structure as the model of 
rationalization. That “something” turned out to be the fast food 
restaurant, most notably McDonald’s, which revolutionized not only 
the restaurant business, but also American society  
and ultimately, the world.                                                                       
(Ritzer : 1996 : xvii) 
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He emphasizes McDonalds being used as an example rather then being the sole 
representative of this phenomena. Ritzer bases his theory on Max Weber’s (1864 – 
1920) sociological concept of the ‘iron cage of rationality’. Weber was anxious that 
bureaucracy would eventually disallow for human diversity and individuality and 
would become cages wherein people became trapped by moving from one 
rationalized structure to another throughout their lives, ‘from rationalized educational 
systems to rationalized work places, from rationalized recreational settings to 
rationalized homes, (Ritzer : 1996 : 21).  Ritzer believes that Weber’s depiction of 
bureaucracy as the epitome of rationalism has now been historically superseded and 
expanded upon by the fast food industry as epitomized by McDonald’s. He utilizes 
Weber’s framework for identifying this rationalizing tendency as lying in efficiency, 
calculability, predictability and control as in the replacement of human with non-
human technology. Another Weberian concern was the inevitability of the 
‘irrationality of rationality’ – the more rationally a structure evolves the more 
irrational it can become.  
 
Rationalism, Irrationality and Inauthenticity 
To demonstrate the irrational, Ritzer uses the example of the rationalization of 
recreational activities, usually conceived of as that which allows some escape from 
the numbing rationalization of daily work routines. However, package tours are now 
used widely for this purpose wherein perspectives offered of other cultures are rigidly 
controlled, food consumed and accommodation offered resembles the same 
environment that tourists have come from. Everything is safe, predictable and 
quantifiable, all of which provides no escape from the iron cage of rationality. The 
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relation between rationalism, the irrational and inauthenticity layed out within the 
ordinary, everyday level is highlighted by Ritzer , ‘Thus the people who serve us in 
fast-food restaurants, on the phone on behalf of credit card companies, in the malls 
and as telemarketeers, are all, as a general rule, interacting with us in an inauthentic 
way’, (Ritzer : 2004 : 10). 
 
The evolving of the irrational out of the rational can be seen in the novel, Catch 22, 
(Heller : 1996) and in the work of those like Franz Kafka and George Orwell. On 
similar note, the well known quote of Heidegger concerning technology sheds further 
light on the irrationality of the rational.  
Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in 
its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and 
the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the 
reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the 
manufacture of hydrogen bombs.13 
 
Critique of Ritzer’s McDonaldization 
Ritzer’s work has elicited an enormous response and a diverse critique of the 
McDonaldization theory has sprung from this.  Some have accused him of cultural 
elitism, such as Parker (1998) arguing that in fact Weber’s theory of rationalization 
had a far ‘deeper ambivalence’ than Ritzer gives credit for and McDonaldization 
theory weighs down negatively as a ‘condemnation of modern forms of organization 
and culture’, (Parker : 1998 : 3). Parker is more concerned with the possibility of 
countering McDonaldization from a more critically theoretical position, not on what 
he sees as Ritzer’s nostalgic cultural elitist perspective. Parker’s alternative view is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This quote is from four lectures on technology that Heidegger gave in 1949. The notes are 
unpublished but it was first quoted in Wolfgang Schirmacher's Technik und Gelassensheit. Freiburg: 
Alber, 1983. It is also used in Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington, 1993), p. 132.  Caputo 
claims that referenced this from a translation of this passage from The New York Review of Books, 
June 16, 1988, pp. 41- 43 by Thomas Sheehan 
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that there is more resistance and future potential resistance to the McDonald’s culture 
than Ritzer gives credit for and that postmodern culture will not just lay down and 
acquiesce. J.S. Caputo (1998)14 finds Ritzer’s approach flawed in that it doesn’t 
answer really answer the question of why people have continued to frequent 
McDonald’s in large numbers. He calls for looking at McDonald’s from a narrative 
paradigm, in a sense rejecting Ritzer’s more logical paradigm and opts instead for a 
more democratic approach.  In this regard, Caputo infers that each of us constructs 
narratives to negotiate our way through life and that the one concerning McDonald’s 
and McDonaldization is yet another one; the story line created by McDonald’s being 
‘food, folks and fun’ and accessibility to ‘Americana’ typified by the Japanese ad 
jingo for McDonalds as the ‘United tastes of America’.  We are free to invest in these 
stories or not and Caputo’s postmodern view would be that there is no one universal 
theory to be taken as absolute truth, this is one story amongst many others.  Smart 
(1999) forefronts the cultural rather than the economic view, in that he believes Ritzer 
should have taken American hegemony as the driving force behind the global hyper 
development of McDonaldization as opposed to taking McDonald’s on its own 
merits.   
 
There has been a great deal of critical acclaim and a general resonance with the 
McDonaldization theory. The fact remains that the primal human act of food 
preparation and the eating as systematized by McDonalds’ has far reaching influence 
into many different social spheres. The result being a transposing of much of social 
structure into a faceless scientism, progresively subtracting the human element 
increasingly out of the equation. Is it destructive? Ecologists and health experts will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Not be confused with J.S. Caputo 
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attest that it is on several different counts. Is it dehumanizing? The fact that 
technology is developing to replace human labour supposedly because of 
unpredictable human variance and inexactitude is beyond doubt. Is exactitude and 
precision in all things a desirable outcome? There are viable reasons to generally see 
the process of McDonaldization as a commodification, (read ‘reification’) of human 
life. As objectively as possible, rightly or wrongly, it is not irrational to suggest that 
blanket social rationalist tendencies do tend to take control away from the individual. 
However, as Caputo suggests, individual choice is never taken away, each person has 
the right to either submit or not, i.e. not to go to McDonald’s. Or do they? It could be 
countered that it is difficult for the majority to conduct everyday life without 
encountering the iron cage all around us and not just in our food preferences. Is it a 
concrete fact of everyday life or simply a narrative amongst others? The fact is that 
the systemization is so pervasive that many people do feel restricted in the options 
available whilst others take the conditions for granted.  
 
Nor does Ritzer’s theory necessarily denote cultural elitism. Would we accuse Orwell 
(2003) of such; could the creation of the fictional land of Oceania in ‘Nineteen Eighty 
Four’ be considered as culturally elitist?  While McDonaldization may only partially 
answer the question of why people turn to the hamburger in such large numbers, it 
does not make the evolving sanitization of human characteristics from social 
structures any the less Kafkaesque or Orwellian.  Granted each individual has internal 
conscientious freedom to not accept the premises of McDonaldization, nevertheless, 
the external options to disengage becomes increasingly narrow.  There is no doubt 
that there have been benefits to some aspects of McDonaldization, which perhaps 
reflect Weber’s ambivalence more accurately than Ritzer gives credit for, as Parker 
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(1998) suggests. Yet we must not forget that Ritzer was attempting to make 
accessible. a sophisticated argument that was worth making, to a large number of 
people. Ultimately the argument has proven a compelling one and has become a focal 
point for discussion of social change, something which the majority of his critics 
acknowledge. 
 
McDonaldization in the Religious Realm?  
In consideration of the fact that McDonaldized management systems have extended 
far beyond the provision of food into other social realms; the question of whether 
religion has also succumbed to this process can be asked.  On the face of it, it would 
seem to be the least likely to undergo a process of rationalization as religion claims to 
deal with the numinous, assumedly the converse of rationality. Yet Ritzer proposes 
that, ‘Almost all social institutions (for example, education, sports, politics and 
religion) were adapting McDonald’s principles to their operations’. Elsewhere, Ritzer 
comments on the 1985 Vatican announcement that Catholics could receive 
indulgences through televised broadcasts of the Christmas papal benediction in St 
Peter’s Square as an example of streamlining efficiency, as something characteristic 
of McDonaldization,  (1996 : 48). Nevertheless, while Ritzer does not devote too 
much space to the manifestation of this in religious communities, there is concrete 
evidence provided by looking at the Megachurches phenomena in the United States. 
McDonaldization has extended the process of rationalization to the 
realm of all major social institutions, including religion. In some 
cases, this process has occurred in a literal fashion; several churches 
in the southern United States have added McDonald's restaurants 
and similar retail food establishments to their facilities, complete 
with drive-through windows. Food courts, bookstores, cafes, 
boutiques, and even banks have also become part of the worship 
experience. These developments are best viewed as a by-product of 
a fundamental paradigm shift in religious organization among 
 70 
evangelicals, that is, churches restructuring themselves according to 
a corporate business model.  
                                                             (Watson & Scalen : 2008 :1) 
 
That the label could equally be applied to the religious realm is explored in greater 
depth by Drane (2001), in reference to the Christian church. He bemoans the fact that 
upon exploring ‘the extent to which Ritzer’s McDonaldlization thesis could be 
applied to the Church, I did not have far to look before some of my worst fears were 
confirmed..’, (Drane : 2001 : 35). Following in the footsteps of both Weber and 
Ritzer, he applies the iron cage of rationality in its four precepts; efficiency, 
calculability, predictability and control to the Christian church.  Drane questions 
whether it is;  
…possible to have a world view – or a church structure-dominated 
by predictability without at the same time denying, or at least 
seriously jeopardizing, belief in a biblical God? It is certainly 
striking that all those spiritual paths that are now emerging in the 
West as serious alternatives to mainline Christian belief incorporate 
significant elements of the mystical, the numinous, the 
unpredictable, and the non-rational (which is not, of course, the 
same as the irrational).  
                                                                             (Drane : 2001 : 45) 
 
In regard to the Mega Churches; these are defined as those churches which have a 
Sunday attendance of upwards to two thousand people and above but the term is 
confined to the Protestant American churches, though there are Catholic churches 
with the same large scale congregations but not included under this category. 
Hendricks is cited by Cook (2002 : 22) as saying, ‘In marked contrast to the 
traditional way of "doing church," the mega church operates with a marketing 
mentality: who is our "customer" and how can we meet his or her needs?’.  
 
While commenting on evidence of a widespread postmodern search for spiritual 
expression and fulfilment, the irrationality of the rational is summed up in Drane’s 
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contention that ‘we seem to have ended up with a secular church in a spiritual 
society’, (Drane : 2001 : 54). He also wonders why so little critique has been 
forthcoming from the religious community in response to this commodification of 
human life.  Part of this he puts down to the Protestant ethic which historically 
emphasized a more rationalized approach to the Divine and perhaps contributed to the 
eventual domineering rationalism characteristic of the modern era. Drane comments 
on the irony of the Catholic church, despite being so hierarchally institutionalized, yet 
seemingly able to respond more effectively than protestants to postmodernism 
especially in its approaches to mystery, non rationality and the numinous, the absence 
of which is so glaringly absent in the McDonaldization paradigm.  
 
McDonaldization of Islam? Has Barbie converted ? 
Is it possible to build a case for a McDonaldization of Islam?  In a book intended for 
those engaged in the prosleytizing of Islam, (dawah) in the New York area, we read 
the following:  
It is therefore, desirable that at least in New York City and its 
Metropolitan area, Dawah activities should be planned and carried 
out on a uniform and regular basis with set targets to achieve within 
a stipulated time frame. The Dawah Committee, the Moderator and 
Dawah workers in their meetings, will determine the targets and 
time schedule.    
                                                                         (Siddiqui : 1993 : 50) 
The language of this quote clearly demonstrates the discourse of management and a 
systemized rationalization of Islam with defined characteristics of McDonaldization. 
Is this an indication of a wider phenomenon within the Muslim world? Certainly there 
does seem to be a desire for efficiency, calculability, predictability and control within 
central aspects of Muslim practice. An example of this is the common presence of 
readily available computer deduced timetables for the prayer times found in mosques 
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all over the world. In muslim countries times and dates of prayers and festivals are 
frequently established by governments which attests to elements of calculability, the 
quantitative and control. Previously, prayer times were primarily localized and 
measured by the length of the shadow of a sutra or the naked eye’s perception of 
daylight. Admittedly, there has always been some controversy around this,  ‘The early 
authorities in most of the known Fiqhi schools fought against such a use of 
calculations, as absolutely against the established Sunnah that required looking at the 
shadow or the phenomenon of Sunrise and Sunset for the prayer times’, (Shah : 2009 : 
7) though this did not mean that calculation was not available if viewing was 
somehow hampered but used as a secondary source. Even such calculations can be 
seen to have more direct relevance than computerized technology.  
The Hajj travel industry also shows distinct feautures of McDonaldization.  Saudi 
Arabian laws and regulations, discourage individual travel and encourage group travel 
packages run by Hajj Tour operators. However much this ‘may jar with the ethos of 
sacrifice, simplicity and humility of hajj…..’ (Butt : 2010). A large majority of 
pilgrims stay in top quality hotels with global fast food outlets such as McDonalds, 
Kentucky Fried Chicken and Burger King readily available. The Hajj package tours 
offers efficiency, calculability, predictability and control, completely at variance from 
the arduous journey the hajjis made in previous years. ‘The Hajj requires a degree of 
detachment from worldly pursuits and worldly needs’, (Al Oadah : 2006). No 
judgement is intended here beyond the observation that the Hajj inherently stresses 
detachment contradicting the controlled and packaged hajj of today. Borrowing from 
Ritzer, this is arguably a ‘rationalized worship ritual’. These above examples are 
presented here briefly only as a small yet perhaps significant sampling indicating that 
Islam is no stranger to ‘management discourse’ and McDonalidization tendencies.   
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Summary 
In this Chapter the relatedness of inautheniticity, the irrational and rationalism has 
been established as well as looking at its symptomatic implications, such as the 
syndrome of global management culture, artificiality, bureaucracy, standardization, 
institutionalization, all of which is embodied in the McDonaldization theory. The 
question of the religiously ineffable having been tainted by McDonaldization has also 
been discussed, which included the subject of Islam.  
  
In the next chapter, the questions of inauthenticity and rationalism are delved into 
further and broadened out through an examination of the concept of reification. This 
is then applied to the religious domain, ending again with a more specific and more 
detailed look at Islam.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Reification - Egotistical Calculations  
‘It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous   
enthusiasm, of Philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical 
calculation.’ 
  (Marx & Engels : 2012   : 32) 
 
 
Reification 
The etymological breakdown of the word reification is based on res ; ‘a thing’ and 
facere; ‘to make’ combining together ‘to making something a thing’; as in the 
making of something abstract into a concrete thing or even perhaps making 
something out of nothingand is akin to an ontoglogical metaphor. This is initially a 
mental, conceptual and possibly a behavioural occurrence, according to whom one 
refers to, wherein something that doesn’t have ‘thing-like’ properties in or of itself 
comes to be regarded as such. The process of reification is one in which a) 
appropriation of an abstract concept as a concrete entity takes place and is, b) now 
detached from its original context it is c) then placed and used within another 
context.  Now truncated and dislocated from its original meaning and essentially 
estranged from itself inauthentically – it is depicted as a ‘something’, which it is not, 
either through a limiting constraining or an expansive fallacy. It is certainly related to 
the increasing standardization and codification characteristic of the ‘management 
discourse’ and the ‘iron cage of rationality’ applied to so much of contemporary 
human endeavour and the ensuing estrangement that has occurred has been 
consistently commented upon over several decades. The argument presented here is 
that reification, presented as ‘something which it is not’ has distinct correlations with 
dichotomies of authenticity and inauthenticity.  
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Reification is a concept originally attributed mainly to Marx who defines it, ‘…as a 
definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of 
a relation between things’ (Marx: 1978: 320). Nevertheless, it appears that Marx did 
not use the actual word, ‘Reification’ except on one occasion, (Pitkin : 1987). 
Nevertheless, he used several other terms and concepts closely aligned with 
reification such as Entfremdung, (literally strangifying or alienation) which Marx 
saw both as occurring through the ‘transformation of human beings into thing-like 
beings which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-
world’, (Petrovic :1983 : 412) and thus the concept is regarded as being a central 
tenet to his thinking.  Lucaks (1971) later built on the concept of reification within 
his general theories of capitalism, using the word Verdinglichung,  (direct translation 
– ‘thingification’) in attempting to expound further upon Marx’s concept of 
Entfremdung. For Lucaks, the exchange of commodities within a capitalist context 
exemplifies the idea of people as a means to an end, quantative, instrumental and 
profitable. Understandably, he directly associated Weber’s disquietude at widespread 
social rationalization as the reification of society. In Lucak’s view, in partaking in the 
capitalist exchange of goods, the individual utilizes a calculative appraisal of the 
objects to be bought or sold, the other person/s involved as potential factors to 
meeting their needs and finally the individual’s skill in negotiating profitably, all 
comprising a ‘thing-like’ transaction and as such becomes second nature and effects 
all aspects of the individual’s life bringing on a type of overall human behaviour 
wherein the individual is reduced  ‘contemplatative’ (1971 : 89) behaviour , and a 
‘detached observer’, (1971 : 207). The ‘contemplation’ denotes the passive observer 
and the ‘detached’ signifies emotional detachment. The individual is now no longer 
engaged in their surroundings but is now reduced to a neutral observer, unaffected by 
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what occurs around them, within themselves or with others – all aspects of the world 
and the people around them become viewed as things.  A phenomena, which in his 
view, was furthered by the mechanization of work, as in factory assembly lines, 
wherein humans become subordinate to the demands of the machine. As many 
spheres of human interaction have adapted such factory production line 
methodologies, Lukacs saw this as evidence of reification spreading through all 
levels and all aspects of society. Also inherent to this is a different division of labour 
resulting in an increasing ‘specialism’ wherein nobody is able to see the whole and 
nobody bears ultimate responsibility. Lucaks’ theory of reification has fallen 
somewhat by the wayside partly due to the fall of communism and partly because of 
perceived flaws in some of Lucaks’ thinking in this regard. However, the concept has 
revived in renewed interest as a useful model of social anthropology, (Pitkin : 1987, 
Honneth : 2008). Lucak’s thinking can be considered as too simplistic in the 
perception of objectification automatically pertaining to reification as there is 
recognition that there are perhaps some areas of human life that function best from 
within an objective standpoint that may not necessarily directly equate with 
reification.  
Other weaknesses in Lucaks argument lies in the fact that his theory tends to suggest 
that there is no going back – innate human tendencies had been totally annihilated 
and reified.  He felt that true human nature experienced the world in an existential 
and qualitative way appreciating the quiddity and uniqueness of individual objects 
and people. He understood  reification not just as a misapprehension of reality but as 
the whole paradigmatic ontology under which capitalism functions. While it is 
possible to argue that Lucaks identification of reification within society is a valid 
one, some of the reasons he forwards for this may be faulty. For example, the idea 
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that reification would end with the communist revolution is an idea which is now 
defunct and was something that Lukacs himself questioned towards the latter part of 
his life. Despite these apparent flaws, some philosophers and social anthropologists 
are now beginning to revive the concept as a useful model whilst contesting Lucak’s 
arguments as to how the phenomena developed, (Pitkin : 1987, Honneth : 2008).  
A poignant example of this reification can be seen in the evolving perception of the 
natural world. A river is no longer perceived of as a river but as a possible source of 
energy – the river as hydraulic power, (Heidegger : 1982 : 16). The river has become 
reified, an object to be used with all of the economic and environmental implications 
thereof.  Human beings are also perceived of as units of consumerism, objects to be 
used to an end. Different nations are perceived of as possible markets of 
consumption. Importantly, Lucaks, as Heidegger, believed that the disruption of 
human relations presented by reification disallowed a true and full encounter with 
authentic human experience, yet neither perceived reification as a moral wrong and 
that even in rudimental form, some aspect of active engagement still remained in 
human relations, (Honneth 2008). It was rather that, the acquired ‘second nature’ of a 
detached and objective perception of the world, reified human interaction, (yet never 
fully excising the primordial active engagement of human beings) is a faulty 
interpretation of the world. From the similarities and differences between the two 
thinkers, Honneth (2008) distils the idea that reification is more of a process, a habit 
or manner of behaviour rather than some systemic knowledge framework. Guess 
(2008) is somewhat critical of this as he thinks that Honneth downplays enormous 
differences between these different thinkers in making his point. Nevertheless, 
despite their very different vantage points, both Heidegger and Lucaks understood 
(albeit in the latter case somewhat inconsistently), that beneath this ‘second nature’ 
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tendency there is a deep and underlying existential involvement with the world that is 
natural to human beings, which Heidegger refers to as ‘caring’ and Lucaks as 
‘empathetic engagement’. Both appear to refer to this as referring to one who 
participates as opposed to the one who merely observes. Honneth (2008) believes 
that closer examination of these concernful views pertains more to involvement in 
the world with minimum discord, as congenially as possible so as to maintain a flow 
of engagement with the world around us. Honneth (2008) combines these definitions; 
culled and developed from Heidegger, Lucaks (and Dewey), further supported by 
Cavell’s  (1993) theory of primary recognition. Cavell believes that the individual is 
existentially engaged with the other before he can approach the other in any 
cognitive sense. Taking effective recourse to arguments from child development 
psychology, Honneth uses this to further establish clearly that the subject (i.e. the 
individual) always engages with people and things existentially before any cognitive 
process could begin. In this manner there exists a tension between recognition versus 
cognition models of social interaction. By ‘recognition’ what Honneth refers to is 
being able to identify, perceive and appreciatively know and accept the people and 
circumstances in one’s life and cognition, leading possibly to the reification of the 
other.  
Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment contains an element of 
emphathetic engagement or sympathy, of an antecedent of 
identification, which is ignored by those who claim that 
understanding other people requires nothing more than an 
understanding of their reasons for acting.      
                                                                     (Honneth : 2008 : 50-51) 
It is when the individual forgets the primary act of recognition that reification 
becomes possible. Such a forgetting does not mean an abandonment of recognition 
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but minimal attentiveness to the qualitative aspects of the people and the 
environment or expressed in personal denial or defensiveness.  
However, Guess (2008) questions Honneth’s theory in asking why recognition 
should be inherently positive or negative and is an over simplification of the concept 
of participation. Does lack of participation immediately infer reification, (Butler : 
2008)? Guess believes that Honneth’s depiction of the concept lends itself more to 
something that must precede any emotional or attitudinal stance and that this is more 
in accordance with Hedeidegger’s view. As such the element of concernedness, 
(recognition) should have no moral or ethical basis whereas Guess finds Honneth’s 
concept to be one with an attendant morality and therefore not one, which affords 
any valuable social critique. Lear (2008) also believes that there is a tendency for the 
prior condition, (i.e. primary recognition) to be perceived as relating to a ‘fall from 
grace’ polemic. What went before was good and the good has been forgotten but can 
be ‘recognised’ and recovered, as such he believes that too much ‘goodness’ is built 
into the prior condition. In responding to this, Honneth stresses that one should not 
understand recognition as being by definition either sympathetic or affectionate. Lear 
(2008) is also of the opinion that the terms reification and recognition are ambiguous 
ones and as such lack precision and have ‘slippage’ so that Honneth arrives at 
conclusions ; ‘that are stronger than the evidence or the argument allows’, (Lear : 
2008 : 131). The attempt to establish the use of the word ‘recognition’ as a 
precondition to cognition seems somewhat awkward; for it implies knowing 
something from a previous encounter or to express something like ‘I concede’ or ‘I 
grant’, (Guess : 2008). Nevertheless, what Honneth refers to remains viable despite 
the somewhat maladroit wording and should not be rejected outright. Similarly, the 
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revivification of the reification concept has some currency and could bear fruit as a 
working social model, especially in light of things like McDonaldization.      
In terms of objects and nature, Honneth believes that these involve a different 
perspective. Our relations with people can be reified but our relation to nature and 
objects is reified. The problem here lies more in not recognizing the value and import 
given to objects and thereby further detracting from existential meaning of the 
human environment. Honneth believes that reification is not only possible but can 
take place in relation to other people, nature, objects and even ourselves:  
My feeling is that the tendency towards self-reification will increase 
as subjects become more aware and more involved in the institutions 
of self-portrayal that possesses the characteristics just described. 
Institutions that latently compel individuals merely to pretend to 
have certain feelings or to give them a self – contained and clearly 
contoured character will promote the development of self- reifying 
attitudes.           
                                                                      (Honneth : 2008 : 82-83) 
 
This has clear affinities with Foucault’ s theories of ‘self-surveillance’ wherein 
societal behaviours and structures persist within the self whether one is in company or 
not or within one’s internal dialogue as opposed to one’s outward social behavior. 
(Foucault : 1995).  His view of the institution also has clear affinities with reification 
and bears the stamp of a basic inauthenticity. Modern collective education and its 
institutionalization provides an excellent example of Foucaultian perception of 
reification and its relation to the standardization process. Within most modern 
educational systems the individual student has a ‘permanent observation’ (Foucault : 
1995 : 126) set upon them. Devos explains the Foucaultian perception of this as; ‘Not 
only is the pupil’s presence recorded, but their cognitive progress is tested and 
registered, evaluated and compared, their motivation, their attitude, the composition 
of their family, the problems of their family, the profession of their parents, etcetera’, 
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(Devos : 2004 : 41). Faisal Bodi, a known Muslim journalist and news commentator 
argued for state funded Muslim schools in the UK admiringly stating that such 
schools were ‘factories for university graduates and professionals’ (Bodi :1997) with 
no apparent sense of irony.  The obvious connection with the concept of reification is 
self-evident – the individual child is handled as a thing, not as a living and complex 
individual being. In Foucaultian terms such institutions can be seen in yet another 
light. Though being instruments of power and authority, they are originally set up 
altruistically to address some societal need, such as illness or illiteracy resulting in 
hospital and schools, yet ultimately the self-preservation of the institution ultimately 
supercedes the needs of those for whom the whole thing was conceived for in the first 
place, (i.e., patients, pupils).  
Yet another perspective on reification stems from the sociological theory of Berger 
and Luckmann, (1967) who also use the concept albeit in a different sense than 
Lucak’s Marxist perspective. The difference lies primarily because they see it as 
separate from objectification and they see as socially functional and not as the 
culmination of historically opposed forces. However, they do perceive reification as 
either being possible in universal individual naïveté or within a collectively social 
context. Reification was understood to be characteristic of primitive societies but is 
remedied through increasing experience and sophistication that would naturally de-
reify. On the individual level and as part of the human cycle of development, 
reification will never end as each child will go through a period of this until de-reifed 
by learning and experience.  Some argue that current education models serve more to 
reify things, perhaps on a higher level than that experienced by the young child and 
perhaps in changing one misappropriation of reality for another one, (Gatto : 2005).  
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However, Berger & Luckmann do also perceive a possible existential inauthenticity 
present wherein one obviates the element of personal choice and responsibility by 
projecting these onto a social role, (i.e. husband, manager, soldier, etc.) or a 
stereotypification of that role. ‘I have no choice in the matter, I have to act this way 
because of my position [as a]…’, (Berger & Luckmann : 1967 : 91).  Reification is 
also the inability to see that social institutions and conventions have simply been 
brought into existence through human agency and are not ‘functional imperative[s] 
of the social system’, (Berger & Luckmann : 1997 : 90). This incapacity to 
understand the human originatives of these, results in ‘ the world of institutions 
appears to merge with that of nature’ ( Berger & Luckmann : 1967 : 90) and ‘the 
world loses its comprehensibility as a human enterprise, (Berger & Luckmann : 1997 
: 89).  
Despite flaws in his analysis and the emergence of the McDonaldization theory as a 
whole, these tend to confirm Lucaks’ analysis of reification as a historical and 
dialectical development. While it does not wholly discount Berger & Luckmann’s 
later view, especially in regard to the obviation of choice and responsibility, Lucaks’ 
perspective seems the more plausible in light of the development of things and in 
view of the fact that these authors wrote some time ago. The view of primitive 
societies has also undergone some revision, as Kuper says, ‘The theory of primitive 
society is about something which does not and never has existed’, (Kuper : 1988 : 8).  
Rose (1978) denies reification as even being a viable concept in claiming that Marx 
had not meant that which Lucaks has ascribed to the concept. Yet Bewes, (2002) 
ventures that Rose’s contention is to be seen more mirrored in Derrida’s différance 
than in outright refutation. Derrida insists on différance as pertaining to or indicating 
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that which is neither word nor concept and as Bewes points out, as far as it can be 
expressed, pertains to ‘non-reifability’, (Bewes : 2002 : 111). Indeed, he utilizes 
Derrida’s deconstructive critique further to assert that behind the identification of the 
reification concept, or at least the façade of it, there actually lays a seemingly 
inverted motive in justifying the concept of reification in that : 
Reification privileges, or seems to privilege, use value over 
exchange value, nature over culture, speech (or thought) over 
writing, immediacy over mediation, instinct over rationalization, 
emotion over intellect, spontaneity over routine, the invisible over 
the visible, morning over evenings, youth and innocence over age 
and knowledge and love at first sight over marriage.  
                                                                            (Bewes : 2002  : 114) 
                                                                                                                              
This Derridean interpretation could be equally applied to the McDonaldization theory 
tackled previously. However, it can be misleading to see deconstruction as the 
unmasking of some fallacy, whereas it might be requesting that it does not self-
righteously masquerades as something other than it is. While it may be that an 
approach to reification could be found in the attitudes mentioned In Bewes’ quote 
above, the choice is still presented and one either invests in the chosen idea or not. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that insisting on reification becomes itself a reifying of 
reification, all of which seems to suggest that there is a delicate balance, a no man’s 
land or différance to be maintained in such cases. Indeed, différance seems to be the 
sphere where one is unaffected by either one or the other side of the reification 
argument and is an ultimate transcending of a duality  - where as soon as we pose the 
concept of reification its opposite possibility – the ‘no reification’ immediately rises 
into view. Another aspect comes into to play, for reification is steeped in duality 
insofar as the ‘thing’ and the individual’s perception are separate, thus embodying the 
subject / object dichotomy. Transcending this means an absolute non-acceptance of 
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the premises and practically speaking if one lives accordingly one would be 
unaffected by iron cages. There is resonance here with the Jain theory of Manifold 
Predications (Syādvāda) an all too brief summary of which is seen in its establishing a 
conceptual truth as ‘in some ways it is and in some ways it is not and it is 
indescribable’ - différance could be equated with ‘indescribable’, (Kalghagi : 2009). 
Nevertheless, does this mean that they we passively accept everything? A stance 
might be taken and actions ensue yet all of it carried out in a detached yet committed 
manner. Equally, this position may ensure that the non-reified, (i.e. speech over 
writing, instinct over rationalization, etc.) is not reified.  
 
An inseparable aspect of reification, arising from deconstruction, is anxiety (or fear) 
and is considered so essential that ‘indeed reification as a concept would not exist 
without it’, (Bewes : 2002 : 96). He points out that many of those who write and think 
about the concept of reification usually express the anxiety that the theory itself or the 
converse will become reified. He proposes that the concept must be continually 
interrogated as unmediated usage simply linking reification to notions of ‘modernity’ 
or ‘progress’ is insufficient and serves only to reify reification itself.  Ultimately, 
though he suggests that an absolute reification is an impossibility and inherently 
paradoxical for total reification would be the end of reification, as conceptual 
awareness of it would be nullified, for if it became the ontological paradigm, it would 
be nigh impossible to recognise. Yet the fact that no one would be conscious of it 
does not render it in any way as morally justifiable. While ultimately one may have 
some sympathy with the stance of différance and even situate one’s self within it, this 
does not mean an accompanying non-decisiveness and passivity to all that is 
encountered.  For despite all, it is simply a fact that the life of ordinary people is 
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becoming increasingly mechanized and dehumanized and that options for existing 
outside of this are rapidly diminishing. Whether that is a good or bad thing or neither 
of these may be up to the individual and yet there is sense of possible nihilism here.   
 
Reification and Religion 
 ‘…a long range development that we may term a process of reification: 
mentally making religion into a thing, gradually coming to conceive of it as an 
objective systematic entity.’  
          (Cantwell Smith : 1962: 51) 
 
It may seem already apparent that the reification of religion is a possibility from what 
we have seen of the work of Drane (2006) and others above.  Yet it is felt to be a 
question requiring deeper analysis which is provided by looking at Cantwell Smith’s 
(1978) seminal theory of the ‘mundane process’ wherein a transcending vigorous 
personal faith is eventually substituted for a ‘human and limited conceptualization’, 
(1978 : 118) and evolves into a ‘reification of religion’.  
 
There is evidence enough of a different paradigm in a pre-Cartesian world where 
something more of a living bond existed between people and the world they 
inhabited, (Nishtani : 1982) with the bond itself embedded within a perceived 
presence of both the Divine and Evil interwoven within the experience of the 
everyday world. The cogito or rather the cognosco had been in a primordial, 
subordinate relationship to esse (being). In our times, the connection of the self with 
the world has changed significantly. Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum established the ego 
as the criterion of its own reality of esse (being) separated and relegated to human 
experience.  Others apart from the ‘Philosophers of the Moment’ have  commented on 
the problematical consequences which have resulted from the Cartesian line of 
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enquiry, (Pope John Paul II : 1998; Prisig : 1984; Nishtani : 1982).  The move away 
from this primordial state resulted increasingly in a mechanistic view of the world, 
living creatures and even the human body are perceived of as mere parts of a 
machine. It is characteristic of western modes of thought to see the world as so many 
interlocking cogs and wheels creating both energy and movement. Based in this it is 
easy to see how a concept of God developed as the prime mover, transcendent and far 
removed from creation yet moulded within a similar linear and hierarchical structure.  
In this neatly defined metaphysic, the basis of western religious thought, humans as 
the imago dei is at the pinnacle of creation thus claiming sovereignty over the sub 
creation. The world becomes raw material for humans to enact their superiority upon 
and exploit it. Life itself, the will and the intellect are employed as the tools by which 
human beings dominate the world around them in a supposed imitation of the Divine. 
In contrast to this and in very broad terms, Eastern religious thought bases itself upon 
a basic harmonious and organic oneness at the core of all creation, the Divine ‘is 
interpenetrative of the deepest human essence and interpenetrated by the human 
essence in turn and hence transcendently immanent in his ‘creation’. (Nishtani : 1982 
: xiv). So while there appears to be some variation of rationalistic appropriations of 
the Divine between Eastern and Western religions, it will be argued here that this is 
not neccesarily the case or rather is no longer the case.   
 
Cantwell-Smith’s – ‘The Meaning and End of Religion’ 
Though it may seem retrospectively obvious, Cantwell Smith, (from hereron referred 
to as Smith) coherently argued that there was clear evidence that earlier religious 
communities did not have a word for either the concept of ‘religion’ or ‘religions' nor 
even for themselves. Labels designating one as ‘Jewish’ or ‘Buddhist’ were not in 
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usage demonstrating that the discourse within these groupings were less doctrinally 
rooted and rather indicated communities of belief, living out of a chosen obedience 
and faith. A subtle example of this is provided by John Hick in the introduction to 
Smith’s book (1978) in attempting to illustrate the point just made, wherein he 
discusses the title of a well known text of Augustine’s entitled De Vera Religone. 
Hick perceives both the title and the text that follows as something frequently 
misconceived and mistranslated in its being depicted as the ‘The True Religion’ 
giving the impression that Augustine is engaged in polemical discussion of the 
superior merits of Christianity, in contradiction to other ‘false’ faiths. In fact, Hick 
believes that the title is more accurately interpreted as referring to ‘True 
Religiousness’ at the expense of no one and addressed to individual faith, an 
interpretation with which the text seems to bear out.  
 
Citing the exceptions of Islam and Sikhism, Smith (1978) argues that many religions 
did not originally function under the concept of being a named, labelled or unique 
community. So in the early developmental stages of the major religions, the adherents 
did not have a name for themselves or make significant distinctions between 
themselves and others. Those who followed Dharmic teachings did not initially name 
this as such nor see themselves as Buddhists or Hindus. Any distinctions that might 
have existed would have been based on being students of a spiritual guide (guru) in 
the context of the multitudinous spiritual teachings available in what is now known as 
India. Hindus certainly did not have a name for themselves and the categorizing label 
is still considered debateable.  As an example of this, many Hindus easily regard 
Jesus as an Avatar who simply takes his place amongst a pantheon of Gods which 
exist on the Subcontinent but do not denote themselves as Christians (Hedlund : 
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2001). Equally in Judaism and Christianity, what was originally felt to be a particular 
approach to understanding life and the world developed into a conceptual schema 
based on outward system of observances; which was initially depicted by others.  
Jesus did not preach a consolidated system of belief nor did he seem to have a notion 
of ‘Christianity’ but was more concerned with human beings and their connection to 
the Divine. The absence of a self-imposed or clearly defined group identity is evident 
in many of the older major religions.  
 
The first appearance of such codification occurs primarily in the encounter with 
western colonialism where, in order to subjugate and govern better, it was thought 
necessary to develop some form of classification. Extending this further, Smith 
argues that current concepts of religion are constructs of Western post-enlightenment 
theory, mainly applied to non-western traditions and that this categorization is still 
evident in academic approaches and hence Smith is critical of the way in which 
religions have traditionally been studied. A genuine appropriation of religious 
tradition is hindered and obscured when understood solely as historically fashioned 
theological nuclei separated into ‘contraposed ideological communities’ (Smith 
:1978 : xi) with prescriptive and exclusive membership criteria. Asad (2001) agrees 
with Smith’s overall criticism of this as religious essentialism, wherein the adherents 
of a particular religious tradition are understood to share some common essence and 
that this shared essence drives both the behaviour and outlook and ultimately 
concluding in some innate uniformity. This negates the enormous variety of religious 
expression in a given tradition as well as the agency of individual interpretation. In 
reality, the label ‘religion’ is simply a convenient yet stultifying categorization for 
something that was in actuality a flowing, dynamic and evolving understanding 
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within a community. Smith argues forcefully that religion should be studied as 
historical rather than eternal with an approach of religions as ‘subjective notions of 
truth in any meaningful attempt to understand other men’ (Pruett : 1973) should be 
the central focus. Smith felt that Western Universities needed to approach the study 
of non-Western religions as appropriately as possible to the subject content rather 
than through the traditional Euro-American humanist lens. The imposition of this 
academic approach had over time had created an impaired inter-religious 
understanding while simultaneously having a negative influence on intra- theological 
thinking within the various sacred traditions themselves. This can be seen where 
religious communities were engaged in hostilities and creating derogatory definitions 
to clearly distinguish and begin the process of dehumanizing the perceived enemy. 
When adding with the later colonial codification of the conquered and the biased 
demarcation of the ‘other’ this eventually resulted in religious communities defining 
themselves in contradiction to others, ironically even utilizing the definition of others 
for themsleves.  This was also transposed to the intra-religious, an example of which 
is afforded by the historical appropriation of the label  ‘orthodox’ by certain sectors 
of the Jewish community which was originally a contemptuous taunt by other Jews 
of dissimilar theology. It was insulting as it had been culled from Christianity and 
created by progressive Jewish elements around the end of the 18th century to describe 
the allegedly reactionary and conservative Jew. After some initial furore, the label 
was overtime, eventually appropriated by these conservatives to proudly differentiate 
themselves from the Reform and Liberal movements (Hirsch : 1997).  In more 
contemporary terms, the appropriation of the word, ‘nigger’ by the African American 
community as a term of endearment provides a similar example, (Kennedy : 2002; 
Galinsky et al : 2003). As such, this has bearing on the effects of allegedly 
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discriminatory notions imparted towards the Muslim community, succinctly outlined 
in the findings of the Runnymede Trust consultation paper entitled, Islamophobia its 
features and dangers, published in 1997. There is evidence of the word ‘Paki’ now 
being used by young people British Pakistani origins to describe themselves and their 
community and yet considered as racist if used by Asians of other origins or non-
Asians    (Bhatia : 2007). Other research has revealed prevalent attitudes among 
women choosing to wear the niqab, suggesting a defiant appropriation of 
discriminatory attitudes towards the niqb as a symbol of the oppression of women, 
which in fact these women are anything but that (Perlaz : 2007; Shirazi & Mirsha : 
2010). Even with the deeply negative social outcomes stemming from discrimination 
generally, these are further compounded by the eventual possibility of Muslims 
defining themselves consciously or unconsciously by such labels having an added 
detrimental effect. In religious terms, the negative judgment of Islam as an 
aggressive religion can be appropriated on a twofold basis, first dropping the  
apprehension of Islam as of an intrinsically numinous quality and shifting to Islam as 
an expression of defiance and welcoming of the idealized status of the underdog and 
victim.  
 
Smith’s theory of the ‘mundane process’, which does not refer to the tedious but to a 
gradual shifting from the sacred to the worldly, denotes a significant historical shift 
believed to have occurred within different theologies and practice across the religious 
spectrum in varying ways and at varying rates. Interestingly, the process seems to 
have intensified over the last two hundred years to the present day and the increased 
rapidity of this trend is historically in tandem with the onset of the Enlightenment and 
the Industrial Age. Even in the case of western Christianity, a self-conscious 
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awareness of identity did not arise until the age of scepticism and the arrival of the 
modern age and hence forged within a defensive mode. Though referring to 
Christianity, we get some sense of this heightened velocity of change in reading that; 
‘…..especially in recent centuries [Christians] have formally institutionalized their 
religious life more than perhaps is true of any other society on earth, either at present 
or throughout the past’, (Cantwell Smith 1968 : 66).  
 
One of the central philosophical tenets upon which Smith bases his argument is best 
expressed in the words of Asad (2006), ‘[Smith’s] argument is that no thing 
corresponds, properly speaking, to the noun “religion”. The use of that term to refer 
to what does not exist – namely the personal quality of faith – therefore inevitably 
reifies it.’ (Asad : 2001 : 206 ). In this manner, there is no Buddhist, Christian or 
Sikh people but there are Buddhist, Christian and Sikh ways of life. As Bailey (1969) 
points out Smith was not original in this as the theologians, Barth, Brunner and 
Bonhoeffer had previously articulated similar arguments. Using these words as nouns 
is reifying whereas these should be seen as descriptive and used as adjectives. In 
relation to the truth of religion, one should not ask, ‘Is Judaism true?’ but should 
rather ask ‘What does Judaism mean to the Jews – how does the individual Jew live 
up to the claims of Judaism?’.  Smith argued for historical religious tradition to be 
seen as facts and that any truth to be ascertained lay in the degree to which 
participant participated. The emphasis is not on whether men respond to God but 
how they do so. Smith comments, ‘From the truth of an adjective –Christian or 
Muslim or Buddhist, a man may be a good Christian or Muslim or 
Buddhist….nothing follows about nouns’ (Smith : 1967 : 101).  Nevertheless, the 
exceptions are two unequivocal nouns with profound meaning, ‘God’ and ‘person’ 
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related to the concept of  ‘religion’ in the truest sense of the word as the relation 
between the individual and God. Rounding this up more conclusively Smith says:   
By ‘faith’ I mean personal faith…..By ‘cumulative tradition’ I mean 
the entire mass of overt objective data that constitute the historical 
deposit, as it were, of the past religious life of the community in 
question: temples, scriptures, theological systems, dance patterns, 
legal and other institutions, conventions, moral codes, myths, and so 
on; anything that the historian can observe.  
                                                    (Cantwell Smith : 1978  : 156-157) 
 
Smith believes that the study of religions has been unbalanced insofar that either the 
historical religion or the personal transcendent aspect, (i.e. faith) is neglected at the 
expense of the other and in order to avoid this, proposes that we should approach 
these as two separate aspects, both worthy of attention yet with the individual as the 
link between the two. Nevertheless, Asad criticizes Smith on this point arguing that 
Smith postulates ‘faith’ as an internal matter and ‘not as a relationship created 
through, maintained by, and expressed in practice…... the developed capacities, the 
cultivated sensorium, of the living body and that, in its engagement with material 
objects and social conditions, makes meaningful experience possible.’ (Asad : 2001 : 
208-209).  In saying this, Asad is arguing that while it may be true that faith is 
internal and is mistakenly reified if posed as something external in the world. Yet if 
faith is expressed as external action, is the case for reification quite as strong? Could 
it then be named without reification? In a similar external sense, Bailey (1969) thinks 
that Smith has ignored the import of Christian or Muslim ‘mission’. Asad (2001) 
finds that Smith somewhat confuses the issue of reification by fusing two separate 
notions with insufficient distinction between the two. On the one hand he sees Smith 
as relating reification to the Weberian notion, as in degrees of systemization of 
doctrine and practice. On the other hand, naming the abstract as a concrete thing or 
as Asad describes it, ‘mistaking the word for the thing it names’ (2001 : 209) is what 
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he questions.  At another point Asad (2001) also criticizes Smith in seemingly 
referring to Hindus as the most unreified and yet in referring to some examples of 
sectarianism within that tradition mentions these as a fractional to ‘the total Hindu 
complex’ suggesting a contradicting essentialism. ‘Hinduism is simply what Hindus 
believe and do. But my concern is that it is also, paradoxically, a heterogeneity that it 
is describes as a singular “vision” attributed to a collective subject’, (Asad : 2001 : 
209). Without denying the concept of religious reification, Asad believes that Smith 
was extreme in his application. The point being made that in some way we must use 
language to describe a certain groups of people. While Asad finds Smith extreme in 
identifying reification and that underlying this is the increasingly popular contention, 
though ‘only half-formulated in Smith’s text’ (2001 : 212) that the Abrahamic 
monotheistic traditions are essentially intolerant and that this is ‘careless thinking’. 
No expression is given to the exclusivist praxis of polytheistic religions or the 
inclusivity of monotheistic believers or to the variety of behaviours in which 
“tolerance” is expressed and lived’, (2001 : 212) and as such, Asad believes that the 
‘reification of Islam’ is itself reified. He finds Smith’s presentation of Islam in India 
as an ‘alien force’ (2001 : 210) to be a classical orientalist narrative and yet stresses 
that his concern is not with Smith’s apparent bias with Hinduism as opposed to Islam 
but rather that the historical situation is misrepresented. Smith makes no mention of 
the Aryan invasion of south Asia, the expulsion of Buddhism and the evolving of the 
rigid caste system as all having occurred before the arrival of Islam in India. Asad 
returns to the aspect of faith in practice as being distinct from internal ‘faith’ and that 
Smith’s alleging that sharp boundaries were drawn between believers and 
unbelievers in India by Muslims is based on the faulty assumption that adherence to 
a particular faith was solely an internal and cognitive one, later substantiated by 
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British colonial categorization that Smith himself originally decried. Whereas Asad 
believes that boundaries are drawn through external and practical means and that 
there were ‘complicated patterns of belief and practice shared among various local 
populations of Muslims and Hindus’, (2001 : 211). Asad also cites the apparent 
nationalization of Hinduism and some of the methodically structured campaigns to 
recover ‘converts’ from the lower castes and claiming that Indian Muslims are 
originally and therefore essentially Hindu to demonstrate that Smith had also 
contradictorily reified the concept of Hinduism as being the least reified. 
Additionally, the concept of Islam as the most reified entity is also challenged in 
Asad’s presenting the differing interpretations on relations with non Muslims from 
within the four schools of jurisprudence (madhhab [sing.] madhhāib [plu.]) to 
demonstrate the lack of entity like uniformity. While Asad may find Smith to be 
extreme in his application of reification, he is himself relatively extreme in his 
application of non-essentialism.  Yet Asad’s arguments are never defensively 
couched on behalf of Islam and  he agrees with Smith’s basic idea of non-
essentialism, though finding some of the arguments for this as contradictory.  He 
argues that Smith’s stating that religions ‘present’ themselves in some degree or 
other as to the degree of an ‘organized and systematized entity’, (Smith cited by 
Asad : 2001 : 211) implies that religions are ‘subjects capable of self-presentation’ 
and that ‘One might have expected that Smith, of all people, would be aware that 
“Islam” does not present itself; it is named Muslims in specific times and places who 
express their understanding of a tradition they call “Islam”, (2001 : 211-212) and this 
would presumably be the case for any other faith tradition.  He also suggests that 
Smith may have overly focused on Muslim ‘spokesmen’ largely from India and 
Pakistan and may therefore be lacking in a wider Muslim perspective.  
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Bailey (1969) believes there are signs of naïveté in Smith’s transcendent 
understanding of faith and that he too readily diminishes the importance of specific 
and differing beliefs in something like the afterlife. To what extent must a Christian, 
Jew or Muslim believe in the afterlife and the conditions pertaining to their 
attainment without compromising their faith? How literally or symbolically should 
these be taken? ‘Where does Vedanta fit into Smith’s understanding of faith?’ asks 
Bailey (1969 : 290). Perhaps Smith’s harshest critic, Bolle (1964) is dismissive of his 
work as a whole labelling it as lacking clarity by summarily compounding the 
complex concepts behind ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith’ and proposing the 
replacement of these as ‘traditions’ and ‘systems’ under the heading of ‘cumulative 
traditions’ without proper exposition, ‘The historical method followed is 
astoundingly superficial’, says Bolle (1964 : 171) and goes on to accuse Smith of 
lacking in a necessary grounding in hermeneutical and epistemological problems. 
However, Prueet (1973) responds to this criticism by pointing out that despite the 
obvious lack of some of the wider and deeper implications of what Smith introduces, 
there is a reason why he does not endeavour upon any deeper theological and 
philosophical grounding for his innovatory ideas. Smith’s apparent deficiency in not 
approaching ‘meta-questions’ (Prueet :1973 : 588) is explained by his considering 
these as western based ‘objective’ impositions and that the nature of what he 
contended with lay in the ‘personalist’ and ‘subjective’ realm whereas the former 
was provocatively non conducive in opening a dialogue with non-western religions. 
‘The goal is to understand religious persons, whether or not the method we use 
corresponds to an epistemological norm’, (Prueet : 1973 : 589) and ‘…these 
methodological issues must be treated by the historically self-conscious Western 
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student as part of his own tradition and not as a “universal” methodology for 
understanding the faith of other men.’, (Prueet : 1973 : 590).            
 
Gualtieri (1969) finds seemingly contradictory arguments within Smith’s ideas on 
transcendence and faith. On the one hand, he finds that Smith seemingly accepting 
anything of ultimate selfhood or personal, existential authenticity to be a matter of 
faith and this has traces of a secular orientation and yet overriding all of this is 
suggestion that such expressions faith are ultimately God centred. Consequently, 
Gualtieri (1969) questions this alleged narrow depiction of faith, believing the term 
should extend to ‘its application to all life-commitments to ultimate value – the so-
called secular as well as the explicitly spiritual or theological’ (Gualtieri : 1969 : 
111). Some credibility can be given to the concept of secular or ‘humanist faith’, 
even though faith is usually defined as that which goes beyond or is considered 
reasonable or evident and perhaps could be seen as contributing to ‘de-reifying’ 
Smith’s theory of reification. However, Smith (1967) was strongly critical of many 
secular critics of religion who in their ‘insensitivity and discourtesy [….] 
misunderstand and underestimate’ (Smith : 1967 : 31) the religious, finding their 
attitude reminiscent of evangelical missionaries in colonial times. Returning to Asad 
(2001) and the question of faith  :  
Smith’s separation of ‘faith’ from what he calls ‘cumulative 
tradition’, his presentation of the former as something 
transcendentally personal and the latter as its collective worldly 
expression, and his lack of interest in the formalities of worship and 
behaviour render the difference between the man of faith and one 
who has no faith virtually unobservable. Any view of religious life 
that requires the separation of what is observable from what is not 
observable fits comfortably with the modern liberal separation 
between the public spaces (where our political responsible life is 
openly lived). The idea seems that to be one that one’s beliefs should 
make no difference to publicly observable life and, conversely, that 
how one behaves can have no significance for one’s ‘‘inner 
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condition. Such a view prevents one from investigating how ‘faith’ 
and ‘cumulative tradition’ form each other, and how the grammar of 
faith differs from one tradition to the other. 
                                                                                      (Asad : 2001 : 215) 
 
These observation is insightful and does somewhat detract from Smith’s theory of 
reification as rooted in aspects of the ‘cumulative tradition’ which are the external 
acts of faith. While it sheds some doubt on his reification theory, nonetheless, 
Smith’s argument cannot be fully discounted and contemporary events could be said 
to attest to this. Asad’s views in particular, serve to moderate these effectively, 
providing a fuller and more balanced picture, especially in regard to faith and praxis, 
even if thereby ‘de-reifyng’ Smith’s reification theory somewhat. A culmination of 
the two perspectives provides a good example of the idea of différance and 
Syādvāda, as being something that is and yet is not. Nevertheless, as we have seen 
and will see further, there are many Muslims who are inclined towards an 
essentialist, ‘organized and systematic entity’ of their faith despite the more realistic 
variance of practice and belief that Asad presents. Ironically, there would be many 
Muslims who would be critical of a non-essentialist stance in regard to Islam and yet 
probably agree with the idea of faith expressed in the external as well as the internal. 
Rightly or wrongly, whatever theoretical and critical conclusions Asad arrives at 
these are surpassed by current events on the ground that seem to ascribe validity to 
Smith’s theory. In addition, there is a sense in which Asad appears to get bogged 
down into specifics, losing sight of the overall case being made. Even if some 
aspects of Smith’s theory are flawed, the overall conclusions are viable, something 
that Asad does not deny.  
 
In fact, it could be argued that reification as a whole has perhaps evolved more 
extensively than either Smith or Asad envisaged and events have moved on 
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considerably since Smith’s and Asad’s publication, (February 2001, significantly 
prior to September 11th of the same year) with accelerated velocity.  Certainly it 
could be argued that the mundane process is clearly more evident than ever; from 
hardening attitudes in inter and intra religious discourse and exclusivist attitudes, 
doctrinally legitimized resulting in many of the faithful considering themselves as 
part of an ‘exclusive salvation offering society against others’, (Hick’s introduction 
in Smith : 1978 : xi). Considering that The Meaning and End of Religion was initially 
published in 1962 attests to his keen insight. Such conflicts have ended in death, 
violence and destruction, perhaps unimaginable in Smith’s time and most certainly 
the antithesis of authentic religion as defined by such as Eliade.  Such codifying 
tendencies have corrosively seeped into the ineffable and sacred core of the religious 
traditions and Gould (1999) suggests that religion itself is frequently lived and 
expressed in terms which are fundamentally contradictory to its nature. As we have 
seen, reification can be seen to be at such universally penetrating levels that nearly 
all aspects of human life globally are effected, (Lucaks : 1971; Heidegger : 2008). 
While an attempt to counteract this may lie in returning to Eliade’s vision of religion 
as a deep-rooted alternative by which human authenticity may be recovered from 
superficiality, the problem is compounded further when the religious itself is 
nullified in providing such alternatives. It is also important to note that Asad is 
highly complimentary of Smith’s raising of the matters in question and believes that 
Smith’s Meaning and End of Religion is a classic work that should be part of any 
comparative religious discourse. With all of the above in mind, it is considered 
justifiable to continue to further examine the case for the reification of Islam.  
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The Reification of Islam 
…the essential tragedy of the modern Islamic world is the degree to which 
Muslims, instead of giving their allegiance to God, have been giving it to 
something called Islam.’                                              
                                                                              (Cantwell Smith : 1967 :115)   
In 2002, Mecca Cola was launched in France, one amongst approximately six other 
similar brands, motivated by anti - Coca Cola, (read anti American) sentiments, 
though it does use similar colouring and lettering to the Coca Cola brand.  Sharma & 
Williams, (2006) question the idea of a global Muslim brand saying that while there 
may be similar Christian global brands they are not perceived as such, nor use 
christian references as a basic selling point. They also believe that given the 
complexity and variance of these cultures it is impossible to codify or commodify 
what being Muslim or Christian actually is.   
Shirazi, (2010) has carried out research on the marketing of veiled dolls across 
various Muslim countries. These were again apparently prompted by an Al Azhari 
scholar pronouncing Barbies’ style of dressing as ‘[promoting] an un-Islamic way of 
dressing’. (Meikheimar cited in Shirazi : 2010 : 13).  Shirazi reports that Barbie dolls 
are made in China but in this case now with different clothing, (i.e. kaftan, hijab, etc.). 
Barbie has converted ! Shirazi is not convinced, instead believing that,  ‘…..one must 
perceive the Islamic commodification of hijabi dolls not as a religious ideological 
trend but rather as a clever marketing strategy that utilizes and exploits religion’ 
(Shirazi : 2010 : 13). Returning to the question of Hajj, we can clearly detect the 
traces of reification when we read of the economic benefits of the Hajj: 
 
 
While the direct economic impact of the Hajj is easily 
observable……. If fostered and applied more deeply, 
capabilities and skills linked to the Hajj can be pivotal in 
developing and expanding world-class initiatives and 
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companies. The skill set of the Hajj economy can, if viewed 
strategically, be a significant source of competitive advantage. 
            (Rehman Institute: 2009) 
 
 
No mention here of the essentially religious or spiritual aims of the Hajj but rather a 
depiction of a system able to be transferably modelled to be competitively profitable 
elsewhere.  
 
Islam – Noun or Adjective? 
The word ‘Islam’ was used infrequently by Muslims until up to about fifty years ago, 
(Smith : 1981) and the increasing preponderance of the word corresponds with a 
supposed phase in the historical objectification of the faith.  
The Arabic term Islam itself was of relatively minor importance in 
classical theologies based on the Qur'an. If one looks at the works of 
theologians such as the famous al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the key term of 
religious identity is not Islam but iman (faith), and the one who 
possesses it is the mu'min (believer). Faith is one of the major topics 
of the Qur'an; it is mentioned hundreds of times in the sacred text. In 
comparison, Islam is a relatively less common term of secondary 
importance; it only occurs eight times in the Qur'an. Since, however, 
the term Islam had a derivative meaning relating to the community 
of those who have submitted to God, it has taken on a new political 
significance, especially in recent history.       
                                                                                          (Ernst : 2003 : 63) 
 
Equally the adjective ‘Islamic’ or the idea of ‘Islamization’ were also virtually 
unknown up to fifty years ago and yet very commonplace in contemporary Muslim 
parlance, (Euben : 2002; Hoodbhouy : 1992; Panjwami : 2004). These words come 
with difficulties, for as a matter of course, when determining something as ‘Islamic’ 
the possibility of its opposite, the ‘unIslamic’ arises immediately and is as 
problematical as the concept of something being ‘American’ or  ‘un American’, a 
thing which Edward Said, (cited by Rothstein : 2001) called ‘ideological confections’ 
and  ‘false universals’, loaded with underlying and flawed assumptions that do not 
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bear up to any sensible analysis. One aspect of this lays in the fact that while many 
would understand these to apply to the general precepts and injunctions of the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah there are also geographical implications, which are both problematic 
and impair understanding. This can be seen in referring to things like ‘Islamic food’ 
and ‘Islamic clothes’, wherein many people understand these to be recipes or clothes 
from the Middle Eastern or Sub Continent. The principle of food and dress in 
Qur’anic and Prophetic terms simply enjoins nothing more than that they consist of 
halal contents in the first instance and modesty and covering the shape of the body in 
the second, something easily achieved by means of recipes from any country or loose 
fitting clothes from any culture.  
 
Another very common conversational tendency within the Muslim community has 
been centred around the idea of serving Islam. A typical example of this is to be found 
in the following : 
Being Muslims we are obligated to serve Islam by spreading its 
teaching to the world and by showing the real image of Islam. For 
this, first of all we must have a character that perfectly reflects a 
Muslim’s personality. 
 
We can serve Islam by having a correct resolve and sincere 
intention, for Allaah blesses an action that is done sincerely for His 
sake alone, even if it is little. We should teach the newly converted 
Muslims, that how to offer prayers, fast, proper Qur’an Recitation 
and other good deeds. 
 
We can serve Islam by knowing the right way and following it. The 
Straight Path means following the way of Qur’an and our Prophet 
Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) with 
regard to the principles, ways and means of da'wah and being patient 
in adhering to that, whilst treating people with kindness and 
compassion, because they are suffering from the disease of sin. 
 
We can serve Islam by giving precedence to that which is in the 
interests of Islam over your own whims and desires. Serving this 
religion means giving what is most precious of your money, effort, 
time, thought, etc. Have you not seen those who love sport (football 
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or soccer) for example, how they devote their efforts, time and 
money to their beloved sport? But more is expected of you than that. 
 
We can serve Islam by following in the footsteps of the scholars of 
prestigious Islamic Schools, daa'iyahs and reformers, having 
patience for your companion and putting up with tiredness and 
exhaustion. For you are doing a great act of worship which is the 
mission of the Prophets and Messengers and those who follow in 
their footsteps. 
                       (Islamic Education Online : 2009 : emphasis added) 
 
Smith aptly articulates the question that arises here, ‘Does [the word ‘Islam’], 
.......designate not an ideal but an actuality; not what God asks of men but what men 
choose to give Him?’, (Cantwell Smith 1981 : 58). There are countless other 
publications and websites which utilize the ‘service to Islam’ concept. Yet there 
appears to be no theological grounds for such a concept in the Qur’an as there 
appears to be no mention of ‘serving Islam’ within the text and an argument can be 
made that it is not Islam that Muslims are to serve but Allah, (Shepard : 1989).  In 
the extract above there is one occurrence of the word ‘Allah’ whereas the pairing of 
the words ‘serve’ and ‘Islam’ occurs several times. Other similar phrases and binary 
word / concepts combinations used frequently are; ‘love Islam’, ‘defend Islam’ and 
‘protect Islam’ amongst other similar wordings and concepts. Again, according to the 
Qur’anic paradigm and presumably therefore that of the Muslim community, it is not 
Islam that should be served or loved but Allah, (Qur’an 2: 165). In like fashion this 
can be equated to the difference between attitudes to the Qur’an, namely waqar 
(reverence) and ibada (worship); for as Asad (2011) states, the Qur’an is approached 
only in a reverential manner, as only God can be worshipped. Concluding this, one 
can only wonder alongside Smith says, ‘To reflect on these words is to realize how 
profoundly the meaning of [the word] Islam has changed !’ (Cantwell Smith 1981: 
64) 
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Does such a shift in discourse signify an evolving definition of the word into a 
conceptual icon pertaining to a religio-cultural group? Smith comments that ‘If these 
cases are carefully considered, reflection seems to lead one to conclude that the word 
Islam has become the name not even of a religion but of a culture and a community’, 
(Cantwell Smith 1981 : 56). As we have already seen, the charge cannot only be laid 
only at the door of the Muslims for, as Timothy Winter comments, there is a modern 
tendency to : 
……..redefine the language of religion to allow it to support identity 
politics. Religion has, of course, always had the marking of 
collective and individual identity as one of its functions […..]. 
However, …… this dimension has in all the world religions been 
allowed to expand beyond its natural scope and limits. Increasingly, 
religionists seem to define themselves sociologically, rather than 
theologically.  
                                                                             (Winter : 2003 : 5-6) 
Another significant influence on Muslim self-perception stems from outside, situated 
within the public and private discourse of non-Muslims regarding Islam and Muslims. 
Negative perceptions and opinions frequently based on flawed generalizations only 
serve to narrow the parameters of how Muslims choose to define themselves and their 
religion. The Runnymede Trust consultation paper entitled Islamophobia - Its features 
and dangers (1997), identified eight opposing distinctions pertaining to Muslims and 
Islam within the public consciousness entitled ‘Open and Closed Views of Islam’. 
The distinctions identified were; monolithic / diverse; separate / interacting; inferior / 
different;  enemy / partner;  manipulative / sincere;  discrimination defended / 
discrimination criticised;  Islamophobia natural / problematic. As already 
demonstrated, substantial historical and contemporary evidence suggests that 
communities unconsciously or consciously take on the labels and classifications 
wielded upon them from the ‘other’. What is being proposed here is that if, as 
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Heidegger says, ‘Language is the house of being and in its home man dwells’ (2002 : 
262) and coupled with the Sapir and Whorf hypothesis (Cohn & Russell: 2012), then 
further added to by Smith’s theory concerning the labelling and categorization from 
outside sources; it can be suggested that the language we use concerning individuals 
or whole communities can be fundamental in their forming of individual or 
community identity and self perception. If the above proposition is viable, then it is 
perhaps possible to posit that these are potential causes and/or symptoms of an 
identifiable process of reification within the Muslim body. 
The Reification of Islam as an exception to the Rule 
Understanding the how and why of the transmutations of such words and the 
conceptual shifts involved, Smith’s ‘mundane process’ and ‘reification of religion’ 
offers considerable insight. Despite the historical description of the evolvement of a 
religious reification process outlined previously, Smith (1978) understood Islam to be 
an exception to the historical process of reification. It is important to note that he a 
specialist in Muslim theology as well as fluent in Arabic and his view cannot be easily 
discounted nor summarily categorized as orientalist, despite Asad ascribing orientalist 
nuances within some of his work. Specifically within Muslim history, he identifies a 
particular type of reification not mirrored elsewhere within any of the other major 
religions, except for some aspects of Sikhism. In contrast, to earlier religious 
phenomena the Muslims did have a name for their belief system and an identity. The 
word ‘Islam’ does occur in the Qur’an and is therefore understood to be not a name 
given by others but divinely bestowed. A fundamental Qur’anic paradigm lies in the 
Arabic word, din meaning ‘religion’ (Qur’an : V 49) demonstrating a clear notion of 
religion as a phenomenon, including Islam and other religions.  As already 
demonstrated such concepts were not as sharply delineated in earlier religious 
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phenomena where the emphasis lay more on the personal spiritual path as opposed to 
the collective project. Reflecting this, Islam can make claim to political, social and 
legal systems that are strongly intertwined with the theological, perhaps more so than 
with other major religions. More specifically in India and China Islam is rendered 
more coherently consolidated as compared to Hinduism and more ‘morphous’ than 
Buddhism and Christianity (Smith : 1978).  
 
The initial evidence for this lying in the era of Islam’s inception, wherein the 
historical context into which it emerged was such that it simply could not be as 
equally amorphous as may have been the case in the evolving of earlier religions.   
Within the already existing Abrahamic traditions, stages of development had already 
been breached wherein a sense of specific and separate religious entities had already 
occurred.  These had been brought about in relation to subtle but powerful 
systemizing influences in the wider region stemming from Zarathustran and 
Manichean traditions.  Cantwell Smith (1978) believes these influences, issuing 
mainly from Persia, played a much a greater part in Middle Eastern religious thought 
than is usually given credit for. While Zarathustra had not preached a religion his 
ideas are thought to have had far reaching consequences particularly within Judaism 
(Black : 1962 : 696; Duchesne-Guillemin : 1988) 
 
Christianity was allegedly also affected both through its evolvement through Judaism 
and through inherited aspects of Mithraism, considered a later Roman derivation of 
Zoroastrianism, (Cumont : 1956; Fremont & Gandy : 1999; Reynolds : 1993). 
Partially evident of this and something that Smith finds particularly pertinent was the 
idea of two distinct groups of people – those that through some voluntary act choose 
to either rise to heaven or descend to hell; i.e., those adhering to the group’s beliefs 
 106 
and attaining ultimate bliss while those that reject are thereby damned. In addition, 
there was the further influence of Manichaeism – essentially fabricated religion also 
originating from Iran, which was based on a very deliberate structured system of 
belief – reification par excellence. These systemizing developments have played an 
enormous part in both Middle Eastern and Western traditions and it was under these 
prevailing theological positions that Islam came to fruition.  
 
Other evidence of this lies in examining the Prophet Muhammad’s awareness of his 
own role and it is not difficult to surmise that he was very aware of the construction of 
a system of belief with a defined focus on the sociological.  Smith points out that the 
concept of ummah plays a far more essential role in Islam than the concept of sangha 
(community) plays within Buddhist teachings or any other tradition. Its emphasis on a 
sociological system constitutes one of the unique features of Islam indicative of a 
more consolidated idea than within other prominent traditions. It is clear that the early 
Muslim community had the notion of a Islam as a distinct value distinguishable from 
other religions.  
 
Another unique aspect of Islam pertaining to reification raised by Smith, lies in the 
fact that it is essentially reformational; situated outside of the belief systems 
considered to be in necessity of reform, in that Islam claims to reform the 
monotheistic tradition of the Jews and Christians. Non-Muslims frequently 
understand to be the judeo-christian influence on Islam, while to Muslims it is the 
continuation and resolving of the Abrahamic tradition. Smith posits the idea that the 
valid historical interpretation is to see this as a movement for the reform of traditions 
outside of itself. In summary, Smith see Islam as having come into being at a time 
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where schematized religion had evolved sufficiently so that distinctions between 
different faith positions were already reified, the Prophet seemed to know that he was 
addressing anamed and defined community and Islam’s chief role was correctional.  
All of these are indications of a type of reification not evidenced in other older 
traditions,  although Smith identifies similarities and differences with Sikhism that 
was founded much later.  
 
Notwithstanding all of this, Smith identifies two other significant reification processes 
that Islam underwent at a later stage, stemmimg from within the Muslim body and 
from the outside. The internal aspect was simply that the Muslims themselves tended 
towards greater reification – systematizing and codifying their faith to a greater 
degree than at its inception. This was all the more so at the end of the 18th century 
under the new influence of Europe and largely in an ensuing reactionary mode against 
European colonial powers. ‘One discovers that also in the Islamic case as in others the 
emergence of a conceptualised and named entity has, despite appearances to the 
contrary, been in significant part a gradual but rather late aberration’, (Cantwell Smith 
: 1978 : 109). 
 
A different interpretation of the Muslim canon began to evolve. Smith points out that 
this was not a linguistic question but rather a question of a paradigm shift manifesting 
within the Muslim ummah resulting in the Qur’an and role of the Prophet being 
interpreted differently. There were enormous forces from within the Muslim 
community ranged against this later reification process constituting a ‘nonreifyng or 
pre-reifying’ interpretation which Smith and others (Ernst : 2003) characterized as: 
…sensitively religious, less superficial in their response, less liable 
to the outsider’s mundane view and more perceptive of transcendent 
overtones. Further, such evidence that is available indicates that 
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these persons were in early Islamic times in preponderating 
majority, at least among leaders; and that over the course of the 
centuries there has been a demonstratable drift from the personalist, 
vivid and open sort of interpretation towards the other, the closed 
and reified view that today is common.’  
                                                              (Cantwell Smith : 1978 : 110) 
Though Smith makes little mention of such polemics in contemporary terms, there is 
ample evidence that this dichotomy still exists to this day. At this point, for want of a 
better description, the term ‘classical’ will be used to denote the view of those 
described in the above quote, the word ‘traditional’ having connotations that can be 
confusing. This classical position was strongly challenged (and is still the case today) 
particularly in the areas of Qur’anic interpretation where the consensus was, and is, 
that much has been misunderstood through linguistic and faulty arguments and 
justifications, (Nasr : 1990 ; Winkel : 1997). These have been brought to bear; usually 
by what Smith calls ‘impersonalist’ and ‘entity like’ interpretations of essential words 
and concepts like din (religion), to denote a greater  ‘separateness’.  He provides an 
example of this in the interpretation of the Qur’an, Chapter 3, Verse 19,  ‘Verily the 
religion in the eyes of God is Islam’, wherein modern interpretation indicates the 
meaning as more inclined towards signifying, ‘the right religion is Islam’. Smith cites 
the example of the bi-monthly Journal of the Holy Qur’an Society of Pakistan entitled 
Al Islam, founded in the early fifties, which carried the logo with the following 
translation of the verse in question, ‘Verily the only Faith acceptable to Allah is al-
Islam’ and is arguably a commonly understood meaning attributed to this verse within 
the Muslim community today. In contrast, Smith believes that there is evidence, in the 
Qur’anic text and the written interpretations thereof of something much more 
‘vibrant, searching and transporting’, (1978 : 110). Smith utilizes one of the most 
widely accepted, exhaustive and authoritative commentaries on the Qur’an by Abu 
Ja`far al-Tabarī, (d. 310 H – 933 AD), commonly known simply as al-Tabarī, whose 
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other works include writings on the sciences and dialects of the Qur’an and a history 
of the world in thirty volumes. Somewhat akin to Hick’s understanding of Augustine, 
al-Tabarī’s commentary on this particular verse consists of stipulating that ‘true 
religion’ signifies obeisance to the Divine as opposed to a more sectarian concept of 
defining what and which is ‘the true religion’ and describes it as referring to an action 
of the will as opposed to adherence to a system. On the other hand it must be stressed 
that this is not to suggest that al- Tabarī (nor Augustine, for that matter) or the 
classical outlook generally proclaimed an eclectic spirituality and it is clearly 
understood that by referring to the Divine, al-Tabarī meant the Muslim understanding 
of this.  But what it does signify is something more orientated towards the individual 
rather than indicating any faith system. In another well known verse ‘al yawma 
akmaltu lakum dīnakum’  (Chapter 5 Verse 3) meaning ‘This Day I have completed 
your religion for you’, frequently cited in modern interpretations as having been 
revealed towards the end of the Prophet’s life, suggesting a finalization of the 
‘system’. Yet most of the famous commentators did not place the timing of this 
revelation towards the end of the Prophet’s life. From the biographies of famous 
awliya, (saints), (Cornell : 1996 ; Cornell : 1998; Chodkiewisz : 1993;  Abbas : 1993) 
and from contemporary accounts of people claiming to follow the Muslim spiritual 
path in the classical sense, (Lings : 1993 ; Burke : 1993 ; Skalli : 2012) one gets the 
sense of an indeterminate series of personal experiences, occurrences and events, 
which taken altogether form a process that eventually elicits a personal 
transformation. The idea of a ‘system’ seems at odds with the profession of Islam of 
many Muslims others and the dichotomies this raises has been in part the motivation 
behind this research enquiry. There is a common orientation, with which the paths 
within which the paths are very wide rendering Islam not as a singular entity, nor 
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something that one person can exactly define as to what it is nor what it should be. 
Halliday (1996) strongly debunks the idea of some shari’aesque central platform that 
all Muslims ascribe to and the exclusiveness of Islam and its supposed impenetrability 
is hugely overestimated. Equally, Al-Azmeh believes the idea of a singular Islam as 
‘generically closed, utterly exceptionalist’, (2009:8), or lacking diversity is an illusion 
issued forth from both Islamophobic and Islamophilic confabulations. The balance 
between the individual, the collective and the religion is perhaps better described by 
Jackson (1999): 
The ‘tradition’, although conceived and delimited in different ways 
by different insiders and outsiders, is a reference point for 
individuals and groups. Membership groups (institutions, religious 
movements, denominations, ethnic groups, and peer groups, for 
example) evolve situationally in relation to, and sometimes overlap 
with, one another. The individual is strongly influenced by the 
membership of groups and identifiable as part of the wider tradition 
but is, nevertheless, unique. [..] the interpretation of a religious way 
of life involves a study of individuals in the context of groups, with 
the wider tradition employed as a general point of reference.   
                                                                           (Jackson : 1999 : 203) 
                                                                                                                                                                
This is also reflected in the outward expression of Islam where the study of fiqh 
(jurisprudence) reveals that there are many accepted yet different positions and 
interpretations taken by the classical ulamā’ (scholars) and suggests that there is a 
manifestation of broad guidance and strides that each individual might take to 
actualize Islam in their lives.   
 
In a chapter headed, (1981), Faith in Islamic History : the Meaning of Arkan, Smith 
demonstrates that al-Ghāzali understood a well-known precept; tasdiq bi-al janān, wa 
iqrar bi-al-lisān, wa’amāl bi-al-arkān, (belief in the heart, confirmation by the tongue 
and action within the pillars [of Islam]) differently. The word arkan has been 
commonly interpreted as meaning ’pillar’ but Smith presents Al-Ghāzali , in fact, as 
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interpreting this as the limbs of the body. Without fully denying this, Ziaul Haque 
believes that this sort of assumption requires greater research and that ‘merely 
interpreting a few theological terms in a certain, although plausible, way is not 
enough’, (1982 : 121), which seems to reflect Asad’s critique of Smith’s 
methodology.  When taking account of the overall thrust of Smith’s contentions 
regarding the reification of Islam in its entirety, including the analysis of word usage, 
as referred to above, his argument seems more than just plausible. Ziaul Haque (1982) 
concludes that the problem ‘must be investigated in its linguistic, theological, 
historical and sociological aspects’ (1982 : 121). But it is difficult to see how Smith 
has not done exactly this, with an exacting and comprehensive methodology, in 
researching the possibility of shifting definitions of Islam, iman, shari’ah and arkan 
as further indicating a reification of Islam. Notwithstanding all of the elements of a 
specific reification that Smith identifies in Islam, he eventually moves on to 
demonstrate that, in fact, even Islam is not quite such an exception as might first 
appear and Asad (2001) attests to his attempt in this, despite finding contradictory 
contentions in Smith’s general argument. The correlation of existentialist thought with 
Smith’s understanding of a primacy of an active principal as opposed to the reified 
and theoretical, will be dealt with at length later in this work. Nevertheless, it is 
important to stress something at this point; if one takes the general thrust of Smith’s 
ideas to signify generally that ‘Theology is to revelation what musical criticism is to 
music’, (Cantwell Smith : 1967 : 82), a comment perhaps taken out of context and not 
to be taken literally, then it will be argued that an un-reified and authentic way can 
also be found within the conscious appropriation of Muslim theology and certainly 
not at the expense of the transcendent.  
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Smith (1978) identifies three types of contemporary understandings and usage of the 
word Islam which are as follows: 
1. Islam as the decision of self-commitment of the individual – an intensely 
personal submission to God, quite distinct from that of anyone else.  An act of 
immediate deliberate dedication existentially embarked upon wherein the 
individuals link themselves to a transcendent Divine reality and a community 
based around this. A dynamic and dialectically formed phenomenon.  
2. Islam as a phenomenological and tangible reality with concrete historical and 
sociological components. The grouping of people around these events and the 
beliefs engendered.  
3. Islam as a Platonic ideal. A total perfect system, manifesting as a schematized 
and institutionalized utopia. 
The first of these was the earliest and predominant interpretation, yet gradually 
eclipsed by the second and third perspectives according to Smith. Another argument 
put forward is the contention that there are verses in the Qur’an where relative 
exclusivism is criticised as in Chapter 3 Verse 66, ‘Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a 
Christian but he was an upright man who surrendered.’ Smith believes that the 
evidence indicates that ‘The Qur’an is concerned, and presents God as being 
concerned with something that people do, and with the persons who do it, rather than 
an abstract entity’ (1978 : 111). 
Evidence of mundanization is perceived through a grammatical analysis of the 
Qur’anic text and Smith makes the observation that verb forms far outnumber the 
nouns in Qur’anic usage overall that suggests action rather than naming.  Smith 
acknowledges that as a non-Muslim his understanding of this may not be the ‘right or 
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transcendent one’ but that it is an entirely feasible one and ‘in fact closer to the 
straightforward and simple meanings of the Arabic words …..in fact it was the 
interpretation given to to these passages by , if not most, of the leaders of Muslim 
religious thought in the early centuries’ (1978 : 113). He also carried out an analysis 
on the titles of religious works that spanned across centuries. Asad (2001) is 
dismissive of this method in stating that, ‘The attempt to derive far reaching semantic 
conclusions through simple word count is in general misguided’, (Asad : 2001 : 221). 
However, this type of statistical analysis is now quite common, (Dukes : 2011; 
Wiersma : 2007; Intellyze : 2012; Buckwalter : 2003) and it is difficult to see how this 
approach can be dismissed as entirely inconclusive or of little import in establishing 
the shifting meaning and word usage changing over time and indicative of something. 
Asad’s criticism of this is not justified or extrapolated sufficiently enough to deserve 
discarding the analysis quite so easily. For the analysis of religious titles, Smith uses a 
renowned archive, Brockelmann's Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, (1909) which 
no less than Montgomery Watt15 declared ‘an essential and very helpful tool of 
research for serious scholars of Islamic and Arab affairs.’ (Brill Catalogue : 2012). It 
is difficult to see how the archive could not have been more appropriately used.  
Should this have constituted the only evidence Smith provided then perhaps Asad’s 
criticism would have had more currency but that is not the case. Below is a summary 
of Smith’s analysis (1978) followed by further comments and observations.  
a) Islam is used eight times in the Qur’an and is a verbal noun to 
mean ‘the name of an action, not of an institution; of a personal 
decision, not a social system.’ (1978 / 1991 : 112). Nonetheless, it still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Emeritus Professor Montogomery Watt, (1909 – 2006) University of Edinburgh; Islamic Studies and 
Arabic.  
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appears only a third of the instances then its foundational verb aslama 
occurs. This word is defined as the imperative to ‘choose to recognise 
as binding upon the self’. (1978 / 1991 : 112). ‘Vivid and dynamic – 
and personal: these are the qualities of the term Islam in the Qur’an. 
What was proclaimed was a challenge not a religion’, (1991 : p113). 
This would tend to suggest that the existential act of the individual 
holds precedence within the Qur’an over a declared membership to the 
community.  
 
b) The word Allah appears 2,697 times whereas ‘Islam’ occurs 
eight times. This infers a focus on the central objective; God, rather 
than the system of belief.  Smith notes that this ratio is reversed in 
modern Muslim writing. Nevertheless, the interpretation of Islam 
should be seen in the light of it being a verbal noun; ‘the name of an 
action; not of an institution; of a personal decision; not a social 
system’, (1978 : 112). The Qur’an also speaks of Islamukum, i.e., ‘your 
Islam’, one’s personal commitment to the Divine command.  
 
c) In the Qur’an (also reflected in classical theological work) the 
human side of the relationship is usually designated by the concept of 
faith in its various forms in Arabic. Examples of these are iman (faith), 
occurring 45 times and the related word mu’min (one who has faith) 
occurring 5 times more frequently than the word Muslim, (reated to the 
word Islam) and designates one who follows the outward practice of 
Islam.  Mu’min (related to the word Iman) refers to the decision to act 
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in faith with all the implications thereof as opposed to the outward 
expression of belief, i.e., Muslim. A mu’min is by necessity already a 
Muslim, whereas a Muslim may not be a mu’min.  Imān, (faith, related 
to the word mu’min) is considered an active quality, one that commits 
the person in which he is caught up into a ‘dynamic’ relationship with 
the Divine and to other human beings;  ‘the ability to see the 
transcendent and to respond to it’; to hear God’s voice and to act 
accordingly’, (1991 : 112). In similar vein the word kāfarā means not 
to disbelieve, ‘but rather to reject: it too is active, engage […]What the 
Qur’an presents is a great drama of decision, those who accept and 
those who spurn’, (1991: 112). Smith says that this can also be seen in 
the correlation of the writing of the ‘classical theologians’…..  and the 
actual behaviour of the Muslim community who in their early creative 
history set forth to remake the world’, (1991 : 112).  
 
As mentioned previously, alongside evidence of the historical and hermeneutical 
development of meaning attributed to the words Islam and Imān within in the Qur’an, 
Smith also looks for corresponding evidence in the frequency the usage of these 
words in the titles of religious books.  The survey was taken from titles listed in 
Brockelmann’s (1909), multivolume, ‘Geshicte der arabischen Litteratur’, listing 
more than 25,000 books, over a large span of time, from the 8th to the 20th century. 
These were arranged chronologically allowing Smith to discern whether any 
significant paradigm shift is evident.  The percentage distribution in the Qur’an came 
out as Iman 85% in contrast to Islam 15%. In Classical & Medieval book titles, (up to 
1300 A.D.), the distribution was Iman 40% to Islam 60%. In the Modern era, (1300 to 
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1900 A.D.), Iman stood at 7% in relation to Islam at 93%.  Smith sees it possible to 
discern a clear shift in Muslim usage of the term Islam as a noun denoting a religion 
rather than a verbal noun.  
 
Elsewhere Smith (1981) undertook an analysis of the historical understanding and 
usage of the word shari’ah, (Muslim canonical law), which is at the forefront of any 
contemporary discussion of Islam today. Smith again detects a later codification, (5th 
to 6th century A.D.), indicating reification, by making a distinction between shar’, 
(literally a ‘path’ or ‘way’) and shari’a, (the plural form of the former), so that rather 
than ‘patterned systems of incumbencies’, (1981 : 93),  the definition of shari’ah 
indicates ‘ways’ rather than ‘way’. Given this, Smith sets out to determine whether 
the positioning of shari’ah within the Muslim nexus occupied the same primacy and 
emphasis during the classical period. Although not quite as extensively wide ranging 
as that utilized with the Brockelmann archives. He sifts through the entire content of 
some renowned texts, scholars and schools of thought such as; the Mu’tazilah and 
individuals such as Imam Abu Hanifah, (Wasiya), al-Ash’ari, (al-fiqh al-akbar), the 
Hanbalī scholar, al-Juwayni, (Kitab al-irshad) and several texts of al-Ghāzali, to 
name but a few. His general findings that that the word count for s-h-r rooted words 
was very low. Smith admits the possibility that it was taken for granted and as being 
so central that it was not considered in need of mention but argues that several other 
similar concepts such Allah and Prophethood, (nubuwa) were frequently mentioned 
and were clearly central. The foregrounding of the concept of religious law was 
neither ‘basic or central or emphasized as a concept in Islamic thought during these 
centuries’ (Cantwell Smith : 1981 : 95) and that its later appearance corresponds with 
a decline in intellectual robustness and he makes the suggestion that ‘a closer 
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understanding may involve a more personalized and moralized conception than ‘law’, 
(Cantwell Smith : 1981 : 89) and that the evidence, ‘strongly suggests that the shar’ia 
is not a major concept for classical Islamic thinkers’, (Cantwell Smith : 1981  : 90). 
The societal results of this reifying phenomenon have been a defensive, apologetic or 
even aggressive mentality on the part of many Muslims in regard to ideologies, 
societies, cultures and religions outside of the Muslim nexus. This brings us to the 
point that an evidential aspect of Smith’s theory of the mundanization process resides 
in the correlation between religious reification and an apologetic attitude in a given 
community. A defensive stance requires something to defend and in doing so the 
object of defence is repeatedly clarified and delineated further against attack. He 
expresses the view that this tendency is at work within all the different religions 
across the globe but is particularly evident within the Muslim world. Smith 
comments, ‘On scrutiny it appears that the almost universal Muslim use of the term 
Islam in a reified sense in modern times is a direct consequence of apologetics [...] the 
impulse to defend what is attacked would seem a powerful force toward reifying’, 
(Smith : 1999 : 115). Anecdotally, there does seem to be an increase in Muslim 
apologetics indicating a parallel increase in reification and all the implications 
thereof.  Featuring prominently within the Muslim discourse is the concept of nizām. 
The word does not exist in the Qur’an nor has any root derivatives therein.  It is, says 
Smith:  
The explicit notion that life should be or can be ordered according to 
a system, even an ideal one, and that it is the business of Islam to 
provide such a system seems to be a modern idea (and perhaps a 
rather questionable one).  
   (Smith : 1999 : 117)  
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Summary 
In this chapter and the previous, an argument has been established for the existence of 
some inauthenticity within the Muslim discourse, with some indication as to how 
these might have come about. This was carried out mainly through looking at 
concepts such as reification and, in the previous chapter, McDonaldization. The 
general argument is that these have arisen through the human propensity to rationalize 
and standardize the world in which they live and within the religious sphere this has 
played in the codification of the nebulous and ineffable. In the following chapter, the 
implications and positions that have arisen within Islam as a result of these are 
outlined and critically examined the various positions that have arisen as a result of 
reification and attempts to unpick the confusing options on offer for the individual 
Muslim in pursuit of the authentic.   	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Chapter 6 
Positions within the Muslim Community in Light of Reification  
 
‘…and those who commodify religion thus have no religion – for 
he who trades in something, soon sells it and does not own it any 
longer.’                                                                                             
                                                        (al-Kindi cited by al- Jabari: 1999 : 55) 
This schism between the modernist objectification of Islam as opposed to the classical 
stance, as presented above, is something upon which many ordinary Muslims and 
non-Muslims remain confused about to this day (Kidwai : .2010; Brown : 1996; Nasr 
: 1987, Bruinessen & Howell : 2007). Indicative of this kind of confusion is a report 
commissioned by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy entitled 
Reformation of Islamic Thought (2006) wherein the author asks,‘To what extent are 
these liberal, reformist thinkers engaged in genuine renewal of Islamic thought? Do 
they succeed in challenging the negative image of the West presented by the 
traditionalists? ‘(Zayd : 2006 : 1). There is a great deal of confusion implicit in these 
questions concerning labels such as ‘liberal’ and ‘reformist’ and ‘traditionalists’ and 
who or why, in fact, would be inclined to counter negative images of the West in the 
Muslim world. It is disconcerting that Dutch governmental policies could be possibly 
constructed on what seems shallow and confused premises, nor is the Muslim world 
exempted from this sort of confusion. It is necessary to reconsider, refine and redefine 
such labels and their respective positions.  
The reasons for such confusion lies mainly in historical and socio-political trends that 
can be said to emerge from the encounter between European Enlightenment attitudes 
and the theocracies of traditional sacred societies.  As mentioned previously, in the 
Muslim lands governments and intellectuals have responded to long standing 
European colonization and subsequent independence by attempting reform in the 
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political, economic, educational and socio-cultural arenas. However, this has resulted 
in considerable social and religious upheaval, as Mohammed Arkoun points out:   
Such is the psychocultural background common to all political 
activity of every Muslim leader at least until the end of World War 
II. It was the period of naive consciousness, because these 
generations believed naively that it was enough to take the 
prescription for the success of Western civilization and apply them 
to Muslim countries. Secularism was perceived as one of those 
effective prescriptions to be applied to societies where religion 
controlled all the happenings and gestures of daily life. Those 
generations of Muslim intellectuals did not have a sufficient grasp of 
history to be able to pin down the ideological genesis, sociopolitical 
functions, and philosophical limits of secularism in the West.  
                                                                             (Arkoun : 1994 : 25) 
According to Ziaul Haque (1982) another significant result of this upheaval was that:  
….the logical result of the political process in many Muslim 
societies where socialization of Islam has been attempted, i.e., more 
emphasis has been laid on the law and economics and the 
transcendental/moral aspect has been relegated to the background 
removing man away from his God and enveloping him in legal and 
economic intricacies’ 
                                                                   (Ziaul Haque : 1982 : 120) 
Halliday (1996) argues comprehensively against the notion of clashing civilizations 
claiming it a fallacy precisely because ‘…we are not dealing with a world of 
contrasting political traditions: the very terms in which European power and values 
have been challenged are ones taken from European tradition – the state, the nation, 
rights, independence, democracy’ (Halliday : 1996 : 5).  As a result of these 
seemingly failed attempt at socio-politico rationalization, Brown (1996) identifies 
three main tendencies as having emerged in the religious sphere : 
Traditional Classical Islam  
This is the form of Muslim cohesion over many centuries, wherein the 
traditional ulamā’ and fuquha upheld the accumulated basic Prophetic 
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pattern in establishing and maintaining the Muslim community. The view 
held here would be that by definition, Islam is never in need of reformation, 
incorporating within itself its own critique and revision. However, it is 
understood that these things do not occur instantly simply altering, ‘to suit 
the latest fantasies and ambitions of men’ (al-Murabit : 1982 : 1) and the 
idea of ‘revolution’ is not a concept accepted by the classical canon. Winkel 
(1997) points out that the classical way is one which does not rule out novel 
interpretations but nor does it arrogantly assume that centuries of acute and 
impassioned Muslim scholarship are of no consequence. The classical mode 
is based on the contextual and the interpretative. 
It could be argued that this type of critique is uniquely modern and doesn’t 
reflect the world that Eickelman depicts in following the career pathway of 
the classical scholar Qādī Abdul Rahman.  Eickelman writes:  
Western scholars have for the most part downplayed the 
vitality of Islamic learning for the modern era, a neglect 
reinforced by the tendency of nationalists and 
technocrats in North Africa and elsewhere to deny 
significance to men of learning whose notions of 
political action have differed from their own.                                            
                                                   (Eickelman : 1985 : xvi) 
                                                                    
The classical reaction to western dominance was based on ‘withdrawal and 
non cooperation’ but not in any violent sense. Eickelman (1985) provides 
an account of the encounter between classical education and a more modern 
systemized educational approach in recounting events from a renowned 
classical centre of higher religious education in Marrakesh, the Yusufiya, in 
the 1930s:  
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The Yusufiya had no sharply defined body of students or 
faculty, administration, entrance or course examinations, 
curriculum or unified sources of funds. In fact, its former 
teachers related with amusement the frustrated efforts of 
French colonial officials to determine who its 
”responsible” leaders were and to treat it as a corporate 
entity analogous to a medieval European University.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                       (Eickelman : 1985 :  86) 
 
This account indicates an absence of institutionalization in a Foucaultian 
sense with any related conceptual effects of reification. Sufism has also 
been identified with orthodox classical Islam and was certainly present in 
the Yusufiya and al Qarawayn in Morocco during the 1930s though by then 
somewhat denigrated by both modernists and fundamentalists since the 
early nineteenth century (Segalla : 2009, Cornell : 1998). Another aspect of 
the classical model but historically indicative of wider Muslim application 
was the authority and power accorded to religious scholars even in the 
temporal realm as can be seen by the deposing of Moulay Abdel Azziz in 
1908 in Morocco by the ulamā’ as a result of his appearing to be ineffective 
in stemming French and European influence generally in the country. The 
Fez ulamā’ simply withdrew their support and declared his brother, Abdul 
Hafid as the new sultan, (Segalla : 2009). Representing all that is not 
modernist, un-institutionalized and un-reified, the classical tradition has 
come under sustained attack by both secular and Islamic modernists who 
were also critical of the traditional ulamā’ tendency to stay put – and follow 
tradition – even in the face of the challenges provided by encountering the 
values of the west.  
The [classical] ulama and the Islamic legal discourse 
(fiqh) have been continually and ferociously attacked, 
even from among the Muslim world, from many quarters 
– from secularists to modernists, reformists to 
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fundamentalists. If these groups have one thing in 
common, it is a desire for power and more specifically for 
state centred schemes for Muslim progress. Simply stated 
the ulama stand in the way of this as modern 
centralization has historically been shunned by the ulama. 
In fact the very essence of the ulama project – that edifice 
erected to determine rules and regulations from 
revelation-is its decentralization, slow accumulation of 
positions and argumentation, local dominion and 
diffusion. No one person can define and represent the 
Islamic experience, so the ulama resist Islam being 
centralized in the person of the nation-state leader or in 
any university or institute. And as for state-centred 
schemes for progress, in accord with traditional religions, 
the ulama do not see progress as a virtue. 
                                                              (Winkel : 1997 : 1) 
 
In the view of classical scholars, the reformist movements preach a 
confused polemic based on a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Hadīth that is understood to be permeated by overly rational methods and 
modes of thought confusedly mixed in with the tenets of religious faith and 
belief. As mentioned previously, there is some irony in the fact that the 
modernist movements; avowed critics of all things western are themselves 
based on similar intellectual grounds and premises that characterises 
western secularism. Without wishing to cause confusion in the mind of the 
reader, it is important to stress here that despite the given label and either by 
oversight or error, this category is not the group that is referred to as 
‘traditionalist’ in the Dutch report by Zayd (2006) above. Finally, the 
experience of Abou El Fadl in regard to the seeming demise of the 
traditional classical way is relevant here : 
I was fortunate enough to have internalized an ethos that 
was quickly vanishing in the Arab world.  This is not the 
place to engage in a full description of the nature of this 
ethos, except to say that it was, in part, apologetic.  
However, it was also immersed in the juristic tradition of 
disputation, opinions, and schools of thought.  The jurists 
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with whom I studied were masters of the dusty yellow-
books (al-kutub al-safra), who, at the time, believed that 
the puritanism of the Wahhabis was a marginal and 
passing phase.  They were quite wrong.  The ethos of 
which I speak celebrated and revelled in the search for the 
Divine Way.  The search, the study-the process of 
pondering, weighing, and balancing was considered the 
ultimate act of worship ('ibadah).  The engagement of the 
intellect in searching the Divine Way was invariably 
superior to the engagement of the body in treading the 
Divine Way.  True piety manifested in the search for 
knowledge (talab al-ilm) -- this piety then affirmed by the 
physical acts of prayer, fasting, and so on.  Importantly, 
finding the correct answer to any juristic problem was not 
considered a part of the act of worship ('ibadah).  Finding 
the correct answer, if one existed, was considered a gift 
and blessing from God to be humbly enjoyed as long as it 
exists. 
                  (Abou : 2001  : 6) 
 
It also involves the idea of taqlīd referring to the layman’s following and 
adherence to the accumulated wisdom and teaching of past scholars. 
Modernists put greater stress on ijtihād or fresh interpretations of Divine 
law, which strongly distinguishes between immutable principles and those 
that were subject to change. Probably due to this, the classical fuquha have 
been frequently considered as moribund and unable to meet the challenges 
of modern existence and progress.  
The earliest manifestations of reform that really opposed the classical 
position in the modern era are those undertaken by such diverse groups as 
the Ahli-hadīth in the Indian subcontinent, which appeared in the early to 
mid nineteenth century and the subsequent later appearance of the Wahhābi 
movements in the Middle East in the late nineteenth century which 
preserved and built upon the alledgedly reformist thought of ibn-Taymiyya 
(1263 – 1328) and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703 – 1792).  
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Islamic Modernists  
This encompasses modernists, reformists, fundamentalists and extremists 
linking people as diverse as Usāma bin Lāden (1957 – 2011) and Recep 
Tayyip (1954 - )16.  As Lapidud says, it is ‘an umbrella designation for a 
wide variety of movements’ (2002 : 823). If modernity is defined as reason, 
science and technology all of the above named groups would therefore fall 
under the ‘modernist’ label (Kurzman: 2003), a fact which is often 
confusing for non-Muslims and many Muslims. It is for this reason that 
Nasr terms ‘fundamentalists’ as ‘psuedo-traditionalists’ who ‘…while 
denouncing modernism, accept some of the most basic aspects of 
modernism’ (1994 : 19) 17. Nasr argues that the groups mentioned are all 
modernist despite their many apparent and profound differences, the link 
between; modernists, ‘fundamentalists’, reformers, revivalists, extremists 
and Islamists lies mainly in the reformational idea that for Islam to succeed 
in the modern world it is necessary to return to the canonical sources and 
reinterpret them in light of the modern world.  
One of the oldest of these groups to be considered ‘fundamentalist’ would 
be those known as Wahhābi (and by extension the Salafis), though those 
pertaining to this group would refuse the label. Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahab at-Tamini (1703 – 17920) was born in Najd, in present day Saudi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The current Turkish Prime Minister  
17 The term ‘fundamentalist’ is considered an inaccurate label but is used in here in order to prevent 
confusion and is used between quotation marks and in quotes. Any serious practising Muslim would 
believe in the ‘fundaments’ of the religion but it is acknowledged that in using this term many people 
are referring to extreme religious positions and therefore ‘extremism’, ‘extremists’ or Lumbard’s 
‘puritanical reformists’ (2004) are considered more accurate. Whenever possible these terms will be 
used in place of ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘fundamentalism’ except when it could be deemed as potentially 
confusing. Other labels given to this type of movement will be referred to later. 
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Arabia. He spent sometime studying under various scholars in Basra where 
he began to formulate reformist ideas. He was a follower of the Hanbalī 
school of thought yet at the same time was opposed to the idea of taqlīd, 
perceiving this as the unquestioning following of a particular madhhab. He 
was opposed to the visiting of graves of the companions of the Prophet and 
the saints and within the sphere of his local influence called for a return to 
the stoning of adulterers. He saw it as essential to rid the Muslim world of 
bid’ah (innovations) and shirk (the worshipping of idols) which he saw as 
encompassing things like the veneration of saints and prohibited the visiting 
of graves. He was also critical of sufi positionings in general deeming some 
ideas and practices as heretical. His controversial stance involved him being 
expelled from various tribal communities until he was eventually taken 
under the wing of the Saud tribe, some of whom were his students. The 
Saud tribe was engaged in a long term military campaign for over 140 years 
to wrest total control of the Arabian peninsula from the Turks that was 
eventually successful in 1924. The religious stance of ibn Abdul Wahab had 
become intrinsically bound up with Saudi culture and politics and when the 
Saudi family eventually ascended to power this provided a religious and 
political base for the dissemination of Wahhābi influence.  Wahhābism has 
had a considerable impact on the Muslim world with their insistence on 
ittibaa’ or the ‘following of the correct model’, an arbitrary assumption of 
what is correct that many have contested (Haddad & Esposito : 1998).  The 
Wahhābīyah are committed to shucking off the accumulated accretions of 
classical disciplines and commentaries on Qur’an, Sunna and Hadīth and 
championed the use of ijtihād, or the use of personal interpretation of the 
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Qur’an and Sunna. The method proposed for this was a rigorous literalist 
interpretation of the which bound them to single interpretations of Qur’an 
and Hadīth, equally rejecting the classical use of qiyās (argued reasoning on 
legal questions) or usul (theoretical principles) or ta’wil, (esoteric, internal 
interpretation), (Brown : 1996). From the modernist and fundamentalist 
view, the classical tradition had rendered knowledge content like tafsir 
(Qur’anic commentary) under centuries of calcified erudition passed on by 
rote memorization [and] had, in effect, slammed the holy book shut and 
sprinkled it with punctilious erudition’ (Hardman: 2009 : 140) and that one 
of the purposes of classical education was to form an elite group capable of 
‘..reading the Qur’an properly and guide the less fortunate masses who were 
unable to understand it for themselves’ (Hardman : 2009 : 138).  
As for the modernist or Islamist position perhaps the best representatives of 
this are al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (the Muslim Brotherhood). The group 
would also come under the label of ‘Islamist’ and is one of the most 
influential movements in the Arab world. Its founder, Hassan Ahmed Abdel 
Rahman Muhammed al-Banna (1906 – 1949) was an Egyptian Imam and 
school teacher.  He followed the Hanbalī madhhab and was a member of 
the tariqa al Hassafiyyah (a Sufi order) and was greatly influenced by 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 -1935), an early Islamist thinker. At an 
early age al -Banna was involved in political activity against colonial 
influences and secularist tendencies adopted by the Egyptian government. 
His establishing of the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn in 1928 was followed by 
phenomenal expansion across Egypt. The organizational structuring of the 
movement was highly institutional and multi-functional aiming to appeal to 
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people at all levels of society and mainly funded by businesses and clinics.  
Currently the organization consists of the following sections; Executive 
leadership, Organizational office, Secretariat general, Educational office, 
Political office, Sisters office. The emphasis was and is on reviving Islam in 
the form of modern governance, establishing educational and public health 
institutions and establishing Egyptian national identity and Arab pan-
nationalism. The movement was also aimed at countering colonialism and 
inequality. In its organizational structures and its pursuit of the Islamic 
nation state, the movement could be identified as adhering to 19th century 
modernist principles and values stemming from the west. From the classical 
viewpoint Islam has its own well-tested methods of governance and the 
nation state is regarded as yet another western conceptual import. In the 
same vein the Brotherhood promotes democracy.  
Evidence of this can be further seen in Esposito’s comments on a recent 
Gallup World Study poll:  
‘……. focusing on the attitudes of those with radical views and 
comparing them with the moderate majority results in surprising 
findings. When asked what they admired most about the West, 
both extremists and moderates had the identical top three 
spontaneous responses:  
(1) technology; (2) the West’s value system, hard 
work, self-responsibility, rule of law, and 
cooperation; and (3) its fair political systems, 
democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of 
speech, and gender equality. A significantly higher 
percent of potential extremists than moderates (50 
percent versus 35 percent) believe that “moving 
towards greater governmental democracy” will 
foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world.                                                    
                  (Esposito : 2006 : 6-7) 
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Commonalities within Modernist Muslim Movements 
 
The commonality regarding reform between the reformists such as the al-Kwan 
al-Muslimūn and the Wahhābi and Salafī movements, lies through their shared 
origins in reformist ideologies stemming from figures such as Jamal al Din 
Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad ‘Abdu (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid 
Rida (1865 -1935), Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab at-Tamini, coupled with the 
basic argument that Islam is dynamic by nature and therefore capable of 
modernizing selectively (Euben & Zaman : 2009).  Despite these shared roots, 
there are significant differences between modernism, ‘fundamentalists’ and 
literalists, evident in issues such as modern reformists’ contention that neither the 
classical works of Islam nor many present day scholars of the Muslim world are 
suitable for the contemporary world, something that ‘fundamentalists’ would 
disagree with.  While ‘fundamentalists’ may reject some contemporary classical 
scholars this may not be extended to the classical texts. In their place they prefer 
contemporary scholars18 who apply modern textual methodologies based in and 
around the context of canonical rulings from the early Muslim community. As 
Nasr points out;    
The [classical] traditionalist and the so-called 
‘fundamentalist’ meet in their acceptance of Qur’an and 
Hadith, as well as in their emphasis upon the Shari’ah, but 
even here their differences remain profound…..tradition 
always emphasizes the sapiential commentaries and the 
long tradition of Quranic hermeneutics…where as so 
many of the ‘fundamentalist’ movements simply pull out a 
verse of the Quran and give it a meaning in accordance 
with their goals and aims’                                  
                                                   (Nasr : 1994 : 18)      
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Though many would contest their educational qualifications in being attributed the title.  
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This last approach embodies the idea that all that is needed to become authoritative is 
a working knowledge of the Qur'an, a selective reading of some works on Hadīth and 
the internalization of the conceptual ideal of the "true" Islam’ (El Fadl : 2001 : 8).  
Frequent misunderstandings occur when ‘fundamentalists’ are perceived as 
‘traditionalists’, evidenced in the Dutch report cited above and cause considerable 
confusion, wherein ‘liberal reformists’ (read modernists) are positioned against 
‘traditionalists’, (‘fundamentalists’). Some of this confusion is bound up with the garb 
and the speech of some ‘fundamentalists’ linking them to the traditions of the Muslim 
past, whereas in actual fact, the opposite may be the case, as ‘….the term also gives 
the impression that ‘fundamentalists’ are conservative and wedded to the past, 
whereas their ideas are essentially modern and highly innovative.  
‘…..fundamentalists are not impractical dreamers. They 
have absorbed the pragmatic rationalism of modernity and 
under the guidance of their charismatic leaders, they 
refine these ‘fundamentals’ so as to create an ideology 
that provides the faithful with a plan of action. 
                                                                            (Armstrong : 2000 : xi) 
 
It is impossible to discuss fundamentalism without referring to the inherent anger 
manifested by fundamentalists occasioned by what they see as harmful innovation 
(bi’da) stemming from the classical position on one hand and the secular reformist 
modernists on the other, linking these with economic, social and religious 
subjugation, often resulting in violent confrontation. Armstrong believes these to be 
‘….embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged 
as a response to a perceived crisis. They are engaged in a 
conflict with enemies whose secularist policies and beliefs 
seem inimical to religion itself. Fundamentalists do not 
regard this battle as a conventional political struggle, but 
experience it as a cosmic war between the forces of good 
and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their 
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beleaguered identity by means of a selective retrieval of 
certain doctrines and practices of the past.         
                                                         (Armstrong : 2000: xi) 
 
Within Muslim terms, Winkel (1997) perceives such extremists or fundamentalists as 
having roots which hark back historically to an early tribe of Bedouin known as the 
Khawārij 19 (those who depart), who soon after the death of the Prophet adopted strict 
and literal interpretation of Islam. One famous tenet of theirs was the idea that sinning 
against the shari’a rendered one an unbeliever eternally and could be executed. 
Though there is no inference of this being the attitude adopted by contemporary 
‘fundamentalists’. Nevertheless, the Khawārij were dogmatic, literal and extreme 
(Rahman : 1979) and this relates to the mindset of contemporary ‘fundamentalist’ 
movements such as the Wahhābiya and Salafīya.  Winkel sees Khawārijite tendencies 
in the Wahhābist Saudi government’s destruction of the tombs of the Companions, 
(Jannat al Baqi) in 1925 in fear of the danger that people might began to pray to the 
dead instead of orientating themselves to God. According to Winkel (1997) one 
contemporary characteristic of this group is their ability to;  
….create clear lines of battle, quickly and surely 
defining its enemies, (Jews, tradition bound Muslims, 
Americans) seeks rapid development and success 
(throwing derision at the traditional responses of sabr 
[patience] and the other worldliness of Sufis) and 
mocks the sacred, whether in art, attire, housing or 
occupation.’                                                    
                                                         (Winkel :1997 : 16)  
  
Winkel distinguishes the Khawārij voice as having greater contemporary 
influence due to its sensationalist anti western stance and more will be discussed 
in terms of the effect of the Khawārij in Muslim intellectual history later in this 
thesis.  The only major exception to the overarching critique of all things western 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The Khawārij were a group of puritanical literalists that emerged in the earlier history of Islam. We 
will be examining them in greater detail later.  
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is science and technology; which presumably can be ‘Islamiziced’ (al-Faruqi : 
1982). What manifests is an insecure religious identity based on difference and 
opposition to others of differing views, however slight, both within the Muslim 
world and non-Muslim world. Winkel prefers the title ‘technists’ as opposed to 
‘fundamentalists’ believing that any practising Muslim believes in the fundaments 
of their faith and can be therefore labelled as such without negative connotations. 
He defines the technists as those who believe that Muslim decline is due to an 
application of faulty technique. Should they apply the right technique; and here 
Winkel provides examples, such as a hijāb law or hudūd ordinances (legal 
punishment or penalty – as seen in Pakistan), this would then allow the kind of 
societal success that is seen in the western world.  
Winkel perceives the epitome of the technists approach to be the perception of the 
Qur’an as a constitution, robbing it of its richness and profundity into a 
‘tremendously uni-dimensional and flat document’ (1997 : 18). He believes that 
the vast majority of ordinary Muslims functioning outside the Khawārij technist 
paradigm seem to have given over to an assumed notion of the technists as having 
a monopoly on scriptural rectitude and moral correctness by their having co-opted 
the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadīth with confusing results; 
Well meaning Muslims, Sufis and spiritualists, lay and 
non academically trained Muslims alike, tend to accept 
the technist arrogation of the texts without challenge. 
Believing themselves bereft of hadith and the Quran, they 
forsake the text and search elsewhere for solutions to 
problems facing their communities.  
                                    (Winkel : 1997 : 18 – 19)   
 
Winkel recounts his own experience of having acquiesced to the notion of the 
technists holding an interpretative dominion over the texts and that the only option 
 133 
left for well meaning Muslims was to reach beyond these to recapture an ethical Islam 
outside of the texts perhaps from things like architecture and other cultural 
manifestations. Nevertheless, in researching the matter further and challenging the 
technists over the text he discovered that the Islam engendered by them was at odds 
with ‘ a dozen centuries of scholarship’. Indeed, the classical understanding of Islam 
was manifested in traditional architecture, languages and poetry but there appeared to 
be a misappropriation of the historical positions of the champions of the technists, 
namely ibn-Taymiyyah and ibn-Hanbal. As Winkel says, ‘My study of these thinkers 
leads me to believe that they completely rejected all manifestations of this Khawārij 
tendency’ (Winkel : 1997 : 19). 
Reformist Secular Modernists  
Muslim political leaders adopted western modes on the assumption that they had 
successfully led to establishing European nations as world powers. In this manner 
a rational, empirical mindset was attempted particularly through establishing 
reform in educational curricula and the scientific, military and economic arenas. 
Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser of Egypt would be good 
examples of this.  
Reformist secularism in the Muslim world is understood to originate from a 
humanizing of the Prophet as opposed to that of the cosmically spiritual figure 
attributed to classical modes such as the ‘Perfect Man’ as evoked by Ibn ‘Arabi and 
al-Jīlī (1983). This evolved from thinking based mainly on interpretations stemming 
back to ideas attributed to Shah Wali Allah (1703 – 1762) of India, (emphatically not 
secularist) occurring in the light of a declining Mughal empire and an attendant 
breakdown of Muslim society (Schimmel : 1985). The Prophet was perceived more in 
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the role of progressive social and political reformer eventually leading, sometime 
during the early 1960s, to Gamal Abdul Nasser referring to the Prophet as the ‘imam 
of socialism’ (Schimmel : 1985 : 237). In this we can see the Prophet perceived in a 
more rational and political light, far from the numinous ‘irrationalities’ of mysticism. 
Another seminal influence was that of the previously mentioned Muhammad ‘Abdu 
of Egypt (1849- 1905) though he would probably not have seen himself as a 
secularist. Some of ‘Abduh’s main contentions were that Muslims should not be 
subserviently reliant on the classical commentaries interpreting canonical texts but 
they should use personal reasoning and rationality to arrive at their own conclusions. 
He was particularly opposed to Sufism, especially popular Sufism, as superstitious 
and holding back the overall progress of the Muslims.  ‘Abdu considered European 
culture as exhibiting admirable qualities based on the capabilities of its citizens to 
make independent and reasoned choice whereas the majority of Muslims were 
backward with very little understanding of their own religion; nor did he subscribe to 
the principle of the authority of the Sunna. Together these ideas combine to establish 
later attitudes and concepts of the Prophet’s importance lying solely in the religious 
realm and decidedly not in the political sphere. This was an idea particularly 
identified with the several key figures such as the Oxford graduate and Al Azhari 
scholar and student of Muhammad ‘Abdu ; Ali’Abd al-Rizaq (1888 – 1966) 
sometimes known as the ‘father of Islamic secularism’ who argued that the Prophet 
neither wished to engage in the political nor did his Divine mission encompass 
politics (Tagelsir Ali : 2009; Kassab : 2009).      
Even while they deny the authority of the Prophet in 
specific details, the secularists implicitly recognize the 
general authority of the Prophetic example. Furthermore, 
they justify their own position by invoking the example of 
 135 
the Prophet, arguing, in effect, that secularism is a valid 
model because Muhammad himself was a good secularist. 
                                                             (Brown : 1996 : 67) 
 
Winkel’s (1997) depiction of what he calls the batiniyyah, connected to the word 
batin (inward) as in ‘people of the inward’ refers to those that deny the outward 
aspects of Islam and may well fit under this Reformist Secular category in that it 
refers presently to some intellectuals and academics types who interpret the sacred 
texts entirely in symbolic and philosophical terms. While they adhere to a notion of 
Islam there is no expression of this in the outwardly. Also possibly to be included 
under this category could be the ibahiyyah, (Winkel : 1997) who attempt to argue for 
liberalization of or the permissibility of things that are considered to come under the 
haram (forbidden). An example of this might be seen in the argument of the 
permissibility of eating pork as in the modern age as there is now refrigeration or the 
argument that alcohol is not literally forbidden in the Qur’an.  
One defining characteristic of this movement was the self-
conscious adoption of ‘modern’ values – that is, values 
that authors explicitly associated with the modern world, 
especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and 
certain forms of human equality. Thus this movement was 
not simply ‘modern’ (a feature of modernity) but also 
‘modernist’  (a proponent of modernity).                                                  
                                                         (Kurzman : 2003 : 32) 
 
Areas of contention and confusion between Classical and Modernist 
Perspectives  
 
Some general areas of contention and theological controversy have been referred to 
already but are analysed more thoroughly in what follows. These disagreements can 
be said to be centred around three basic issues (Brown :1996) and yet each of these 
have implications beyond the initial premise :  
a) Anthroporhism within ‘aqīdah (doctrine)   
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This concerns whether or not Allah assumes some manner of form or body 
existent in space and time. This dispute arises through various ayats where 
the hand of Allah or the face of Allah is mentioned. The aforementioned 
medieval reformer, ibn-Taymiyya (1263-1328) held a particular 
interpretation of Hanbalī thought, (one of the four schools of thought in 
Sunni Islam) which has been frequently been misunderstood as 
anthropomorphic by his allegedly upholding that if Allah used such 
terminology in the Qur’an, then therefore He has a hand and face, etc. or 
moves in space and time through things like descending to the lower 
heavens in the latter part of the night, according to one well known 
Hadīth. Ibn-Taymiyyah’s expression of these views has created a 
considerable polemic between the classical and modernist positions even 
up to this day.  However, there seems to be some misunderstanding of his 
position, as his written work seems to suggest a middle way reflecting the 
position of the early community,  (ibn-Taymiyyah : 1996; Michot : 2006 
& 2007). This can be summed up as seeking neither rationalization nor 
engaging in speculation as to the meaning of ‘hand’ in terms of the 
Divine. At the same time this does not reject the perceptible meaning of 
‘hand’, nor attribute symbolic meaning to it; all of which comprises an 
attitude known as the mufawwidāh or ‘non-committal’ in wanting or 
needing to know more beyond what is given in the Qur’an. Furthermore, 
in refuting the accusation that the Hanbalī position, (the madhhab which 
ibn Taymiyyah followed) justifies anthropomorphism, the classical 
scholar Nuh Ha Mim Keller recounts the questioning of Imam Ahmed 
Hanbal, (a renowned imam, after whom one of the four schools of 
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thought) concerning this : ‘Imam Ahmad was asked about the Hadīth 
mentioning "Allah’s descending," "seeing Allah," and "placing His foot on 
hell"; and the like, and he replied: "We believe in them and consider them 
true, without ‘how’ and without ‘meaning’ (bi la kayfā wa la ma‘nā)’ 
(Keller : 1995b) which is distinct from anthropomorphism. Despite 
Hanbalī jurisprudence being part of the classical canon, the majority of 
traditional ‘aqīdah (doctrinal creed) positions from the classical school is 
that these were allegorical and figurative (ta’wil) references rather than 
literal ones so that there is some variance within the schools of thought 
with the Mālikī position closer to that of the Hanbalī.  
Furthermore, Michot (2006) makes a highly credible argument that ibn-
Taymiyyah has been wrongly accused by past and present classical 
scholars and non-Muslim commentators as anthropomorphic in outlook, 
anti-Sufi and anti-madhhab, whilst on the other hand wrongly 
appropriated by extremists to argue their cause for advocating violence. 
Muslims of other persuasions frequently and mistakenly identify ibn-
Taymiyyah (and by extension the Wahhābiya and Salafīiya) with 
anthropomorphism.  Yet the Wahhābiya and Salafīiya wrongly use and 
over emphasise aspects of ibn-Taymiyyah for critiquing the classical 
taqlīd, the madhāhib and the Sufi positions (Rahman : 1979; Keller : 
1994). Confusingly for many, there is irrefutable evidence that many 
famous Hanbalī scholars were indeed Sufis, including ibn-Taymiyya, who 
was in the Qādīriyya Order.  Vice versa, the renowned Sheikh of that 
order, Sheikh Abdul Qādir al Jilani was himself of the Hanbalī madhhab 
(Makdisi : 1973).  This will be surprising to some, as the Hanbalī 
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madhhab is usually associated with the more puritan stance, probably in 
relation to its being associated with Saudi Arabian culture and politics and 
the Salafī and Wahhābi elements.  
The hostility to many Sufi ideals and practices of the 
Wahhabi sect, in which Hanbaliam survives in the modern 
world, may have encouraged the view that Hanbali 
traditionalism were intrinsically hostile. [….] But in fact 
there has never been any widespread and categorical 
rupture between traditionalism and Sufi mysticism, and by 
the Middle period many prominent Hanbalis were 
themselves initiated into Sufi chains of authority.  
                                                            (Berkey : 2003 : 236) 
 
The principles embodied in the traditionalism of Hanbalīsm have many 
shared characteristics with Mālikīsm and the evident link between classic 
traditionalism, especially in the aspect of mufawwidah20 and Sufism 
present in both of these schools of thought is something that will be 
explored further later in this work.  
b) The madhāhib (schools of thought).  
The four schools of thought; the Mālikī , Hanbalī, Shāfi’ī and Hanafī 
schools of thought named after famous earlier scholars has been an 
essential element of the traditional canon of Islamic jurisprudence. They 
do not constitute fissures within the Muslim nation. However, modernists 
and reformists question the need for such schools of thought seeing them 
at best as an irrelevance and at worst a sinful innovation (Rahman : 1979; 
Keller : 1995a), in arguing that each Muslim must interpret the word of 
God and the words and acts of the Prophet for themselves. On the surface 
a plausible argument and yet the classical response is that the body of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The position of not questioning further beyond that which is stated. 
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knowledge and the complexity of everyday life is too vast to allow for 
simple deductions to be made by the unversed and that great confusion 
would arise as a result which seems to be borne out through current 
events.  The circumstances within which a verse of the Qur’an was 
revealed or the factors involved in those events described by one of the 
Hadīth are complex and can only be commented upon by one who has 
studied these in detail over a long period of time. The interpretation may 
have great import with significant implications and are not likely to be 
accessible to the ordinary Muslim. The profounder aspects of the 
interpretation and its application in law requires an intensive scholarly 
background with the madhāhib providing this abundantly as frameworks 
of and for accumulated wisdom and knowledge (Coulson : 1964; Rahman 
: 1979; Brown : 1996). The following of a madhāhib is called taqlīd and 
does not necessarily imply a blind and unquestioning acceptance on the 
part of the individual.  
c) Tawassul and wasila.  
Tawwsul signifies ‘agency’, as in ‘the means to..’, ‘approach’ or 
‘proximity to’ enabling one to achieve something. It refers generally to the 
performance of something that will bring one nearer to God (ash-Shafi : 
2007; al-Yahsubi : 1991).  The appeal to a person, as a means of appealing 
to God and entailing something like asking them to pray on your behalf is 
called wasila.  Enormous controversy has arisen about whether it is 
permissible for the Prophet to be a wasila in one’s supplication to God by 
dint that he is no longer alive and is therefore rationally can no longer act 
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as an intercessor (shafi’) with God and the disputation also covers the 
visiting of the graves of the awliya, (the friends of God or saints) for the 
same purpose. Classical and well know supplications are always directed 
towards the Divine beginning with phrases such as,  ‘…beseeching You 
through your Prophet’ or ‘… for the sake of your Prophet’ or ‘…by the 
light of your Prophet’ or in the case of saints, ‘I ask you by the grace of 
your saint,  ….’ or something similar. All of the classical madhāhib accept 
this form of supplicating the Divine, in some degree or other but always 
with the clear understanding that ultimately the direction of the plea is not 
made to the Prophet or the saint in question.  However, the Salafī and 
Wahhābi positions on this is that it is forbidden on the basis that once a 
person dies they are no longer considered capable of being an 
intermediary with God and doing so is shirk, (attributing power other than 
to God) and considered the gravest of sins (Duwaish : 2012; al-Butami : 
1981). The classic response to this is provided below:     
As for the heinous comparison, from near or far, of 
Muslims making tawassul through the Prophet to the 
Christian worship of Jesus, or Muslims making tawassul 
through awliya to the Christian worship of saints, we ask 
Allah to reform those who make such comparison and 
stray so widely from the right path in their views as to 
forget, by ignorance or design, that Muslims are strict 
monotheists who worship Allah alone and use the 
blessings of particular acts, times, places, and persons to 
benefit them, not as objects of worship. If you persist in 
not seeing the difference between taking one as an object 
of worship on the one hand, and using one as a means to 
obtain blessings on the other, we ask Allah from 
protection from such misguidance, for persistence in 
making analogies between the doctrines of Muslims and 
Christians in disregard of their fundamental disparity is a 
characteristic of the enemies of Islam.  
                        (al-Dimashqi cited by al-Na’man : no date)  
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Kabbani (1996) refers to Ibn-Taymiyyah’s ‘Treatise on Lawful Forms of 
Worship and Reprehensible Innovation (Risalat al ibadat al shariyya wal 
farq baynaha wa bayn al bid’iyya)21 wherein Ibn-Taymiyyah 
unambiguously states that an example of the lawful method is provided by 
the ‘those who follow the sufi path’.  
The most distinctive feature of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb’s (1703-
1792) reasoning at the core of the Wahhābi undertaking constituted in the 
idea that it is not sufficient for an individual to just affirm God’s Unicity 
and the Prophet as the messenger of God. Of additional, yet extreme 
importance is the denial of any other object of worship, which he based on a 
famous Hadīth wherein it is stated that in denying all other than God as 
worthy of worship the believer is safe from harm (Commins : 2006).  
Based on this rationale, Ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb sets out to describe various 
forms of idolatry in the renowned Book of Tauhid, (al Wahhāb : 2006 ) 
including things like making a vow to another person as an act of idolatry, 
despite any concrete textual basis. Seeking the help of others could, in some 
cases, be a form of idolatry, based on a verse of the Qur’an wherein God 
calls upon the believers not to seek help except from Him. Al-Wahhāb used 
further evidence to establish this from a Hadīth wherein the Prophet 
admonished some of the companions for seeking the help of someone 
known as a hypocrite urging them rather to turn to God for assistance. This 
was extended to prohibiting asking anyone for assistance irrespective of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Risalat al ibadat al shariyya wal farq baynaha wa bayn al bid’iyya, Beirut: Lajnat al-Turath al-
Arabi, 5:83 
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nature of the request or the sincerity of need and is one of the major issues 
of contention against the Wahhābis. Whereas Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb reasoned 
that the essence of worship as ‘calling upon’ anything other than God was a 
major form of sin, the classical argument against this was that the intention 
and expectation of the individual in asking help from another human being 
could not be so summarily judged. If an individual calls upon another being 
with the understanding that ultimately they are calling upon God through 
the auspices of human agency then this does not constitute idolatry or 
something directed to other than God. 
In concluding this section, the result of these conflicts has caused enormous upheaval 
not only in the Muslim world but globally. An interesting yet improbable solution to 
this religious, political and social upheaval is presented by Lumbard ; 
In adopting foreign theories and analytical models without 
fully evaluating them, both modernist and puritanical 
reformist (to avoid the amoeba-word "fundamentalist") 
Muslims have abandoned the guidance of their own 
intellectual heritage. But in order to be effectively 
assimilated into the Islamic world, such modes of thought 
must first be evaluated. Then what is found to be of value 
can be incorporated organically through a genuine 
intellectual and civilizational discourse, as happened in 
the encounter between Islam and Greek thought in the 
ninth and tenth centuries. When, however, one intellectual 
tradition is abandoned outright, there is no basis for the 
evaluation of another intellectual tradition and none of the 
fertile ground that is necessary for effective assimilation. 
Recovering the Islamic intellectual tradition is thus an 
essential, if not the essential, step to ameliorating the 
malaise which Muslims and non-Muslims alike have long 
bemoaned and decried. When this has occurred, Muslim 
peoples will be better prepared to engage Western 
civilization without surrendering to it altogether or 
opposing it outwardly while capitulating inwardly.   
                                                          (Lumbard : 2004 : 40) 
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Chapter 7 
Mysticism and the Iconoclasm of Islam  
‘It is often simpler …. to fall back on the mechanics of religion instead of 
tackling the reality of being religious.’ 
                                             Making Sense of Religion (Ofsted : 2007 :12) 
European Counterculture and the Muslim world 
Historically, the religion of Islam had provided an alternative to the pervading 
presence of rationalism in the Euro-American context. In order to escape the 
consumer led and industrialist exactitudes of modern Western life in the 60s and 70s, 
many people looked towards Muslim society (and the East) to recapture a sense of the 
mysterious and the paradoxical, (Halman : 2006; Heelas : 1996;  Johnstone :1981; 
Kose :1996; Maclean : 2006).  In the Book of Strangers, (Dallas : 1972), the central 
character is depicted as one who escapes from a sterile, systematized and clinical 
society, into the desert Muslim lands where he encounters a basic humanity 
intertwoven with the Divine in all aspects.  Taji-Farouki describes the era; 
There was a bid for liberation from the controls and limitations of 
institutions experienced as coercive and repressive and radical 
disillusionment with the ‘mainstream’ meanings and values they 
provided. This encompassed traditional religion, its plausibility 
having in any case been thrown into crisis by the undermining 
effects of pluralization, itself a product of the processes of 
modernization.  In their homelessness, counterculture youth 
undertook of necessity a turn to the self as the only remaining source 
of meaning and significance. One major counterculture orientation 
thus found expression in a search for ways of life that nurture ‘the 
authentic self’. The idea of pursuing this by taking the ‘journey to 
the East’ indeed became so popular that the countercultural interest 
in Eastern traditions (religions of the ‘Orient’) was one of the most 
striking features of the sixties.  
                                                                      (Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 3)      
This was not a novel phenomenon, for centuries, the Muslim world had provided a 
refuge for those out of step with the European status quo. Peter Lamborn Wilson’s 
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(2003) historical study of the European ‘Renegadoes’ between the 16th and 19th 
century, suggests many of these felt ‘abandoned and betrayed Christendom as a praxis 
of social resistance’ (Wilson : back cover).  A significant amount of European non-
conformists chose to live in the Ottoman world, which offered a viable alternative 
society based on meritocracy and greater social tolerance and mobility. For many 
people, who for one reason or another felt alienated from mainstream society and 
unable to keep up pretences of respectability, societal norms or religious mores, 
converted to Islam.  Some joined North African Pirate Corsair communities of along 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts to engage in a piracy of European shipping. As 
Wilson states, the situation in the early 17th century was as follows:   
In a broader context, Islam might have had a vague appeal for some 
Europeans who were simply anti-religious or at least anti 
clerical…..A general impression of Islam’s freedom from any 
authoritative priesthood or even dogma percolated into European 
culture or soon would do so. A line of European intellectual 
Islamophiles began to appear.’  
                                                                              (Wilson : 2003 : 20) 
Interestingly, Wilson traces Nietzsche’s existentialist approach back to a tradition of 
free thinkers and anti-christian sentiments by route of the Enlightenment, 
Freemasonry and Rosicrucianism to an Islamophile tradition in Europe.  
Would contemporary Islam offer the same attraction to present day non-conformists 
like their 16th, 17th and 20th century forebears?  While there is some contemporary 
appeal to Islam for who feel disenfranchised, this seems currently within the context 
of racial and social class tensions, (Bowen : 2009;  Haddad : 2006;  Marsh : 1984; 
Rambo : 1993;  Wohlrab-Sahr :1999;  Kose : 1996; Walker : 2005; Zebiri : 2004; 
Zebiri :2008) and this has been a constant source base for conversion to Islam. 
Nevertheless, this differs from those those covered in Wilson’s research, who were 
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not able to accept the basic premises of European society on an intellectual and 
spiritual basis. Taji Farouki, (2007) cites numerous sociological research showing the 
typical profile of the counter-culturalists in the 60s / 70s, who orientated themselves 
to the East. These were usually white, though not exclusively, educated, middle to 
upper middle class and as likely female as male who took ‘a turn to the self as the 
only remaining source of meaning and significance’ in a search for “the authentic 
self”’, (Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 3) and from amongst this grouping, many turned to 
Islam.  
Wohlrab-Sahr (1999) distinguishes a contemporary typology of those who converted 
in disassociating from their own social context in a ‘symbolic battle’.  This is usually 
a rejection of socio-moral conventions, sub cultural behaviour and the concept of 
loyal citizenship in which, ‘Islam is related to a biographically relevant problem of 
social integration and recognition’, acted out to ‘[enable] the symbolization of 
maximal distance within one’s own social context’, (Wohlrab-Sahr : 1999 : 361).  
Perhaps one way of differentiating between those identified by Wilson and Wohlrab-
Sahr typologies could be located in distance; Wohlrab-Sahr’s typology remaining in 
their social context and locality but accentuating their ‘maximal distance ’ from the 
known and familiar. In contrast, the first type, as depicted in Wilson and Taji- 
Farouki, removing themselves physically and mentally from their familiar 
surrroundings and contexts. This first typology may be also be distinguished by 
borrowing and adapting the Berger et al, (1974) term;  ‘homeless mind’, as displaced, 
‘intellectual vagrants’ who turn inward in the desire for ‘the personal encounter with 
the transformative sacred’, (Taji-Farouki : 2007 : 4 ).  The second typology is more 
aligned with ‘…articulating problems of disintegration in one’s own social context..’ , 
(Wohlrab-Sahr :  1999 : 361) and orientated more outwardly to the socio-moral 
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sphere. The first group might, as classified by Rambo (1993) have undergone a 
powerful transformative event; ‘Conversions are often stimulated by an extraordinary, 
and in some cases mystical, experience. (1993 : 48) which points to a more internal 
orientation. The latter group seems identified in Al-Toma and Hibell’s (2012) study of 
British converts as those whose motivation to convert ‘….may stem from a political 
rather than spiritual basis which can involve a rejection or questioning of 
conventional norms and standards prevailing within British society. (2012 : 33). 
Perhaps over simplifying, Roy writes; ‘To convert to Islam today is a way for a 
European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology’ (Roy cited by 
Bubandt : 2010 : 103). In the more recent past many of the more socially privileged 
Europeans became Muslim, (Hellyer : 2007), lending further argument to differentiate 
conversions on spiritual and intellectual grounds as opposed to moral and social 
disenfranchisement. Some examples of this are: 
In the 18th and 19th Centuries there were a number of converts to 
Islam amongst the English upper classes, including Edward 
Montague, son of the ambassador to Turkey. Other notable 
conversions included Peter Lyle, the Admiral of the Tripolitanian 
Corsair Fleet during Nelson’s nineteen century Battle of the Nile, 
and Hedley Churchward, the first recorded British Muslim to 
perform Hajj’.  
                                                            (Al Toma & Hibell : 2012 : 21) 
In a rather dated but well known publication, Islam- Our Choice, (Bawany : 1992), 
republished by the Saudi government, (not to be mistaken with the later book of the 
same title – Dirks & Parlove : 2003), the personal accounts of thirty two converted 
European Muslims, (plus Japanese and other nationalities), circa 1900- 1930, reveal 
them to be invariably from the professional or aristocratic strata of society. Moreover, 
their accounts reveal more of the inner search or mystical experience variety than any 
form of social protestation.  Commenting on the French publication, D'Une foi l'autre, 
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les conversions a l'Islam en Occident (Rocher & Cherqaoui : 1986), Winter (aka 
Sheikh Abdul Hakim Murad) says, ‘Their conclusions are clear. Almost all educated 
converts to Islam come in through the door of Islamic spirituality’ (1997). This begs 
the question, what changes have occurred within the Muslim world, that now attract a 
different type of convert motivated more by the socio-political rather than the spiritual 
basis that was previously the case ?   
Mysticism and the Religiously Maximalist - Minimalist Dichotomy  
Those possessed of a religious persuasion commonly profess a belief in a Divine 
Being frequently expressed through communitarian rituals. For the sake of argument, 
we could say this can incorporate two different types of individual interpretation; a 
minimal and maximal interpretation of religion. The minimalist interpretation would 
incorporate an adherence to a creed or dogma related to canonical and scriptural texts.  
On the other hand, a maximal interpretation of religion could equally adhere to a 
creed or dogma yet involve a wider definition. A maximalist interpretation might 
involve the experiential interpretation of the religious life perhaps making links with 
elements not found within the perimeter of the core beliefs. This infers no negation of 
the beliefs, rituals or scriptures of one’s given faith nor adapting eclectic supra 
religious perspectives. A further formulation of the differentiation between minimalist 
and maximalist religious perspectives might be indicated in polarities; form vs. 
essence, private vs. public, mystical vs. dogmatic and the passive vs. active.  A devout 
and committed Catholic may possess this maximalist religious perspective.  
In arguing the existence of God, the religious person would most likely base this on 
causality, cosmological or ontological arguments, which are at centre of the 
metaphysical religious structures. However, the maximalist approach referred to 
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above might tend to move away from the metaphysical formulation of God; the  
posing of the ‘when and where’ of God are questions considered somewhat irrelevant. 
For the maximalist, bringing such questions to bear into the everyday phenomenal 
world could be seen the imposition of a facile dualism between theism and atheism 
Whereas the minimalist perspective may be prone to the idea that a particular doctrine 
defines Truth, Existence, the Universe and God in exclusive and absolute terms, the 
maximalist view tends towards the position that exact definitions of these things are 
beyond precise human comprehension but are indications of a greater reality. In this 
latter case, the individual ascribes meaning and value to the rituals and doctrine of as 
a fully conscious and voluntary act of commitment rather than a duty incumbent on 
believers. The more rationally minded believer or atheist may require, in their 
different ways, more concrete evidence for faith, either insisting on there being 
rational evidence for the existence of God or not. On this basis, the atheists have it as 
evidence for the existence of God can be philosophically refuted on a variety of 
counts. For example, the idea of a prime mover encompassed within the Causation 
argument; what evidence is there that this signifies only one prime mover or that the 
prime mover has any other qualities other than ‘moving’? (Hollenbach : 1994). The 
maximalist might question the need for establishing this kind of evidence. Why do we 
presume that we should demand proof in the first place? In the same way that 
Literature may be an inadequate discipline to solve a maths equation, rational 
deduction may be an inadequate discipline to approach the question of God. We can 
see something of the nuance of this in Caputo’s explanation of Derrida’s concept of 
différance, in describing it as ‘formlessness’ and ‘namelessness’ (1997 : 212) 
retreating and resisting definition or theorization. While the general consensus of 
western philosophy may perceive religion as irrational, this might be more revealing 
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of the limitations and prejudices of rationalist thought than anything to do with 
religion. Yet it would appear that since the enlightenment, religion has progressively 
succumbed to the primacy of the rational and as Gould (1999) suggests, it is 
frequently communicated in a manner contradictory to its essential nature. Within the 
parameters of rationality, the theological discourse is ultimately unable to match the 
exactitude of the rational and is thereby called into doubt. Once religion is 
‘institutionalized’ by dint of rational deduction, its essential nature is lost. The 
categorization, codification of truth, of existence and of God – is the placing of a grid 
work of metaphysics upon the numinous. As Caputo says22, ‘Metaphysics cannot 
digest movement, becoming, temporality, genuine novelty and the attempt to do so 
results in ridiculous logicizations’ (1987 : 18). As we have seen, over-rationalized 
religious doctrine can conceivably foment the human tendency of fundamentalism 
and puritanism and is perhaps religion at its least effective.  
Mysticism 
As with différance, mystical experience is not so easily prescribed and relates more to 
the ineffable and indefinable. Popularly misunderstood as something rather fanciful, 
it is important to define exactly what is meant by mysticism. General understanding 
perceives it as stemming from the past involving those who undergo supranormal 
experiences or able to perform extraordinary phenomenon or miracles. While Muslim 
modernists and reformers are severely criticism of Western scholarship on Islam, they 
have adopted the view of early Western orientalists in perceiving mysticism as 
something imported from Christianity and other religions into Islam (El-Fadl : 2001). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Not to be confused with J.S. Caputo 
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Bertrand Russell (2007) saw mysticism as the antithesis of rationality in postulating 
that a mystic could not also be a rational individual. Wittgenstein says ‘It is not how 
things are in the world that is mystical but that it exists’ (Wittgenstein : 2002 : 88). 
Misunderstandings can ensure as a result of the mystic’s heightened sensibilities, 
giving an acute sense of the wonder of being and existence, where ordinary things are 
experienced as extraordinary things, which to the outsider appears strange and 
illogical. This is corroborated in the following description of the mystical state:  
…concerning touch they feel extreme delight, at times so intense 
that all the bones and marrow rejoice, flourish and bathe in it. [..] 
The experience is common with spiritual persons. It is an overflow 
from the affection and devotion of the sensible spirit, which each 
person receives in their own way’  
                                  (John of the Cross cited by Welsh : 1996 : 125) 
 
The sensationalism of claiming such things as bilocation, levitation, speaking with the 
dead, visions, healing by touch and other unexplainable phenomena has tended to 
obscure an inherent earthiness in the message of much of what the genuine mystics 
have had to say. On the other hand, it is important not to discount such phenomena. If 
there is a God, an encounter with the Divine must be overwhelming and what is 
communicated will not be mundane. However, it is important not to dwell on these 
experiences, they are essentially secondary and can detract from the essential. Instead 
of seeing the mystics as a privileged group accorded experiences that ordinary people 
do not have, we should veer more toward seeing them as ‘clarifiers of what it means 
to be human’ (Welsh : 1996 : 123). In speaking of both Pamuk and Soroush, dealt 
with previously in Chapter One, Heyking (2006) understands them both to relate to ‘ 
…..mysticism, not as an escape…..but as a means of recapturing a more authentic 
experience of reality characterized by existential openness’ (p76). Another 
characteristic of mysticism to be considered is that of ‘earthiness’, something which 
Klein (1967 : 13) identifies in the mysticism of the Prophet Muhammad and those 
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that followed after him. There are elements of bawdiness to be seen in Jalaluddin 
Rumi’s Mathnawi (1983) and mystical love for God masquerading as profane love 
and drinking of wine and drunkenness to denote spiritual states such as those which 
appear in the poems of al-Khayyam (d.1131) (Fitzgerald : 1997), or Abu Madayn al-
Ghawth, (d.1179; Cornell : 1996),  al- Shushtari (d.1253; Elinson : 2011), all of 
whom are renowned Muslim mystics; to name but a few. Other mystical attributes in 
the Prophetic practice were asceticism, devotional exercises and a rationale for 
mystical states. 
 
Both Heidegger and Derrida engaged with the thought of Meister Eckhardt, a primary 
figure of Christian mysticism, clearly recognising him as possessing an uncommon 
insight into the nature of things. Heidegger expressed the view that genuine mystics 
could be  ‘astoundingly clear’ and expound views characterized by ‘extreme 
sharpness and depth of thought’ (1996 : 39).  In further contrast to the nebulous 
concept of mysticism commonly held, it can also refer to a more grounded idea of 
that which can be claimed as an experience of ‘communion with Ultimate Reality’ 
(Steindl-Rast : 1989: 36; Rahner : 2010) appearing as something that many human 
beings who might never claim themselves as mystics can undergo at some point or 
other in their lives (Steindl-Rast : 1989; Maslow : 2004; Harmless : 2008; Rahner : 
2010). Tensions between such experiences and institutionalized religion can be 
fraught nonetheless, the relationship is close and inevitable. 
If the religious pursuit is essentially the human quest for meaning, 
then these most meaningful moments of human existence must 
certainly be called “religious”. They are, in fact, quickly recognised 
as the very heart of religion, especially by those people who have 
the good fortune of feeling at home in a religious tradition. And yet, 
the body of religion doesn’t always accept its heart. This can happen 
in any religious tradition, Eastern or Western. To the established 
religion, after all, mysticism is supect. The established religion asks : 
 152 
Why is there a need for absorption in the Cloud of Unknowing when 
we have spelled out everything so clearly ?  
                                                                      (Steindl-Rast : 1989 :11) 
 
Almost all religions seem to originate in the mystical experience of its founder and 
with the passing of time, a set of beliefs are built around this experiences; resulting 
eventually in mundanizing the ineffable. As Steindl-Rast says ‘There is no religious 
doctrine that could not ultimately be traced back to its roots in mystical experience’ 
(1989 : 11) and ‘The same plot is acted out repeatedly on the stage of history: every 
religion seems to begin with mysticism and end up in politics’. Breaking this down, 
the mystical experience occurs, upon which the intellect steps in to interpret what has 
occurred which is the beginning of doctrine.  The intellect swoops in on the initial 
experience in the human compulsion to interpret and understand and formulations are 
made. Even the inclination to try to avoid naming or classifying the experience 
remains an intellectualization of the experience and leads to a doctrine. As time 
passes, further intellectual accretions accumulate upon the earlier formulations, 
slowly detracting from the initial experience and the numinous begins to concretize. 
Similarly, the early ethical formulations, translating the primal mystical experience 
into everyday actions, also become codified through the perhaps mistaken desire to 
adhere to the original experience, yet slowly become incapable of changing to new 
circumstances. As for the ritual aspect, the same sort of atrophying occurs through the 
desire to conserve and perfect the meaning of the earliest rituals derived from the 
primary mystical event and as a result people become more attached to the form of the 
ritual than the essence. In addition, ever narrowing circles of differentiation are 
created between those who are seen to adhere to ever narrowing definitions of what 
the original teachings signify and those who do not, whereas in reality the original 
experience points to the universal. All of these together, result in historically 
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fashioned dogmatisms, legalisms and ritualisms that become progressively removed 
from the primal and initial experience and eventually rendering the religious as 
irreligious. However, religion can also serve to facilitate a two way process from the 
primordial initial experience to its application in the present through the acceptance of 
the mystical. The mystics have frequently served to point a way back by rupturing 
through the skein of doctrine and ritual; yet without negating it, to point the way back 
to the original effusive experience indicating and encompassing an authentic 
knowledge beyond theoretical ‘book’ cognizance and a love encompassing all things. 
In discussing mysticism within the Abrahamic traditions Idel & McGinn (1996) 
express the view that : 
…mystics constantly break through existing theological theories in 
order to stress the unity of love and cognition ... Gregory the Great’s 
‘amor ipse notitia (‘love itself is knowledge’) provided Western 
contemplatives with a basis for affirming again and again that the 
highest love includes supreme knowledge ... We detect a similar 
favoring of love among Muslim mystics.  
                                                                       (Idel & Ginn :1996 : 22) 
The accumulated accretions of dogma can manifest outwardly in stultifying social 
structures and institutions. While there may be a need for structures or institutions, it 
is when such structures become ends in themselves that the tradition is ultimately 
betrayed. Such structures require the ability to transcend themselves and as Steindl-
Rast says real faith involves letting go ‘of institutional structures and so [finding] 
them on a higher level – again and again’ (1989 :14). As Gallagher says, ‘The 
continued existence of tradition depends upon learning and interpreting processes. 
Traditions live only to the extent that they play themselves out in such situations, only 
to the extent that they are transcended and appropriated in this interchange which 
questions and transforms them’ (Gallagher : 1992 : 168). 
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There are means and ways of reconnecting back to the primal effusion or heart of 
religion. One of these has been through the presence of people who have seemingly 
reconnected with the immediacy of the initial mystical experience, adhering to the 
outward forms of the religion but not slavishly bound to them. These are processes 
and indications rather than ends in themselves and the existential choice before each 
believer is to reconnect to the mysticism at the heart of their tradition, focusing on the 
‘becoming’ rather than occupying a formulated ‘being’, in short, a journey towards 
authenticity. Inauthenticity could occur when Islam is seen as identifying a category 
of people and occupying a sociological identity, at the expense of a more authentic 
appropriation of it as a process of ‘becoming’ through the primal and mystical 
experience of the Prophet. The basic formula of the Islamic creed La illaha ila llah23 
is an assertion made about the reality of existence and not an exclusive historical 
assertion. 
From the maximalist and mystically religious perspective, theism as represented in 
cosmological or ontological arguments are inadequate approaches to the question of 
God. Arguments proving the existence of God can be philosophically dismissed and 
this indicates nothing more than that this may not be the means of approaching the 
question. Equally, a theological discourse housed rationality is ultimately unable to 
match the exactitude of rational scientific discourse and thus calls it into doubt. 
Rational religion taken to the extreme foments the human tendency towards 
fundamentalism and puritanism - anathema to the mystics and is perhaps religion at 
its least effective.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ‘There is no god but the God’. This will be discussed at length later.  
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One of the challenges to traditional religious thought lies in that which has evolved 
out of the methodology of Cartesian doubt. In relation to the question of God – 
Descartes’ theory inadvertently suggests a greater enablement of an easier human 
appropriation of the Divine; effectively a mundanization of God with a lesser and 
considerably restricted role.  A bifurcation in human conception has developed 
between God and creation through the ramifications of Cartesian subject / object 
divide. The subject – object duality has deeply pervaded Western thought and values 
by separating human intellect from the individual’s existence, hence perhaps 
separating the human from the Divine. Hence the usual critique of the res cognitan is 
that in solidifying the concept of ego, this has posited the ego as a central vantage 
point in connection with the world and existence generally (Nishtani : 1982).   
 
Esotericism 
As with mysticism there is confusion over the definition of esotericism. Again, like 
mysticism, it too refers to non-rational and experiential aspects of religious 
experience. The esoteric ranges from Occultism, Hermeticism, alchemy, 
Rosicrucianism, magic, Gnosticism, Kabbalah and Freemasonry and various other 
secret societies, generally favouring the ‘mythical/symbolic over discursive forms of 
expression’ (Hanegraaff : 1999 : 226). Esotericism differentiates between the outer 
(exoteric) as opposed to the inner (esoterism) and as Alice Bailey describes it, is : ‘the 
science of the inner soul of all things’ and ‘the meaning which is to be found behind 
all individual, community, national and world affairs’ (Bailey : 2006 : 38). It lays 
claim to accessing hidden, underlying, yet essentialist, core universal theories behind 
all worldly phenomena. Inaccessible to the average person, esotericism can be said to 
be the inner search for universal theories and metaphysical system building and run 
 156 
counter to the existentialist themes presented thus far in this work.  Esotericists 
frequently lay claim to a primacy of knowledge transcending all other knowledge by 
its inherently transcendent nature – the mysterious key to all things.  In the religionist 
sense, the esotericists claim ascendancy over the exoteric in its advocacy of religious 
syncretism, narrowing the focus of its analysis to that which is allegedly common to 
all religions. Alice Bailey (1880 – 1949), a prominent esotericist, describes it thus;  
…. the emphasis upon the world of energies and to recognise that 
behind all happenings in the world of phenomena (and by that I 
mean the three worlds of human evolution) exists the world of 
energies; these are of the greatest diversity and complexity, but all of 
them move and work under the Law of Cause and Effect.  
                                                                                 (Bailey : 2006 : 1) 
 
However, a critique of the esoteric shows some basic flaws, as it functions within the 
terms of its own reference; in the ‘principle of [its own] reason’.  mainly centred 
around the idea. Perhaps even more poignantly, despite this grounding, esotericism 
remains firmly within a traditional metaphysical system, thoroughly rationalist and 
therefore seemingly at odds with a mode of thinking that claims to transcend the 
rational. Esotericism falls prey to an unquestioning adherence to the semantic basis of 
their mode of thinking (i.e., ‘inner truth’, ‘outer’, ‘sophia perennis’, ‘syncretism’ ) as 
self evidently true with no further underlying rationale.  Some of contradiction is 
manifest in the following passage from Fritjof Schuon (1907 – 1998) a well-known 
perennial esotericist :  
..the exoteric point of view cannot comprehend the transcendence of 
the Supreme Divine Impersonality of which God is the personal 
Affirmation; such truths are of too high an order and therefore too 
subtle and too complex from the point of view of simple rational 
understanding.  
                                                                             (Schuon : 1984 : 38) 
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Conflicting truth claims of religions are deemed details of little importance. When the 
esotericist looks at Islam, they see a general theory, rather than its ‘particular and 
immediate’ praxis and specificity, yet regard theory as ‘timeless and universal’ 
despite Islam claiming that. We may begin to recognise similar fault lines in the 
historical development of thought in the Muslim Western and Eastern lands -  perhaps 
pointing to a link between Eastern speculative thought and ‘speculative mysticism’. 
The authentic path proposed here, does not recognise a separate inward way (Sufism) 
diametrically opposed to an outward one (shar’ia), for they have been classically seen 
as two sides of a coin, neither claiming primacy over the other.24 It is useful to 
remember the assertion that Maghrebean Islam is ‘..,,more earthy than esoterically 
mystical’ yet ‘…….indistinguishable from Sufism’ (Wilson : 2003 : 175 ). 
 Any encounter with God in the Muslim sense plays out through God’s omnipresence, 
by means of either tanzih (transcendence) and / or tashbih (immanence), in other 
words as impersonally personal or personally impersonal. In this manner, there are no 
separate inner or outer realities for they are integral to each other. ‘The existence of a 
man who meets with that reality must not be thought of simply as ‘ “internally” 
personal existence’ (Nishatani : 1982  : 41). Not much more will be said about this 
beyond quoting the words of Sidi Ali Jamal (d.1779), the sheikh of Moulay ad-
Darqawi, (1760 – 1823) who said : ‘The faqir will not obtain the fruit of knowledge 
until the shari’ah [outward] and his reality [haqā’iq – reality – the inward] are one 
thing (al-Jamal : 1977 : 246 ).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This has direct correlation to the controversy involved in the introduction of al-Ghāzali’s books into 
al-Andalus and their subsequent burning.  
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Summary  
In this Chapter, an account of Islam has been given as historically providing refuge to 
Westerners seeking alternatives and contrasted with the current situation. The idea of 
religion inherently possessing a counter challenge to the monolitihic, lying within 
their mystical origins, has also been discussed. The chapter ends on making a clear 
distinction between esotericism and mysticism. In all this, it is hoped that the presence 
of inauthenticity within the religious realm has been recognised through identifying 
its interrelation with reification, modernism and rationalism and shown to be 
diametrically opposite to genuine mysticism.  
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Chapter 8 
A Brief History of Rationalism in the Muslim Context 
Building further upon the effects of rationalism covered in previous chapters, it is 
proposed here to undertake a critical and historical review of Muslim thought. This is 
carried out in order to trace some of the inevitable accrued formulations and distance 
from the original and mystical Prophetic experience in the cave of Hira, a 
phenomenon discussed in the last chapter.  
After the death of the Prophet, one of the most significant events for the Muslim 
community lie in the effects ensuing from the Battle of Siffin in 648 (CE) with lasting 
consequences to this day. After the Prophet Muhammad’s death (632 CE) the 
question of succession arose; which resulted some thirty years later in the 
assassination of the third and fourth caliphs, Uthman Ibn ‘Affan in 656 and Ali ibn 
Talib in 661 and war and dissension.  At Siffin two opposing armies supporting rival 
claims of succession, one side led by Ali ibn-Abu Talib, (599 - 661), the son in law of 
the Prophet and on the other, Muʿāwiya the Ist, (602 - 680) who was Governor of 
Damascus and the cousin of the recently assassinated Uthman and who felt that he 
was the rightful successor to the position of Caliph. As a result of this, Ali ibn-Abu 
Talib had dimissed Muʿāwiya who consequently refused to step down. Ali ibn-Abu 
Talib’s army was in a strong strategical position to defeat Muʿāwiyah and when the 
two armies faced each other poised for attack. In a tactic presumably designed to 
delay the inevitable, Muʿāwiyah called for adjudication in the matter of the 
succession.  This was agreed to and on the instigation of Ali ibn-Abu Talib, neutral 
arbitration was arranged with someone from either side, Abu Musa al Asha’ri and 
'Amr ibn al-'As, presumably with the intention of settling the matter in a manner 
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conducive to the future well being of the Muslim community as a whole. However, 
the arbitration actually resulted in Mu’awiyah confirmed as not only having the 
greater right of succession but as a result of this also causing a mutiny on the part of 
some in the ranks of Ali ibn-Abu Talib.  The mutineers were known as the Khawārij 
(those who leave), and they deemed that what Ali and his chosen arbitrators had done, 
as not only wrong, but as having constituted a major sin in having consented to 
adjudication in the first place, in that it indicated some doubt in Ali’s claim to the 
caliphate. Not only did they arbitrarily designate this as a major sin shortly afterwards 
but also declared it irredeemable and incapable of being forgiven by the Divine 
(Rahman : 1979; al-Maghnisawi : 2007). 
In justifying their separation from the main body of Muslims; the Khawārij took it 
upon themselves to make a series of legal opinions extending far beyond the 
particulars of the incident yet anchored still anchored in the original conflict. They 
generated complex moral and theological positions in establishing what they declared 
constituted ‘sin’. They also judged it the Muslim community’s right to kill anyone 
guilty of a major sin, political, moral or theological. A major sin indicated that 
through the act of sinning, the perpetrator was designated as an infidel or apostate and 
therefore punishable by death. Subsequently, Ali ibn Talib and the two arbitrators 
were judged as such eventually resulting in Ali ibn-Abu Talib’s murder at the hands 
of a khāwarij assassin in 661. Furthermore, the Khawārij went on to claim that the 
position of caliph should be abandoned altogether but any other leading position 
should not be the preserve of members of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh, as had 
been the understanding up to that point and that the position should be granted only 
through communal agreement.  In time, some branches or mutations of the khāwarij 
even abandoned the idea of any type of religious authority whatsoever, even to the 
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extent of the having an established Imam in the mosque, (except for any random 
person chosen to lead the ritual prayer) arguing that the individual is capable of 
reading the Qur’an on his own and required no intermediary interpretation.  Other 
similar legal decisions were frequently attributed to the Khawārij, distinctive in being 
extreme and against mainstream opinion, though these might well have been 
incorrectly attributed. The term probably came to designate anyone considered to be 
taking up severe positions and not need necessarily refer to the actual group involved 
in the Siffin incident (Rahman : 1979; Fahkry : 1997; al-Maghnisawi : 2007). What 
characterized the Khawārij was a particular kind of rigid, inflexible iconoclasm with a 
puritanical bent and a claim of orthodoxy. An indication of this was their considering 
their arbitrary interpretations to be binding on upon all Muslims. If we think of certain 
movements such as the Wahhābiyya or Salafīyya or other modernist movements and 
compare this with the characteristics and self assumed orthodoxy of the Khawārij, 
there does seem to be some similarities. In referring to contemporary Khawārij 
influence, Rahman comments; 
Indeed something of their radical spirit (although not overt 
influence) has been relived […] in relatively recent movements 
inspired by radical idealism such as the Wahhabi s in the 12th/18th 
century, and, in a more moderate spirit and more recently the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Middle East […]. We shall also 
note, when we discuss modern movements in Islam, certain aspects 
of the similarity of the Kharijite ideals with certain aspects of the 
doctrine of the radical Islamic movement, the Jama’at-i- Islami, in 
Pakistan.  
                                                                         (Rahman : 1979 : 170)                                             
 
Some of this can be seen in the refutation of the reasoning of Muhammad ibn Abd al 
Wahab (1703 – 1792) the founder of the Wahhābi movement already mentioned 
previously, by his brother Suleyman ibn Abd al Wahab who was also a religious 
scholar. ‘At numerous points, he accused his brother of rupturing Muslim unity and in 
so doing, going down the same misguided path as the Khairijites of early Islamic 
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times’ (Commins : 2006 : 23).25 Elsewhere Commins comments on other scholarly 
critique ranged against Muhammad ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb (1703-1792) during his time 
by Sulayman ibn Suhaym, (1718-1767) as being indicative of arguments used against 
the Wahhābi s up to this day. On the basis of the Wahhābis having declared whole 
towns guilty of infidelity and consequently waging jihād on them across the Arabian 
peninsula on the basis of their being idolaters, (though they considered themselves 
Muslims), ‘Ibn Suhaym accused the reformer of declaring that whoever did not agree 
with his position is an unbeliever and that whoever agrees with his position is a 
believer…’ (Commins : 2006 : 21). In fairness and in contrast to the Khawārij, there 
were elements of redemption in Abd’ ibn al-Wahhāb’s perspective as he did 
understand that many of the ‘idolaters’ mistaken beliefs were based in ignorance 
rather than outright rejection and insisted that those deemed as such should be invited 
to see the errors of their ways.   
 
Returning to the earlier era, the Khawārij opposition to unequivocal allegiance to the 
family of the Prophet as sole and rightful heirs to the caliphate roused much resistance 
and series of counter positions arose originating in reaction to the excesses of the 
Khawārij (al-Maghnisawi : 2007). Reactions ranged from absolute allegiance to the 
family of the Prophet and bestowing martyrdom to Ali ibn-Abu Talib. Perhaps not in 
direct reaction but surely related; this became the oppositional response of the Shīʿah 
to the extent that the caliph or Imam was not only the political and spiritual leader but 
the infallible interpreter of the Qur’an, particularly its hidden meanings.  Other 
positions ranged against the Khawārij were those of the Murji’ah who established a 
different dispositional stance; īmān (faith) as consisting of a knowledge of God and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The khawārij are also referred to as the Kharijites 
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submitting to his will but bearing love for the Divine (Fakhry : 1997). In direct 
opposition with the Khawārij, they believed that disobedience; any minor or major 
sin, did not automatically entail disbelief in God that thrust one into kufr, (rejection of 
the Divine).  For the Mujir’ite the question of Īmān (faith, belief) ‘was entirely a 
matter of inner assent; (Al Sharastani Abd al Karim cited by Fakhry : 1997 : 16) as 
opposed to outer practice and ‘the true believer is admitted to Paradise by virtue of his 
sincerity and love, rather than his action or obedience’ (Fakhry : 1997 : 13).  The 
matter of the individual’s sin should be left to the Divine Mercy and much of 
oppositional reaction roused against the Khawārij was centred around the question of 
individual responsibility in regard to sin. The Khawārij insisted on the fact that 
human beings had freewill, for they could not accept the idea that God would be the 
cause of someone instigating a bad act. Hence, the consequences of the Khawārij 
conflict at Siffin resulted in the first and earliest known debates between intellectual 
‘camps’ that arose in the Muslim world, setting off a series of other controversies still 
evolving to this present day. The first of these was between the Qadaris and the 
Jabariyyah. The Qadaris26 who proposed the question of free will and are often 
associated with the revered Hassan al Basri (d.728) and posited the argument that the 
individual was a free agent and should be held responsible for their own actions. The 
jabariyyah argued for strict predestination and were also known as the Mujbirah 
(Determinists) headed by Jahm ibn Safwan (d.745) and his adherents (al-Maghnisawi 
: 2007). They argued that all power stemmed from God and that no human had within 
them the agency of freewill. ‘Starting from the Koranic premise that God was 
Omnipotent, the determinists (al-Mujbirah) asserted that man is incapable of any 
activity, since he is already fully determined (majbūr) in his actions, which are wholly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Also know as the Qādirīyya but should be mistaken for the Sufi order by the same name.  
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created by God’ (Fahkry : 1994a : 36).  God could not be spoken of or described in 
the same terms that human acts are described (as in verbs) and that to do so was 
delineating the indefinable and committing the sin of anthropomorphism. On the other 
hand, when describing human actions – a priori powerless without God – a figurative 
form of speech was necessary in everyday conversation which nonetheless incorrectly 
attributed the action to the individual, whereas in reality these were determined 
Divinely.  These opposing arguments of the Qadaris and jabris became the basis of 
many ensuing theological debates within the Muslim world and can be traced back to 
the Khawārij controversy. However, it is important not to equate the position of the 
mujbirah (the jabris) with the zealousness of the Khawārij. Additionally, such 
opinions and standpoints were utilized in the application of political power and 
authority.  Theories established by intellectual debate had political implications as 
exemplified by the ruling Ummayads (661 – 750) who officially assumed the 
theological position that all matters were predestined by God, (the jabbari position).  
The implications being that people in authority were not directly responsible for any 
actions they took, as would be the case of ordering cruel punishments and torture 
(Saeed & Saeed: 2004; Fakhry : 1997). Any reprehensibility was secondary and all 
guilt removed, as what had occurred had been meant to occur and ordained so by 
God, perhaps furnishing early examples of ‘the irrationality of the rational’. In 
addition to this, the Ummayads claimed this to have been the traditional view of the 
salaf  (the righteous ancestors – first Muslim community). 27  These claims were 
challenged by the Qadaris and subsequently officially sanctioned reprisals were taken 
against them. It is indicative that the allegations made against them centred on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Not necessarily to be confused with the modern movement known as the salafīs though the claim of 
this movement is associated with the idea of being in line with the first Muslim community. 
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Qādirīs having been corrupted by Greek philosophy and Christian theology, for Islam 
had now come into contact with the knowledge and practice of Ancient Greece.  
 
The Beginning and Development of Speculative Philosophy and Structured 
Theology within Islam 
 
While the intellectual positions and movements mentioned above had based 
themselves around particular questions arising out of the excesses of the Khawārij 
they did not initially form any overarching paradigms of Muslim interpretation.  The 
main juridical tenets, (fiqh) had remained constant and unaffected by such conflicts 
and the juridical has to be distinguished from the more theological though of course 
there are clear overlaps and the development of this will be dealt with later. Yet with 
the passing of time more evolved general theological positions moved in on the 
juridical praxis of the everyday of ordinary Muslims becoming entrenched around the 
central themes of sin, responsibility and free will. More evolved and detailed 
arguments were developed and expanded to fortify the premises of respective 
intellectual stances, which had implications beyond the immediate debate. For 
example, the interpretation of Qur’an was central to these arguments and used as both 
rationale and stimulus for further questions requiring different, more evolved, 
sophisticated, intellectual approaches and methodologies, all of which went into 
forging the beginnings of a more speculative and structured theology. There was also 
considerable dissension around the question of ta’wil, a method of interpretation of 
the above mentioned mutāshabihāt verses of the Qur’an. Ta’wil involves the idea that 
such verses must concur with reason thus maintaining the independence of reason in 
regard to revelation. This whole of this type of discourse became known as kalām, 
literally meaning ‘speech’ and was something that expanded theology beyond praxis 
and basic creed. This is not to be confused with what the Mutakallimūn that 
 166 
eventually formed itself sometime later in the mid tenth century and also referred to 
as kalām (Haleem : 1996). Presumably kalām refers to the ‘speech or words of God’ 
and theology became the subject which deliberates upon the meaning of God’s words; 
to be contrasted with the simple yet profound belief system of the original Muslim 
community. It is both inconceivable and evident that the early community did not 
engage in the type of discourse characteristic of these Muslim intellectual movements 
and schools. Equally, inconceivable is that such an original discourse could be 
maintained in light of a nascent Muslim society encountering different cultural and 
social circumstances that required establishing certain guiding principles to maintain 
some coherent unity   
 
As with the word kalām, the Greek ‘logos’ also means signifies ‘word’ with related 
meanings; as in the word ‘logical’ or ‘theology’ signifying ‘the word of God’, both 
derived from this. Accordingly, kalām refers to a method of discursive philosophy 
employed by the Muslims with the object of arriving at an ultimate truth; a dialectic 
method adapted from the Greeks, used to arrive at a greater understanding of the truth 
in the Qur’an. Given the central role of the Qur’an as the primary source of truth, a 
more methodological approach to understanding the text emerged in which two 
specific categorizes were initially made concerning verses in aiding interpretation. 
One of these categories was known as mukhama and which has its root in the word 
uhkima meaning deciding between two things, equally related to a series of words 
invariably to do with judgements and wisdom. The mukhama verses are those, which 
refer to very clear decisive issues, mainly legal rulings but also clear elucidation 
between truth and falsehood.28 Other Qur’anic verses were identified which do not set 
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  An example of  the Mukhama: 'O you who believe! When you deal with each other in transactions 
 167 
out clear delineations of interaction in social, commercial, governance or religious 
observance and are more open to varied interpretation.  Even the mufasir’s (exegete’s) 
background knowledge of the event and circumstances of the verses did not always 
simplify or aid interpretation.  Such verses are named by the Qur’an itself as 
mutāshabihāt (ambiguous), which is derived from the word ishtābahā denoting 
‘uncertain’ things. Such verses were given this category when it seemed that the 
meaning was neither clear cut or easily agreed.29  When considering both the 
readiness of the Khawārij, and it must be said, the general human propensity, to insist 
on one unassailable interpretation, then it is clear that much claiming and counter 
claiming would occur. Thus by the 7th century (CE) there were any number of 
interpretations of various mutāshabihāt verses, which were endlessly expounded 
upon, refuted and debated (Rahman : 1979) and these differences evolved into various 
intellectual camps with strongly delineated forms of thought. These were not 
constrained only to internal Muslim dialectics for Muslims were now encountering 
Christian and other belief systems engendering more debate with an inevitable 
intellectual cross pollination taking place.  
 
While Greek philosophy was assimilated by Muslim scholars it is important to 
distinguish this from what is popularly known as ‘classical Athenian’ philosophy.  
Rather, what the Muslims encountered was that which had been inherited, sustained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
involving future obligations over a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. Let a scribe write 
down faithfully as between the parties ...' (Al-Qur'an 2: 282). 
29 An example of mutāshabihāt: ‘It is God who created for you all that is on the earth, then turned to 
the heights, and fashioned them into seven heavens, and God knows all things' (Al-Qur'an 2: 29). 	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and developed in the late antique world mainly by Nestorian Christians in southern 
Iran and Alexandria, Antioch and Khurasan (Robinson : 1996).  This was especially 
so in Alexandria, where prior to the Muslim conquest, Greek thought had become 
thoroughly cosmopolitan and adapted more religious and mystical tones that had 
evolved considerably from the more classical mode of thought. This brand of 
philosophy, now referred to as Neo-platonism, merged the different classical modes 
of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Pythagoreanism and Stoicicsm and was the integration 
brought about through the teaching of Plotinus in the 3rd Century AD and later 
incorporated wisdom from India and the East. In a general sense, it is a theory of the 
world as a place of imperfect materialism and the soul as being able to rise above this 
world through knowledge of the transcendent God. It was only later that recourse was 
taken to actual Greek texts and that translations were undertaken and deliberated 
upon. Though prior contact with Greek thought had already occurred in the 
borderlands, the Muslim conquest of Alexandria in 641 was seminal in this respect as 
this city had maintained its reputation as a living and thriving centre for Greek 
science, medicine, philosophy and Hellenic Christian theology.  It was this latter 
aspect that is understood to have profoundly influenced Muslim thought at the time 
and spread further east to Damascus during the Ummayyad period (661 – 750).  
Intellectual controversies now stemmed from a heady mixture of Muslim – Christian 
encounters arising out of political struggles and theological differences based around 
questions of the correspondence between the earthly realm and the spiritual between 
Muslim and Christian understanding. In this manner, the Greek philosophical 
tradition was adopted and developed by large segments of Eastern and Western 
Muslim intellectual circles in the eighth and ninth century. By the eleventh century, 
under the patronage of rulers like Hunayn Ibn Ishaq (d.873), major Greek 
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philosophical figures had been translated into Arabic (Robinson : 1996). Fakhry 
(1994b) is of the opinion that the Muslims did not merely copy and pass on Greek 
thought but actually advanced its scope further insofar as their focus started from the 
basic premise of the unicity of creation as emanating from God and life after death, 
most of which had not been the philosophical concern of the Greeks.  
In logic, they not only amplified Aristotelian categories and canons 
in very extensive commentaries or paraphrases, but actually 
questioned and revised them; they also contributed significantly to 
the analysis of logical terms in a manner which was not equaled by 
any of the Greek philosophers or commentators 
                                                                           (Fakhry : 1997 : ix-x) 
 
There was less interest in Greek literature or history as the Muslim focus was rather 
more utilitarian and the analysis tools most appreciated were reason, logic and natural 
science.  It is crucial to consider the change of paradigm and mental outlook within 
the Muslim world required in appropriating philosophical methodology and is a 
subject that is not commented upon sufficiently.   
 
When less emphasis is placed on the actual intellectual inheritance and more focus on 
the dispositional paradigm shift that it brought about other things begin to emerge. 
For this ‘Greek’ perspective was a novel approach insofar as it called for a critically 
disembodied attitude, objectively orientated towards any given question or 
phenomena. The Greek reflective mode was one which called upon the individual to 
subdue any personal interest or emotional attachments so that objective truth could be 
arrived at. One has to take into account what Muslim ‘beingness’ encompassed prior 
to this encounter.  From the accounts of the Prophet and the Companions and the 
jahiliyya (the era of ignorance prior to the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad) we can 
surmise that these were a people who were largely subjective in outlook and entirely 
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engaged, functioning within a world of feelings and passionate action and anything 
but detachedly objective.  But this does not infer a primitive, chaotic unreasonability 
or either a lack of impartiality or empathy when required. Based on classical sources, 
Bashier (1978) expresses the view that the term jāhilīya is all too frequently 
misinterpreted to refer to an obtuse barbarity whereas in fact the pre-Islamic semitic 
tribes possessed ideals and characteristics of karamah, an innate and natural dignity, 
karām, a generous nobility encompassing jud, an almost irrational generosity as 
exemplified by the renowned legendary figure of Hatim al-Tai 30, muruwwah, 
chivalry, as exemplified by the famous 7th century, Alliance of the Virtuous, (Hilf-al 
Fudūl) formed in pre-Islamic times in Mecca to confront injustice against travelling 
merchants who came to Mecca and who had little tribal associations or support in 
Mecca. Also najdah, signifying a readiness to come to the help of anyone oppressed 
even if it involved risk to the self. The term jāhilīya refers more to the ignorance of 
the Divine revelation of the Qur’an while the term Bedoūin, literally a desert dweller 
but referring to anyone living nomadically in open spaces away and outside of the 
cities. This word has composite and seminal meanings, on the one hand, the virtuous 
qualities just listed above, combined with a deep rooted sense of personal freedom, 
while on the other, a concomitant lack of refinement and an impassioned commitment 
between thought and action.  In the ‘Muqaddima’ of Ibn Khaldūn (1332 – 1406), a 
famed historical treatise and the first of a seven volume history of the world, he 
writes, ‘The Arab Bedouins are a wild people….Their wildness is dear to them, for it 
means for them freedom and independence from all authority’ (Ibn Khaldūn : 2 : 25). 
Expressing this bedoūin mentality and counterbalancing quality equally famed Emir 
Abd al-Qādir (1808 – 1883) wrote : 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 A legendary 6th century figure known for his exceptional generosity and regarded as the epitome of 
this virtue acknowledged to this day within Arab culture.  
 171 
O thou who preferrest the dull life of the town 
To wide free solicitude 
Dost thou despise nomadic tents 
Because they are light, not heavy 
Like houses of stone and lime 
If only thou knewest the desert’s secret !… 
                                                   (Emir Abd al-Qādir cited in Burckhardt : 1992 : 21) 
 
This is to be contrasted with Ibn Khaldūn’s depiction of the city dweller, ‘They are 
used to luxury and success, and to giving in to their worldly desires. Consequently 
their souls are coloured by every kind of reprehensible and negative characteristic’ 
(Ibn Khaldūn  cited in Burckhardt : 1999 : 19). However, this should not be reduced 
to some romantic yearning for the pristine desert life, for in contrasting and 
juxtaposing the idea of the nomadic with refinement and ‘culture’ of the city, they 
emerge as repositories of knowledge, such as spirituality, science and the arts. 
Conversely, nor is this to be interpreted in detriment to the nomad for ‘In order that 
the city may not die or inwardly decay, it must be continually nourished by the influx 
of nomadic elements, while contrariwise the Bedouins must share in the spiritual 
influence that emanates from the city’ (Burckhardt : 1992 : 24). Ibn Khaldūn’s theory 
is that human culture is always poised between the two extremes of civilization and 
nomadism and that any imbalance one way or the other resulted in either degenerative 
corruption (civilization) or lawlessness (nomadic).  Therefore the perfect balance for 
human society was between the sedentary and the nomadic and Burckhardt 
understands this equilibrium to be central to Muslim culture, manifested in the 
equilibrium seen in the great classical cities of Islam, particularly evident in Fez.  As 
for the encounter with Western civilization, ‘Only the European Renaissance, and a 
fortiori French rationalism, which found its expression in the French revolution, 
adopted completely literally the “civilization” of man as its goal’ (Burckhardt : 1992 : 
23) rendering the overwhelming impetus behind the modern concept of human 
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development is here perceived as an imbalance. In this understanding we can begin to 
see the nuances of Kierkegaard’s (2008) reference to the differences between Jewish 
(read semitic) and Greek paradigms. Within Ibn Khaldūn’s dichotomy of the 
sedentary versus the anti sedentary there are nuances of Kierkegaard’s polarities 
between the religious and the ethical, the subjective versus the objective, passionate 
subjectivity and reasoned objectivity, the situational versus the universal and the 
present moment versus the projected future. 
 
By the middle of the eighth century the Qadari31 movement, already mentioned 
above, evolved into the famous Mu’tazilah school of thought. Wasil ibn ‘Ata (d.748), 
a protégé of Hasan al Basri (642 – 728) is generally seen as the founder of this 
movement and provides an example of the punctiliousness of the debates and 
controversies that raged at the time and as the lingering influence of the khawārij 
controversy. Wasil ibn ‘Ata was said to have split with his teacher over the ‘major 
sin’ matter, wherein he believed that the sinner was neither fully Muslim, nor fully 
kāfir (disbeliever). As Wasil ibn Ata had removed himself from his own teacher or 
a’tazala (to withdraw) the adherents of this school were named the Mu’tazilah and 
became a prominent intellectual movement for over 250 years. 
 
The Mu’tazilah engaged in a rational and Hellenistic form of logic and syllogism, 
which grew into various metaphysical dogma. An example of one of the precepts of 
this school of thought was based around the argument for Divine Justice and Unicity 
– not preordained as this would render religious obligations as meaningless as in: ‘I 
am not following the commandments of God because God has ordained it so’ (Fakhry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Again not to be confused with the Sufi Order of the same name which evolved some time later. 
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: 1997 : 16). The Mu’tazilah position involves the understanding that Divine Justice 
recognises the human capability to choose between right and wrong and human 
beings instinctively know one from the other.  A merciful God cares for his creation 
and would otherwise be unjust and therefore they asserted that God functions in a way 
which is best for his creation. It was reasoned that people are compensated for any 
suffering in the after life, (according to an interpretation of the Qur’an) for any 
suffering they may have endured whilst living. Those in opposition to the Mu’tazilah 
understood this as a deplorable suggestion of a reciprocal relationship between 
humans and the Divine (Glasse : 2001). Whereas the Mu’tazilah maintained that in 
some manner, there is an obligation on God’s part toward acts of goodness on the part 
of the individual. This was directly opposed to the Mujbirah and naqli (traditionalist) 
view that God was not bound by anything and that whatever is Divinely commanded 
is right and whatever is Divinely prohibited is wrong. 
 
The Dichotomy of ‘Aqli and Naqli  
Those of Mu’tazilah leanings of interpretation found themselves in opposition with 
the Mālikī and Hanbalī traditions (madhāhib [pl.] madhhab [sgr]). This was a 
conflict between rational (‘aqli) or reasoned faith and traditional faith (naqli). It is 
important to differentiate the madhāhib as juridical and not theological and in broad 
terms to see the former as based on praxis with the latter based on the theoretical, 
though there is considerable overlap between the two. This form of thinking is often 
referred to as a ‘traditionalist’ and/ or ‘transmissionalist.  However, it is of extreme 
importance not to understand the naqli as part of some reactive, nostalgic trend or 
possess or the mordancy of the Khawārij; as the madhāhib, by their very nature 
cannot be equated with the puritanism of the Khawārij in any manner or form. Yet the 
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naqli engagement with the Qur’an was generally on an explicit basis and 
interpretation was based on the classical linguistic and grammatical grounds. As an 
example of this there is the famous incident recounted from several different sources 
wherein Mālik ibn Anas (711 – 795) otherwise known as Imam Malik and the founder 
of the Mālikī madhhab was asked about Allah’s establishment (istiwā) on the throne 
(Qur’an 20 V. 5), ‘How is he established?’ asked the man. Imam Malik is recorded to 
have looked down sweating profusely then looking up and replying, ‘”The Merciful is 
established over the Throne” just as he described Himself, (i.e. in the Qur’an). One 
cannot ask “How?” as “How?” does not apply to Him. Belief in it is obligatory, 
asking about it is innovation’ (Keller : 1994 : 854). As Fakhry says, ‘Ibn Hanbal [and 
Malik] …..in their deference to the Koranic text, refused to even debate these 
questions…’ (1994a : 36: my italics) and so what emerges is the tendency for the 
traditionalists or the naqli, (i.e. the Māliki / Hanbalī positions) to have based their 
beliefs on revelation by apprehending the Qur’an seemingly in a more literal fashion, 
(but without being literalists) and affirming their faith without wishing to engage in 
knowing why or how it could be verified. Upon closer analysis, we can see how this 
breaks the usual pattern of rationality. The need or requirement for everything to be 
understood more thoroughly is not embarked upon in the naqli perspective – the 
Qur’an is not a common book compiled by man but as the Divine word is taken as it 
is and is not interrogated in the same manner as a human being might be. Clearly, this 
view contrasts sharply with the speculative nature of Mu’tazilah thought that was 
fully established by the late eighth to ninth century and there were now two distinct 
positions in the Muslim world – the traditionalist (naqli) one wherein God was 
approached by means of his revelation and the mu’tazilite who denied literal 
interpretations and affirmed man’s individual free will and wished to defend the faith 
 175 
through the use of reason and render it intellectually plausible (‘aqli). The Greek 
metaphysics effect is seen in the Mu’tazilite interaction in their affirmation of the 
autonomy of human reason and that man could come to know God through reasoning 
without revelation. Whereas the traditionalists approach insisted on the assertion of 
God’s incomparability and unknowability.  
 
There was another noted intellectual movement incorporating more of a pure 
philosophy method (falsafa). These individuals contended that philosophical truth 
was applicable to all fundamental questions thereby rendering religious symbolism as 
something of a populist means of conveying truth in a way accessible to them. From 
this, something of an intellectual élite emerged from Muslim neo-Platonism with the 
likes of Al Kindi32  (d. circa 866), one of the earliest scholars associated with 
Aristotle, born in Kufah but lived and taught in Baghdad and is said to have written 
over 242 treatises covering philosophy, logic, metaphysics, arithmetic, spheres, 
music, astrology, geometry, medicine and politics (Corbin : 1993; Klein-Franke : 
1996). 
Al Kindi was perhaps one of the first to engage in ta’wil, the type of interpretation of 
the mutāshabihāt verses mentioned above. While he may not have adhered to the 
Mu’tazilah in all matters he generally had strong sympathies with many of their basic 
precepts.  Nevertheless, philosophy was never well received in popular circles as 
falsafa was regarded as something of an intruder into Muslim thought and remained 
so throughout much of its intellectual history as the Greek foreignness of being quite 
apparent. Others were the neo-Platonist Al Farabi (872 – 950 AD) who was famous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Abu Yususf Ya’qub Al Kindi One of the earliest scholars associated with Aristotle, born in Kufah 
but moved and taught in Baghdad. He is said to have written over 242 treatises on logic, metaphysics, 
arithmetic, spheres, music, astrology, geometry, medicine and politics.  
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for his constant travelling between some of the great Muslim centres of learning such 
Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. He held jobs as varied as a religious judge in Aleppo 
to being a garden caretaker and frequently suffering under the consequences of 
different political and intellectual trends. His intellectual span encompassed 
philosophy, science, logic, sociology, medicine, mathematics and music. Al-Farabi 
was able to simplify the study of logic easier by dividing it into two categories; 
Takhayyūl (idea) and Thūbut (proof), (Black : 1996). The renowned Ibn Sina (980 - 
1037) devoted himself to Muslim jurisprudence, philosophy, natural, physical science, 
logic and Euclid as well as mastering the disciplines of astronomy, theology, 
metaphysics, medicine, psychology, music and mathematics (Inati : 1996).33 Notably 
absent from this list are the figures of Ibn Baja, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Rushd and the 
reason for this is that these figures were situated in the Western lands of the Muslim 
world and therefore considered as having different intellectual development. Despite 
these significant figures, much of the problem lay in the fact that falsafa never 
managed to convincingly amalgamate the ideas of Plato, Pythagoras, Neoplatonism in 
a logical fashion accessible to the ordinary Muslim. Thus philosophy is still viewed 
with some trepidation within the Muslim world. As al-Jabri says, ‘Philosophy was 
never an intellectual luxury within Islamic society. In was in fact, ever since its birth, 
a militant ideological discourse (Al-Jabri : 1999: 55). 
….the philosophers had always been unpopular in Islam. Among the 
upper classes, many cultivated philosophy and science with 
enthusiasm. But the multitude hated and persecuted all who were 
marked as devotees of philosophy. 
                                                                  (Coulton : 1996 : 122-123) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Perhaps Ibn Sina’s most famous work was the famous Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb, (The Rules of Medicine) 
an immense tome of medical knowledge.  
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Viewed in the general sense, in the Muslim world as a whole, it is true that up until 
the 8th century that both fiqh (jurisprudence) and ‘ilm (knowledge) held very little 
difference between them; both dealt with morals, dogma and law and markedly less 
with any theology. The idea of discussing the nature of God, in this earlier period was 
seen as nebulous and even dangerous – as the Qur’an itself deals very little with 
theological questions in any depth.  
In the pre-speculative and pre-controversy period, reason (fiqh) and 
tradition (‘ilm) were regarded as complementary and there is no 
doubt that in the Ancient Muslim attitude reason and revelation or 
reason and Shari’a were not distinct. But in the later 2nd/8th and 
3rd/9th centuries, the Mu’tazila rationalists introduced an opposition 
between ‘aql (reason) and sam’ (tradition and authority) or Shari’a.’                           
                                                                          (Rahman : 1979 :104)  
 
Yet in the Western lands of the Muslim world, this ‘pre-speculative and pre-
controversial’ period, (though the latter is arguable or at best relative) was maintained 
beyond the 9th century. This sam’ or naqli position was consciously maintained in Al-
Andalus and the Maghreb and that despite itself eventually lead to a form of 
philosophy that seems to have superceded its Eastern counterpart.  Al-Andalus and 
the Maghreb, two areas linked by common cultural, religious and political ties were 
disassociated from the politics and cultural developments of the Eastern lands under 
the influence of the Ummayad, Abbasid and Fatimid domination. As a result, the 
intellectual development of the region took another route and the role of reason and 
rationalism developed differently and is a matter of some consequence. Al-Jabri 
(1999) gives two reasons for this; 1) the lack of a long pre-Islamic heritage, the 
impact of Christian and pagan beliefs never really having much impact on the Muslim 
culture of these areas, as might have been the case in the Eastern Muslim conquest of 
Alexandria and the cultural pollination that took place there and spread throughout the 
Muslim Eastern lands. The previous cultures that had occupied these regions did not 
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have the capability of competing with Muslim culture and 2) Al Andalus and the 
Maghreb had remained culturally and ideologically free of Eastern influence. As a 
result, intellectual development and the employment of reason was comparatively low 
level and as al-Jabri says, 
We must emphasize the fact that Al-Andalus and the Maghreb 
regions had, during all this period, proceeded no further than the 
level of intellectual activity of the time of the early conquest, i.e., 
Islam of the companions (sahaba) and the followers (tabi’un) whose 
basic sources for the acquisition of knowledge remained oral 
accounts (riwaya) and transmission (naql), be it for religious, 
linguistic or other knowledge, unlike the East where one could find 
numerous schools of law, theology and grammar.’ 
          (al-Jibri : 1999 : 64)  
 
Of course, due to the phenomenon of wide spread travel in the Muslim world, not 
least the yearly Hajj, there was an awareness of the theological and philosophical 
controversies that raged in the east but none of these Eastern intellectual movements 
were able to find fertile ground in the Western lands. Thus the praxis-based 
methodology of the original community (salaf)34 was maintained over the cultural and 
religious aspects of society in that region. There is a tendency for historians to view 
this as a reactive and retrogressive tendency vis a vis intellectual development 
elsewhere, which includes al-Jabri, though he does acknowledge that this isolation 
culminating in the Muwahidūn era in the region (roughly 1120-1215) was ultimately 
beneficial in the development of a more authentic Arab-Islamic Philosophy, 
particularly seen in the thought of Ibn Hazm (994-1064) and Ibn Rushd (1128-1198). 
However, the contention of this work will argue against this overall historical view of 
the i position as something reactive. That the Mālikī school of law was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Again, not be confused with the contemporary movement with the same name 
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predominant doctrine utilized over the regions of Al-Andalus and the Maghreb and 
the reasons for this were as much political as they were religious.  
The Abbassids in the East had adopted the doctrine of the Hanifite 
School, (that of the Iraqis), and Malik Ibn Anas, the founder of the 
Malikite School of Jurisprudence, was perceived as a figure of 
opposition to the Abbassids, not only because of the school’s 
doctrine that made wide use of the Prophet’s sayings – as opposed to 
the Hanafi School, which preferred personal opinion (ra’y)- but also 
because of some politically motivated positioning that he was 
rumoured to have taken against the Abbassid.  
                                                                             (al-Jabri : 1999 : 65) 
 
It is important to take note of the geographical connotations of the Hanafīs as located 
in the east and within the religious and cultural context wherein the development of 
rational thought had taken root within theological circles and the ensuing 
preponderance of the ra’y (opinion) method of the Hanafī madhhab. Though the 
Hanafīs are certainly considered to be part of the traditionalist movement as one of 
the four schools of jurisprudence, there are clear indications that reason and 
rationality plays more of a role within their methodology than can be accredited to the 
Mālikī s. Nevertheless, this geographical element does not bear out fully, as the 
Hanbalī madhhab was also located in the East, though more to the south, in the hijazi 
region (Arabian Peninsula) and would be considered more akin, if not more 
traditionalist than the Mālikī approach. In this regard, Rahman (1979) says, ‘The 
Mu’tazali offensive forced the extreme wing of orthodoxy, therefore, to change the 
pre-controversial attitude of ancient Islam and explicitly to reject human reason’ 
(Rahman : 1979 : 105). Again the wording of this statement; as in ‘extreme wing of 
orthodoxy’ could be questioned as reflecting a certain interpretation assumed by 
modern analysis, in similar fashion al-Jabri uses the term ‘rigorism’ in describing the 
Mālikī ulamā’ (1999 : 70). These themes will be developed further at a later stage in 
this work.  
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The Mālikī jurists in Al Andalus and the Maghreb were strongly opposed to outside 
influences in the fear of importing ideas that could remove or distance the community 
from the ethos of the original Medinan community. The Andalusi / Idrissi rulers 
appropriated the Mālikī methodology in the view that it had clearer and more direct 
links with the first community while also staunching all things Eastern which 
reflected their political positioning. Al-Jabri (1999) is somewhat cynical of this in 
alleging that this amounted to political manipulation of the religious, indicated by his 
labelling ‘The Maliki jurists, who were the ideologues of the Ommeyed state..’ (al-
Jabri : 1999 : 66). The use of the word ‘ideologue’ suggests a modern historical 
hermeneutic of scepticism of all things ‘political’ on his part. There appears to be no 
evidence of manipulation akin to the Eastern Ummayad authorities’ appropriation of 
the jibri35 position to explain away harsh measures meted out to opponents and the 
Western Ummayad position need not have been motivated as rather cynically 
portrayed, as there could have been an honest religious concern on the part of the 
authorities. It also fails to take into account the nature of the divide between the 
political and the religious, which is incorporated within the naqli. Al-Jabri (1999), 
basing his history of Andalusian / Maghribean intellectual development upon Ibn 
Tufayl (1105 – 1185) of Guadix and Sa’id al- Andalusi (1213- 1286) of present day 
Alcala la Real; in establishing that scholars initially took up the ‘ancient scientists’ 
knowledge, (i.e., Greek) such as astronomy, mathematics and logic. Al-Jabri sees as 
having been tolerated by the Mālikī scholars in aversion to Eastern theological 
problematics. However, al-Jabri seems to make an unwarranted difference between 
scholars (ulamā’) and jurists (fuquha) and equally between knowledge (‘ilm) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Not to be confused with al-Jibri, the Moroccan historian and philosopher just mentioned previously 
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jurisprudence (fiqh). Even in the later decline of emphasis placed in Maliki 
jurisprudence during the Muwahidūn period, the scholars were actually considered to 
be Mālikī ulamā’ themselves; added to this is the fact that the faqīh is by default an 
‘alim. In other words there would have been very few ulamā’ that would have 
required a faqīh to approve or consent their work. Again this may reflect a twenty first 
century compartmentalization of knowledge, the perception of secular and religious 
positions that would not have existed at the time.  For example, one of the most 
famous scholars of the Western regions, Ibn Rushd (1128-1198) wrote the well-
known jurisprudence manual Bidāyat al-Mujtāhid wa-Nihayāt- al-Muqtāsid which 
was regarded by the famous theologian, Ibn Jafar Thahabi (1033) as possibly the best 
book on Mālikī jurisprudence, despite the fact that Ibn Rushd is renowned for his 
expertise in philosophy.  
 
Despite this, al-Jabri suggests that, due to this consciously hermetic stance from 
Eastern ideas, the Western Muslim scholars, (despite his contention, inclusive of both 
fuquha and ulamā’), were thereby afforded the chance to develop and strengthen 
techniques in a unique way, whereas theological concerns in the East had not 
undergone the same maturation as in :   
…going through the phase of mathematics and the physical sciences 
and rushed development of thought directly towards metaphysics. In 
Al-Andalus, however things ran their natural course : philosophy 
developed there when scholars turned earnestly to the study of 
mathematics, astronomy and logic for a whole century, without ever 
getting involved in the theologian’s problematics of the conciliation 
between “reason” and “transmission” that was at the center of 
theoretical thought in the East.  
                                                                             (al-Jabri : 1999 : 69) 
 
Accordingly, Maghrabean and Andalusian scholars were able to circumvent the 
obstacles that had been faced in the East, such as kalām and its dialectical theology 
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and Eastern neo-platonism. However, it was a famous Mālikī scholar who is 
seminally responsible for the establishment of Malikism in the Māghrib and the Sub-
Saharan. Abū ‘Imran al-Fasī (975 – 1015) had studied under the renowned Ash’ari – 
Shāfi’ī - Mutakallimūn Bagdadi scholar, al Bāqillānī (950 – 1013) under whom ‘he 
was introduced to the then revolutionary idea that Ash’arite and Shāfi’īte doctrine of 
ūsūl might be harmoniously combined in a Maliki environment’ (Cornell : 1998 : 35) 
though there was considerable resistance to this initially.  
Despite this, as a result of the hold-off of Eastern speculative intellectual 
development, this meant that scholars like Ibn Rushd dealt primarily with Aristotle’s 
methodology rather than directly with his metaphysics which had resulted in so much 
controversy in the East. In this manner, Western Muslim philosophy had developed 
far stronger and deeper roots in the methodological fundaments and the scientific 
basis of this metaphysics primarily through the study of logic and physics. This 
intellectual path of development grew from the end of the Ummayad rule (circa 1030) 
and was discretely maintained through the al-Murābitūn era (circa 1040-1147) finally 
emerging more publically during the al-Muwahidūn (1121-1269) period. In particular, 
the al-Muwahidūn promoted the premises of a more elucidated theoretical theological 
thinking in oppositional reaction to the al-Murābitūn who based themselves on the 
naqli position resulting in the al-Muwahidūn accusing them of mujāssima 
(anthropomorphism) very reminiscent of the accusations made upon Ibn Hanbal 
referred to previously.  Again, this was not just political propaganda; as Stroumsa 
says, ‘The rejection of anthropomorphism was not, however, a mere strategy in order 
to legitimize the declaration of jihād on fellow Muslims. The abstract incorporeal 
conception of God was a cornerstone of the al-Muwahidūn doctrine of divine unity 
(tawhid), (Stroumsa : 2009 :54). While the al-Muwahidūn maintained the Mālikī law, 
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even taking on more of a dhahiri (exoterist) position, in the area of theology they 
identified largely with al-Ghāzali (1058 – 1111) and the Ash’ari kalām arguments 
(Stroumsa : 2009; al-Jabri : 1999).  
 
Some of the major figures emerging out of the Western Andalusi and Maghrebean 
thought are presented here in tracing the role of reason through Muslim intellectual 
history. Ibn Baja (1106-1138) was born in Spain (possibly Saragossa) and died in Fez 
and is known primarily as the teacher of Ibn Rushd but was a prolific scholar in his 
own right. He was a mathematician, sociologist, theologian, doctor and philosopher 
and was closely allied with the al Murābitūn dynasty especially in Saragossa. 
Considering Ibn Baja’s thought in general, this fact seems somewhat anomalous with 
the labelling of the al- Murābitūn as rigorously opposed to all forms of philosophical 
enquiry. However, in professing a mystical philosophy, he was criticized and branded 
as a heretic in some quarters (Goodman : 1996; Forcada : 2007), and imprisoned for a 
while in present day Rueda de Jalon. Ibn Baja understood the human soul to develop 
through a series of phases, plant (embryonic), animal (sense based) and ultimately to 
the rational life, (rational speculation) and rejected some of the basic tenets of Sufi 
thought, especially the idea that the ultimate ends of human experience were to 
experience na’ima, the Divine pleasure, arguing that if this was the ultimate goal as 
something for its own sake it would supersede the rational, rendering the intellectual 
faculty and knowledge generally as essentially redundant.  Ibn Hazm (994-1064), 
born in Cordoba frequently identified with the dhahiri movement, (exoterist) though 
he had significant differences with them. This movement is frequently asociated with 
the Hanbalī school of thought and dealt with things like the difference between 
apparent and literal meanings arguing that the two may not be the same. This is the 
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idea that the Qur’an and Hadīth should be taken on the apparent meaning as 
understood and that the apparent meaning may not be the literal meaning. When using 
metaphorical language, i.e., ‘..throwing stones in glass houses’, the apparent meaning 
as understood is that one should not criticize others when one may be equally 
blameworthy, the literal meaning speaks for itself. As such Ibn Hazm rejected 
allegorical interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadīth preferring instead grammatical 
and syntactical analysis. The dhahiri perspective on qiyās (analogical reasoning); 
wherein principles are applied to seemingly new situations was that this was 
effectively granting superiority to human reasoning over that of Divine will. The view 
on ijma was that it was something that only the first community had been able to 
engage in and that generally all things had been encountered and established, (bearing 
in mind that Ibn Hazm lived in the Middle Ages). He was also indisposed towards 
taqlīd (imitation) in relation to adherence to the madhāhib preferring that the non-
jurist individual should ask the jurists the best methodology to arrive at a decision for 
himself.  Ibn Hazm was also a logician, philosopher and astronomer and is credited 
with having discovered the spherical nature of the earth’s surface and that sound 
travelled at speed.  
 
Already mentioned yet equally famous is Ibn Rushd born in Cordoba, who similarly 
made remarkable contributions in philosophy, logic, medicine, music and 
jurisprudence. He studied philosophy and law from many scholars including Ibn Baja 
with whom he also studied medicine.36 In philosophy, his most important work 
Tuhafut al-Tuhafut was written in response to al-Ghāzali's work criticism of falasafa. 
His views on fate were that man is neither in full control of his destiny nor is it fully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 At one point he was the chief physician for Abu Yaqub, the Caliph of Morocco. 
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predetermined for him. However, Ibn Rushd was censured by many scholars for his 
defence of philosophy and rationality (Urvoy : 1996).  
Even though al Mansur was an enlightened ruler, seeing the dangers 
facing Islam and wishing to appease the conservative scholars, he 
accused Ibn Rushd of heresy and ordered the burning of some of his 
books. He needed the support of the Malikite jurists in his fight 
against the Castilians.  
                                                                              (Salloum : 1998 : 6) 
 
Again the oft criticized Mālikī scholars are perceived as reactionary zealots whereas 
in reality, even al-Jabri grudgingly concedes some understanding of their position – 
the esoterism and speculative thought of the East had sown confusion and did not 
seem to reflect the Prophetic approach as manifested in the early community.   
 
Countering the Rationalists - Abu Hasan Al Ash’ari and the Mutakallimūn 
Amid the wide ranging and diverse controversies, one important middle ground 
position was established by Abu Hasan Al Ash’ari (874 – 936) who subsequently 
became a founder of a major school of orthodox theology, which bears his name and 
endures to this day, representing standard Sunni Orthodoxy.37 He was a student of al-
Dhubba'i, (a leading Mu'tazilan scholar of Basra) but eventually changed to a 
traditionalist position by virtue of visions he had of the Prophet Muhammad.  In the 
first of these visions he was commanded to adhere to the traditional (naqli). Believing 
his vision to be true and since the traditionalists refuted rational argument for the 
existence of God he also gave this up. In the third vision, however, he was told to 
adhere to the naqli but not to abandon kalām. Therefore while abandoning the content 
and beliefs of the Mu'tazila, he nevertheless continued to defend his new beliefs by 
the type of rational argument which the Mu'tazila employed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The Al Maturidi Creed and Al Tahawi Creed are also mainstream Sunni but less well known than the 
Ash’ari. 
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It can be difficult for the casual historian to distinguish between three intellectual 
movements when looking at the intellectual development of this era. One 
interconnecting and intertwining word that unites and distinguishes these Ash’ari 
position; from that of the Mu’tazilah as Cyril Glasse says, ‘Kalām is dominated by the 
school of Al Ash’ari (Glasse : 2001 : 249). The confusion lies in kalām being a word 
used to denote a structured theology by the Mu’tazilah themselves that emerged out of 
the controversies surrounding the interpretation of Qur’an and defense of the religion. 
But what later emerged is yet another movement named the Mutakallimūn or (the 
adherents of kalām) which evolved out of deep seated qualms concerning the limits of 
reasoning as employed by the Mu’tazilah. Thus Kalām though originating as a type of 
philosopical theism developed by the-mu’tazilite adaptation of speculative 
philosophy, came to represent a reaction against the excessive reasoning of the 
Mu’tazilah.  Kalām eventually became a major feature within Islamic thought in its 
own right. One example of this systematic theology (kalām) was a postulation of a 
structured cosmological argument. It was based on a well known rational and 
causational argument for the existence of God dating back to Plato but refined within 
medieval Muslim philosophy and theology.  The outline of the kalām cosmological 
argument is as follows : 
1. The Universe either had (a) a beginning or (b) no beginning 
2. If it had a beginning, the beginning was either (a) caused or (b) uncaused 
3. If it had a cause it was either (a) personal (intelligent not mechanical) or (b) not 
personal (neither intelligent nor mechanical).  
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While the Mutakallimūn and the Mu’tazilah were speculative thinkers they were 
somewhat different from the more purist philosophers (falsafa) in that their starting 
point was the basic tenets of Islam. In reality this was also the starting point of the 
majority of philosophers but the popular perception of them was that they engaged in 
dangerous free thought and suspicion arose as to an alleged sophistry of the 
philosophers in relying more on reason than revelation.  At the same time Kalām is 
also a rational attempt to prove God’s existence and Al Asha’ris’ approach was also 
based on the basic methodology of Greek discursive logic. The questions with which 
they concerned themselves remained the perennial ones; the anthropomorphic 
descriptions of God in the Qur’an, pre-determinism, personal responsibility and 
whether the Divine Attributes were part of the Divine Essence. The Ash’arites and the 
Mutakallimūn believed that (and incidentally still do) the Divine Attributes are both 
eternal and separate from the Divine Essence usually expressed in stating that Divine 
is not all merciful because He has the attribute of being All Merciful which was the 
position of the Mu’tazilah. The Mutakallimūn and the Ash’aris believed that the 
attribute of mercy issues forth because He is All Merciful. In this manner, the 
Attributes are not the Essence nor are they different to the Essence. However, fear of 
the philosophers may have been exaggerated as it was not necessarily the case: 
‘Unlike doubt ridden modern philosophy, the classical philosophy of the Muslims was 
based upon the certainty of God and revelation’ (Glasse : 2001). While there was 
some consternation at things like validating Plato and Aristotle’s view that revelation 
proceeded from one’s intellect which is a point that some Muslim philosophers 
eventually settled on, most famously Ibn Tufayl (c.1105-1185) previously mentioned, 
suggested something akin to this.  Obviously, this challenged the basic canonical 
belief that the Prophet was directly inspired by God and which would have 
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implications in regard to the nature of the Qur’an. However, though Ibn Tufayl never 
actually denied the Divine origin of the Qur’anic revelation it ‘nevertheless horrified 
the theolgians’ (Glasse : 2001 : 356).  
 
Perhaps the most famous theologian to question the limits of philosophical 
speculation was Abu Hamid al-Ghāzali  (1059 – 1128). Born in Tus in the Khorasan 
region now in present day Iran, al-Ghāzali, at one point a renowned and highly 
respected religious scholar, appointed to teach at the Madrassa Nizamiyāh in 
Baghdad, one of the most renowned religious institutions of the time. Controversially 
he abandoned both his reputation and position to become a wandering ascetic feeling 
that there was something missing in his spiritual life and wrote of this event later in 
his life. From this point he devoted himself to a spiritual path, which resulted 
outwardly in prolific writing on various subjects mainly religious but also 
philosophical as well as subjects like astronomy. It was during his wanderings that he 
encountered Sufi teaching and was thereby underwent personal transformation. He 
famously opposed the adherents of falsafa through critiquing their metaphysical 
rudiments and postulates and is considered by many to be one of the great Muslim 
theologians. One of his most famous books is the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa,  (The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers)38 wherein he is said to have conclusively destroyed 
the premises of philosophy by depicting it as overly rational and reductionist. Al-
Ghāzali manages to combine, the traditional view, the intellectualist view and 
mysticism in this work in opposing figures of some magnitude, such as Ibn Sina and 
al-Farabi.  He refutes any logical justification and explanation of God as something 
inherently contradictory in nature and ultimately fruitless as he was strongly of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 As mentioned, sometime later Ibn Rushd wrote a rejoinder to his Tahāfut al Falasifa entitled 
Tahaāfut al Tahāfut, ‘The Incoherence of the Incoherent’  
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view that the Divine and the mystery of the universe and creation are beyond the 
limits of conscious rational human thought and was able to make a balance between 
religion and reason by identifying their respective realms as consisting of the infinite 
and the finite.  Mathematics and the sciences were exact knowledges and therefore 
within the realm of the rational. He adroitly took the very tools of Aristotelian logic 
and Socratic methodology to distinguished some flaws and arbitrary presumptions of 
the neo-platonists which he identified as an excessively rationalist Aristotelianism, 
(Gianotti : 2001). In opposing the likes of al-Farabi, he argued that reason alone was 
incapable of arriving at an understanding of the Absolute and the Infinite. Grounded 
in the finite, reason was inadequate in transcending this and engaged only in the 
relative. Furthermore he expressed the view that philosophy could be a dangerous in 
relying on man’s rational thinking alone, potentially leading to excessive doubts and 
questioning, anathema to religious experience. Al-Ghāzali should not be construed as 
absolutely anti-philosophical, indeed much of his work in refuting falsafa was 
philosophically constructed itself;  
Not an anti rationalist by any stretch of the imagination, al-Ghazali 
is obviously not setting out to refute all of the philosophical 
doctrines embraced by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Indeed, he judges 
much of their intellectual tradition, including logic and the natural 
sciences to be beneficial to the work of the religious scholars, such 
as the jurists (fuquha) and the mutakallimun.’ 
                                                                (Gianotti : 2001 : 88)  
 
 
While many consider him as being largely responsible for the decline of pure rational 
thinking in Islam, ironically in using the philosopher’s tools against them, al-Ghāzali 
ultimately managed to produce a more favourable attitude to philosophy in some 
quarters as eventually the philosophers were forced to improve the clarity of their 
theories and to tighten up their logic as witnessed in the work of the Andalusians Ibn 
Baja and Ibn Rushd, both of whom undertook the defence of philosophy.  
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Perhaps the most famous of al-Ghāzali’s work was the Ihyā ‘Ulūm ul-Din (The 
Revival of the Religious Sciences) which sought to unite the esoteric with the exoteric 
by highlighting the connection between mysticism and orthodox religion. In uniting 
the inwardly spiritual with the outwardly ritualistic aspects of the faith he laid 
emphasis on the importance of authentic sufism, which he saw as a clear path to the 
Absolute while at same time also taking on something of a reformist role towards 
excesses of within Sufism of the time.  Parts of his work was translated into Latin 
during the Middle-Ages and his theories have penetrated deeply into European 
thought with clear references to him in both Jewish and Christian theology.  It is 
particularly evident in the arguments used by Aquinas in re-establishing the authority 
of orthodox Christianity in the West.  
 
An Encounter of some Interest  
While Ibn ‘Arabi, has not yet been introduced in this work in any detail, it is of some 
interest at this point to recount a famous alleged incident between Ibn ‘Arabi and Ibn 
Rushd, the great philosopher of the Peripatetic School39 mentioned above. As a young 
man in Cordoba, Ibn ‘Arabi was taken by his father to meet Ibn Rushd.  Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
growing reputation for spiritual capacity had reached the philosopher’s ear and he 
allegedly questioned Ibn ‘Arabi as to whether one was able to arrive at the same level 
of spiritual understanding through illumination and divine inspiration as was possible 
from speculative thought.  Ibn ‘Arabi’s frequently quoted account of the meeting with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 So named as it referred to Aristotle’s habit of walking back and forth (peripatetic) whilst giving 
lectures at the Lyceum in Athens.  It signifies him as being a member of the Aristotelian school of 
thought. 
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one of the major Muslim figures of the philosophical speculative tradition is 
characteristically as ambiguous as it is intriguing: 
As I entered, the philosopher arose from his seat and came to meet 
me, showing me every possible token of friendship and 
consideration and finally embracing me. Then he said to me: “Yes?” 
I in turn replied to him: “Yes”. Then his joy increased as he saw that 
I understood him. But next, when I myself became aware of what it 
was that had caused him joy, I added “No”. Immediately Ibn Rushd 
tensed up, his features changed colour and he seemed to doubt his 
own thoughts. He asked me the question, “What kind of solution 
have you found through illumination and divine inspiration? Is it just 
the same as what we receive from speculative thought?” I replied to 
him: “Yes and no. Between the yes and the no spirits take flight 
from their matter and necks break away from their bodies”. Ibn 
Rushd turned pale: I saw him start to tremble. He murmured the 
ritual phrase, “There is no strength save in God”, because he had 
understood my allusion.  
                                                                            (Abbas : 1993 : 37) 
 
Abbas comments on various explanations of this incident, culled in the main, from 
presentations and discussions by Michel Chodkiewicz, a specialist in Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
thought, based upon his interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s own written account of this. 
Chodkiewicz believes that the subject matter obliquely referred to by Ibn Rushd was 
to do with the resurrection of the bodies on the Last Day. Presumably – the rationalist 
Ibn Rushd would have seen this be an allegory rather than a literal truth. While 
neither Chodkiewicz nor Abbas are able to fully explain Ibn ‘Arabi’s response; both 
comment that one might understand Ibn ‘Arabi’s enigmatic response as politely 
intimating the futile imponderability of that which concerns the rational speculation. 
Ibn Rushd’s spiritual state (hāl); nor his death; nor the progress of his soul thereafter 
would be affected in the slightest by whether he could rationally establish the truth of 
the Day of Resurrection as an allegory.40  It might also constitute amiable advice, in 
warning that such speculation could lead to charges of blasphemy on the part of the 
authorities leading to a possible death penalty by beheading. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 One of the philosophical analyses that Ibn Rushd worked on. 
 192 
 
As already outlined above, Ibn Rushd’s position was to interpret Prophecy and 
revelation by means of Aristotelian reason. He negated the notion previously posited 
by Ibn Sina of a ‘pure intellect’ without sensory perception and comprising ‘pure 
imagination’ as the means to a spiritual realization. Corbin compared the distinction 
to such things as the divide between faith and reason, prophecy and rationalism, 
theology and philosophy and oriental wisdom and Western secularism (Corbin : 
1993).  While Ibn ‘Arabi based his thought upon spiritual realization, he had an 
appreciation of philosophy and did not see it as being entirely useless. Yet he later 
cautioned in his Futūhāt al Makkīya (Meccan Revelations),  (Ibn al-‘Arabi : 2002)  
that reflection alone could lead to confusion and false conclusions and that he 
preferred that such reflection was couched within the context of spiritual revelation 
induced by an immersion into the Divine, chiefly through the means of contemplation 
( fikr) and the dhikr (repeated invocation of the Divine namesof Allah). Nevertheless, 
he does allow that a few people have on rare occasions reached or been granted a high 
spiritual level through speculative thought, mentioning Plato, as being an example of 
such a phenomena.  
 
The Neo Hanbalīte Position  
Some aspects of the Hanbalī position have already been mentioned but are used to 
focus on a perspective of an anti – rationalist stance. As we have seen some of the 
first reactions to philosophical speculative thought was a call for a return to the more 
literalist or ‘traditionalist’ transmitted (naqli) stances, despite significant and 
important differences between these two approaches which require further 
explanation. The Hanbaliī scholar Ibn Taymiah (d 1328) declared all vestiges of 
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Greek or any other outside influences, ideas or intellectual groups based beyond the 
pale of Islam; as understood as practised up to the death of the Prophet, were ahli 
bid’ah (people of heretical innovation).  This included all such afore mentioned 
groups: the Khawārij, the Shīʿah, the Murji’ah, and the Mu’tazila, and philosophical 
or theological theories.   This general approach called for a return to a pure 
interpretation of the Qur’an and this stance could be termed traditional insofar as the 
early or first community of Muslims allegedly did not have access to other forms of 
thought.41 Fakhry (1997) labels this position as neo-Hanbalīte42 indicating figures like 
Ibn Taymiah who took up a call for a return to the ways of the Salaf  (the early 
original Muslims).  Surprisingly, he also rejected the teaching of Ash’ari which was 
now at the core of all Sunni orthodoxy.  As for the philosophers; Ibn Taymiyyah 
found that they had been unable to prove anything conclusively or advance anything 
within the religion; on the contrary the evidence was that they were in perpetual 
debate and disagreement.  He perceived the philosophers as engaging in sophistry and 
assuming the Qu’ran to be something for the common masses and the religious truths 
revealed thereof served to inculcate some morality for the uneducated, which in turn 
indicated a scepticism of revealed religious truths.  In a well known book Dar ta’rud 
al ‘aql wa’l Naql (Rejection of the Conflict between Reason and Tradition) Ibn 
Taymiyyah ‘…. criticized the methods of Al Razi and Al Amidi and others who put 
‘aql before naql (Nasr & Leaman : 1996 : 82). In this book, Ibn Taymiyyah also 
criticizes Ibn Rushd for leaving out what he considers the most important group, i.e 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Many would consider this debateable – Wilfrid Cantwell Smith for one. Whether Islam can boast of 
pure Arab influence at the inception of Islam with an absence of exterior influences would appear to be 
debatable. 
 
42 M. Fakhry A Short Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism, Oneworld 
Publications, Oxford, 1997, Pg 101 
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the Salaf43 when listing the number of main groupings within the Muslim world and 
just as is the case of with al-Ghazali, he refutes Ibn Rushd’s arguments through his 
own philosophical analysis.  In al Radd’ala’l Mantiqiyin (The Refutation of the 
Logicians), Ibn Taymiah attacks the fundaments of Aristotelian logic through finding 
flaw with its methodology, i.e. the syllogism (Fahkry : 1997; Haleem : 1996; al-
Maghnisawi : 2007). Ibn Taymiyyah refutes this basic methodology on the grounds of 
it being possible to arrive at an invalid conclusion drawn from this method of 
reasoning and that when considering the mental aptitude of different people and the 
difficulty some may have with the middle term, i.e., referring to the second of two 
propositions which lead to a conclusion or given the possibility of differing 
interpretations of the middle term, can result in differing conclusions and is therefore 
not a consistent or reliable means to truth.  For in rationalization lies the possibility to 
provide an account of or for something with sufficient plausible reasons even if these 
are not true.  
 
Ibn Taymiyyah and later his student, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah are perhaps the best 
known representatives of the ealier neo-Hanbalīte position which has had major 
reverbations in the rise of modernist and Islamist movements, whose adherents 
frequently relate their views back to Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah.  As a 
result neo-Hanbalītes are frequently associated with the contemporary Wahhābi and 
Salafī movements. They are also identified as precursors and the main source of 
inspiration for the 18th century reformer Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhāb (1703-
1792). When considering Winkel’s ‘technist’ critique, the recourse to a supposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Referring to the earliest Muslim communities not the contemporary movement.  
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rationality, the rejection of tradition, albeit in the name of tradition and the virulent 
stance taken against the Sufi position, this can seem paradoxical indeed. 
  
The Sufi Approach 
‘The One is known before any definition and before any letters’ 
                  (Attributed to Abu Bakr al-Shibli by al-Qushayri : 2007 : 5) 
 
It is appropriate to look at the sufi perspective in the historical context of rationalism 
and the counter response, though there will be a far more detailed breakdown of 
sufism later.  It is enough at this point to define something of the historical position of 
sufism in relation to rationalism. Al-Qushayri, a famous sufi and author of the Al 
Risala al-Qushayriyya fi Ilm al-Tasawwuf  (Al-Qushayri’s Epistle on Sufism : 2007) 
writes: 
Know, may God have mercy on you, that the elders of this path built 
the foundations of their affair upon the sound fundamental principles 
of God’s oneness. In this way they protected their beliefs from 
reprehensible innovations and tried to bring themselves closer to the 
ways of the pious forefathers and the followers of the Prophet’s 
Sunna, namely the doctrine of God’s oneness that contained neither 
likening nor stripping. They knew well the true nature of God’s 
eternity and realized fully how an existent entity emerges from non-
existence. 
                                                                    (al- Qushayri : 2007 : 4) 
 
The ‘path’ in this quote refers to the sufi method of spiritual wayfaring while the 
‘likening’ and ‘stripping’ refer in the former to ascribing human attributes to God on 
the one hand and postulating that God has no attributes at all in the latter, all of which 
is indicative of the controversies that raged during that era, placing the sufis well 
within the naqli – Ash’ari positioning. 
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The Hanbalī view, (including Ibn Taymiyyah’s), on Sufism and how this does not 
seem to accord with the manner in which these historical figures have frequently been 
perceived has already been covered. Closer historical analysis suggests that both were 
far more than just supportive of the Sufi position than is commonly accepted (Michot 
: 2006). In Ibn Taymiyyah’s case, while there seems to be aspects of Sufism of which 
he is critical, not only does he seem to be an admirer of Sheikh Abdul Qādir Jilani 
(1077- 1166), a major figure in the development of Sufism but allegedly claimed to be 
an adherent of the tarīqa al-Qādirīyyah (the Qādirī Order) based on al-Jilani’s 
teachings, eventually becoming a Sheikh in his own right within that order (Kabbani : 
1996; Makdisi : 1974; Makdisi : 1990; Michot : 1996). In terms of this assertion, 
Picken writes,  
There is also, however, a minority view promoted by George 
Makdisi that Ibn Taymiyya was a Sufi disciple of the Qadiri 
fraternity. Although Makdisi’s position is not easy to defend, the 
opposing view is also debateable and hence I would place Ibn 
Taymiyyah in this third category – that of Hanbali Sufi reformers’ 
                                                                                       (Picken : 2011: 247) 
Ibn Taymiyyah wrote a hundred page commentary on the Sheikh’s famous Futuh al 
Ghayb (Michel : 1981) found in a collection of his writings, Majmu’fatawa - Ibn 
Taymiyyah wherein Ibn Taymiyyah responds to questions regarding Ibn ‘Arabi, 
Suhrawardi, Ribi’a, al-Hallaj and other well known figures in sufism (Michot : 2007) 
and published in Saudi Arabia,44 Cairo,45 (Kabbani : 1996) and Rabat (Michot : 
2007).46 However, it is interesting to note that Ibn Taymiyyah was strongly opposed 
to the ideas as set out in Fusus al Hikam of Ibn ‘Arabi but was an admirer of all of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Majmu’fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah (no date),Vol. 10, Riyadh, pgs. 455-548  
 
45 Majmu’fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah al Kubra, (no date),Vol. 11, ‘At Tasawwwuf’,  Dar ar-Rahmah, Cairo  
 
46 Majmu’fatawa,(1981) edited by A. Ibn Qasim, 37 Volumes, Rabat, Maktabat al-Ma’rif 
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other works (Kabbani : 1996)47. Another very common assumption is that 
Muhammad ibn Abd’ al-Wahhāb (1703-1792) refuted Sufi thought outright, yet there 
are numerous references that would suggest that he was not as virulently anti-sufi as 
is often portrayed (al-Makki : 2012), indicated by the following sort of statement ‘I 
never accused of unbelief Ibn ‘Arabi or Ibn al-Fari  for their Sufi interpretations’ from 
his ar-Rasa'il ash-Shakhsiyya (al-Wahhāb : cited by As Sunnah : no date : 1) and 
‘From among the wonders is to find a Sufi who is a faqīh and a scholar who is an 
ascetic (zahid) from the book Mu’allāfāt al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-
Wahhāb (al-Wahhāb : cited by al-Makki : 2012 :1) 
 
When casting an overall view over the phenomena of Sufism three chronologically 
sequenced modes emerge though not entirely exclusive of each other (Fahkry : 1997).  
The earliest of these was the way of ascetism originating in the early 7th century. This 
early ascetism was probably in reaction to the Muslim community’s preoccupation 
with the worldly whilst establishing political systems and coming to terms with new 
found wealth and expansion. The main preoccupations of these early figures, like 
Hasan al Basri (d.728) mentioned previously, was the temporality of existence and the 
finiteness of the human condition, in relation to the Eternal and the Divine. These 
were people who led lives of self imposed simplicity and poverty impelled with ‘the 
urge to reach out to the infinite’ (Fahkry : 1997 : 73)  
 
Another mode of Sufism is the ecstatic, spiritually drunken (sukr) way which ensues 
from an overwhelming love of God, which Fakhry refers to as pantheistic or unitary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
47  Kabbani refers here to Majmu’ fatawa - Ibn Taymiyya, Vol. 1, comprising of a letter from Ibn 
Taymiyyah to Abu al Fath Nasr al Munayji expressing his approval on Ibn ‘Arabi’s work but 
disapproving of the Fusus.  
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mysticism epitomized by the likes of al Bistami  (d.874) and Al Hallaj. (d.922). These 
eminent figures represent a teaching of self annihilation or personal extinction (fana) 
in the presence of Divine reality and a union (ittihad and / or jam’) with the Divine 
wherein the mystic becomes a channel or agent of God. Their spiritual state was 
ecstatic and the utterances they were famous for usually expressed some aspect of 
union with the Divine. Some of these were highly controversial and outwardly 
blasphemous though inwardly expressing a reality accessible to those of spiritual 
understanding. Al Hallaj’s spiritually ‘drunken’ statement ‘I am the Truth’ (ana l-
haqq), in reference to Divine Attribute, the Reality (al Haqq) was in the eyes of some, 
claiming divinity, which exoterically was blasphemous. Consequently, al-Hallaj was 
famously executed in brutal fashion on a charge of blasphemy. 
 
The third mode of Sufism to be looked at here is one of outward sahw or soberness, 
(though some would claim with inward sūkr -spiritual drunkenness (Lings : 1993; 
Eaton : 1985). In this regard three main figures are worth mentioning. Abu Qasim ibn 
Muhammad Al Junayd,  (830 – 910), Abu Hamed Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-
Ghāzali (1058-1111), already mentioned above and lastly Ibn ‘Arabi, though in a 
sense he can be seen to encompass all three modes. Apropos al-Junayd, after the 
ecstatic effluence of the unitarian mystics, his way is seemingly sober yet none the 
less profoundly experienced. The mainstay of his approach was to bring the more 
spiritual into ordinary life advocating normal pursuits of jobs and professions for 
those following the Sufi way, instead of the wandering dervish mode more identified 
with mystical inebriation. In contrast with the ecstatics, al-Junayd’s approach was one 
of soberness (sahw) and in keeping with this approach, he was a shopkeeper in 
Baghdad and is reputed, when approached by al-Hallaj to take him on for spiritual 
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instruction to have been unwilling to accept al-Hallaj within his circle claiming that ‘I 
do not accept madmen’.48 To Al Hallaj’s ecstatic ejaculation ‘ana’l haqq’ he is 
reputed to have responded, ‘No. It is through al haqq (The Reality) that you exist.’ 
(Glasse : 2001 : 243) though other sources claim that al-Hallaj was the student of al-
Junayd,  
 
As for al-Ghāzali, his position epitomizes much of Sufi thought, despite the fact that 
he also used a dialectic manner in confronting the seemingly excessive rationality of 
the peripatetics and as a Shāfi’ī, he put forward his ideas through the use of qiyās 
(analogy).  Yet al-Ghāzali’s definitive stance was that the Sufis were the true 
inheritors of the Prophetic way. The Divine could not be known through rational 
means nor through personal union but only through the desire and the mercy of the 
Divine to unveil itself, usually but not always, as a result of an individual’s difficult 
journey of self discovery and spiritual effort.  The approach of Ibn ‘Arabi, will be 
detailed at length at a later stage of this work.  
 
The event of the Prophet’s experience of revelation within the Cave of Hira, when set 
against the deliberations of the Khawārij and all that has transpired from that clearly 
demonstrates what was expounded in the in the preceeding chapter. The initiating 
mystical experience of the founder is interpreted and conceptualized so as to 
formulate ways of being and ethical human interaction. However, in wishing to hold 
fast to the primacy of the initial experience something of its immediacy is lost in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 However, several sufi commentators that while sufis may disagree outwardly esoterically there is 
understanding and it is worth remembering that affiliation with ecstatics like Al Hallaj’s could be 
threatening by association. 
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ongoing intellectualizations resulting in a slow removal away from the founder’s 
experience and with the changing circumstances of time begin to atrophy.  
 
Exponency and Proponency 
In this sense, it is argued here that the Prophet, his immediate community and those 
that followed, (the sahaba and tabi’in respectively), could be said to be exponents, as 
they embodied the Hirian experience, whereas later intellectual speculative 
development renders the Muslim community as proponents of the Muhammadan 
experience. In the light of this understanding the naqli approach may be perceived 
differently and perhaps not quite as reactive and retrogressively as is usually 
proposed. First and foremost, the exponential nature of the Prophet is expressed in his 
being described as the ‘Qur’an walking’ by his wife Aisha sometime after his death.  
Whereas, the impression of the more ‘aqli (dialectic) schools of thought presented 
above are more indicative of the proponent mode outlined here who set forth 
arguments with underlying a priori theoretical assumptions requiring some measure 
or form of apologetics to justify truths which not immediately evident when reading 
canonical or sacred texts. On the other hand, there is a distinct lack of propenency in 
the discourse of the likes of Imam Malik, one only has to look at the terse response to 
the question concerning the istiwa of Allah. There is no inclination to explain or 
propound further than that the modality of istiwa is known without need for further 
elaboration. No recourse is taken to logic or dialectic discourse in respect to the 
Divine. His use of reasoning analogy was consciously limited : 
Although Malik himself makes frequent use of analogical 
reasoning—as I have shown but it seems to be by citation of the 
sunnah terms in the Muwatta’ that the ‘amal precepts to which they 
pertain are ‘off limits’ to analogy and that despite their anomalous 
nature they are legitimate parts of Islamic law by virtue of the fact 
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they had been instituted under the aegis of Prophetic legislative 
authority. 
                                                                   (Abdullah : 1978 : 26) 
 
This is mirrored in the later attitudes of Mālikī movements such the al- Murābitūn, 
who consciously resisted intellectual speculation. This naqli position is widely 
interpreted in the Western modern dialectic as having been retrogressive and 
intransigently intolerant, an attitude also assumed or perhaps adopted by some 
modernist Muslim commentators. This is particularly seen through the interpretation 
of the al Murābitūn presence in Andalus. Stroumsa says ‘The Almoravids are 
identified with Mālikī law, and typically (or stereotypically) described as opposed to 
rational speculation in all its forms’ (Stroumsa : 2009 : 9). Yet, it is also the period 
wherein an enormous surge of mystical thought and major figures in Muslim 
mysticism emerged from both the Maghrib and al- Andalus, such as, Abdullah ibn 
Yassin Jazouli (d.1036), Abu Jafar Ishaq Amghar (d.1060), Moulay Abu Abdellah 
Amghar (d.1060), Shaker ibn Yaala Dukkali (d.1060), Abu Abdallah ar-Ragragi 
(d.1065),  Abul Fadl ibn Nahwi (d.1098), al-Qādī 'Ayad ibn Moussa (d.1129). 
Levtzion (1977) sees the appropriation of Sunni Sufism by the Muwahidūn as the 
means by which they challenge the ‘narrrow-minded Malikism’ of the Murābitūn 
through a ‘trend towards Sufism’ (1977 : 338).  Yet Mohamed Hassan Mohamed 
(2012) contends that ‘..the difference between Mālikīsm and Sufism is not as 
substantive  as the Almoravid-Almohad duel seems to suggest’ (Mohamed : 2012  : 
127). Hammoudi (1999) also suggests that any transition was more a slow melding, 
‘the synthesis between ‘ilm (exoteric science) and gnosis, synthesis that led the 
‘ulema to mystical awareness and the Sufis towards the quest for ‘ilm’ (Hammoudi 
cited by Mohamed :  2012  : 127) 
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To the Sufis, both early and late, Muhammad’s Koranic revelations 
were themselves the result of mystical experiences, and in their 
attempt to recreate these experiences, many Sufis would utter 
pronouncements that were prophetic or oracular in nature. 
                                                                        (Khalidi : 1985 : 70) 
 
When understood this way, the exponency of both the Mālikī jurist and the mystic 
seems conjoined and these roles were often simultaneously.  
 
Some Conclusions 
In conclusion – it is hoped that this brief tracing of the rational within Muslim 
intellectual, philosophical and theological history provides some perspective of the 
Muslim mind. What emerges from this brief overlook is a persistent schism 
engendered by the move away from the original position of the early community. We 
have seen this as initially manifesting in the Khawārij position and later manifested in 
the position of Mu’tazilah, forming a polemic under which the Muslim discourse has 
laboured ever since.   
In their secondary form we note two divisions in the Muslim 
community. The mu’tazili and the khawārij. The first make sects and 
divisions while the second cut off and reject the body, that is, are an 
elite.The first introduce the rationalist spirit into subject matter that 
is beyond its scope while the second rightly insists that only they are 
right – in the former viewpoint nobody is right. What, with the 
mu’tazili is right, is to be the enquirer, is an end in itself.  
 
Historically, the mu’tazili come out of the khawārij. The khawārij 
make takfir of the main body of believers. They in turn split from 
their original allegiance and set up a further, more extreme 
“correctness”. At that instant they become mu’tazili and indeed it 
was from their ranks that the movement emerged.  
 
So by their nature these two impulses to deviation and sectarianism 
are forced to cross connect one with the other in a doomed dialectic, 
one which is rarely if ever recognised by its practioners.  
                                                                                   (al-Murabit : 1982 : 5) 
 
Once a Grecian response to Khawārij exclusivist thought had taken hold position 
became entrenched. Many of those who denounced the use of dialectics and 
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rationality, an acknowledged Greek legacy, frequently used reason itself against the 
‘reasoners’. This does not detract from their critique – as in the case of al-Ghāzali 
who found philosophy irrelevant, yet acknowledged the effectiveness of logic. The 
overview also indicates that the naqli position does seem to have an affinity with the 
earliest community prior to the Khawārij. Do the rationalist historical trends 
identified constitute a degeneration in the form that Smith has outlined; codification 
of the sublime and a mundanization of the sacred? How do the ‘aqli and naqli 
positions stand relatively vis a vis reification? 
 
As has been outlined, philosophy is still not considered generally in a positive light in 
the Muslim world, a residual suspicion of the rampant speculative tradition of thought 
from the Eastern Muslim lands. Nevertheless, rationality, essential to philosophical 
pursuit, plays a central part within the average Muslim’s understanding of religion. 
This can be discerned largely through the recourse to rational discourse taken by the 
majority of scholars in addressing ‘lay’ people. The more pronouncedly negative 
reactions against philosophy are usually based on a confused definition of what 
philosophy consists of, its aims and where its roots lie (Coulton : 1996). The 
Malaysian traditionalist Syed Naquib al-Attas understands philosophy to stem from 
Western roots : 
..conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western 
civilization; knowledge which pretends to be real but which is 
productive of confusion and scepticism, which has elevated doubt 
and conjecture to the ‘scientific’ rank in methodology and which 
regards doubt as an eminently valid epistemological tool in the 
pursuit of truth.  
                                                                           (Attas : 1979 : 19-20)  
 
Al-Attas’ depiction of the results of rational thinking could perhaps be contested in 
his citing this as solely a Western phenomenon, whereas its origins are arguably both 
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Greek and markedly augmented by Muslim thought. While there are acknowledged 
elements of rationalism in past Muslim intellectual history there is also evidence of 
this in more contemporary Muslim thought; when discussing the views held on 
philosophy by classical scholars, differentiating them as ‘..those not influenced by the 
rationalizing movements of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Islamic centuries associated 
with the name of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and others...’ (Nasr : 1982 : 4). Within the 
Muslim mind, classical or otherwise, there lurks the suspicion in the potential of 
philosophy to cause internal confusion and loss of faith by exceeding theological 
boundaries and causing doubt, ‘….most of modern philosophy is in fact kufr from the 
Islamic point of view’ (Nasr : 1982 : 5).  Yet despite these objections to speculative 
philosophy and rationalizing, ironically, the names of those like al-Farabi and Ibn 
Rushd are nostalgically hailed as the great intellectual heroes of Islam.  In fact, this 
intellectual tradition plays a current role in the mind of the Muslim community and 
there is constant harking back to a golden era of Muslim intellectual tradition. As Al 
Jabri says: 
The dialogue surrounding this axis and the dialectical order that it 
implies are set between the past and future. As for the present, it is 
present, not only because we refuse it, but also because the past is 
very much present to the point that it infringes upon the future and 
absorbs it.  Acting as the present, the past is conceived as a means to 
affirm and rehabilitate one’s identity.’  
                                                                               (al-Jabri : 1999 : 9) 
 
Others admire the developed world’s apparent success in material wealth through its 
technological progress but equally reject a seemingly unfettered atheistic intellectual 
pursuit as leading to personal alienation and collective corruption, a view very central 
to the writings of Sayid Qutb and Muhammad Iqbal, both of whom have been 
particularly influential. The concept of ‘Islamizing’ is underpinned by the belief that 
the method can be disconnected from the outcome so that production and wealth 
 205 
obtained through technological means is sought after as desirable. Yet the intellectual 
underpinnings and cause and effect are somehow seen to be mitigated by the insertion 
of Islam through ‘Islamizing’ the means of production, technology and banking 
worlds on a global scale. Whether it is possible to pursue unrestrained technological 
development and divorcing it from its originating modes of thought and social 
consequences is proving difficult to substantiate.  In referring to this particular 
mindset al-Jabri says: 
Its followers claim to support the scientific method, objectivity and 
“strict” neutrality. This reading insists that it is “disinterested” and 
“without any ideological intentions whatsoever.” The upholders of 
this habitus claim to be only in understanding and knowledge: if 
indeed they do borrow the “scientific“ method from the orientalists, 
they firmly reject their ideology. But when they say this, they forget, 
or pretend to forget, that along with the method they also adopt the 
vision. After all, are vision and method not inseparable?’  
                                                                             (al-Jabri : 1999 : 12) 
 
Summary 
In this Chapter, a rationalist thread has been pursued through Muslim intellectual 
history. Despite an apparent aversion to speculative philosophy, viewed primarily as a 
western phenomenon, it would appear that this speculative tradition has held a strong 
presence within the history of Muslim ideas.  While it may be usual to say that that 
western philosophy owes a large debt to Muslim civilization, another way of 
approaching this would be for Muslims to assume some responsibility for the 
contemporary dominance of rationalism and the effects thereof. Yet the antidote for 
this also lies within the religion of Islam and Muslims could be more conscious of 
transforming current paradigms, through application of the more mystical aspects of 
Islam. Saying that, there can be no question that despite shared aspects of rationality 
with medieval Muslim thought, western philosophy has evolved uniquely and in some 
sense to an extreme.  In the last three to four hundred years, the development of 
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systematic doubt as a thinking tool has developed beyond anything that Muslim 
philosophers could have ever conceived.  
 
Not wishing to lose sight of the question of personal authenticity, it is hoped that the 
reader will now be beginning to form some idea of a general orientation. This lies in 
an approach placing less demand for reasons, acknowledging the imponderable, 
recognizing the Divine as beyond human cognition and a savouring of the numinous. 
In the next Chapter, these will be translated into searching for an unprescriptive yet at 
the same time, more defined and authentic habitus within the contemporary Muslim 
context. Various typologies and positions within the Muslim world are compared, 
which though regionally based historically exemplify some of the concepts that hae 
been discussed up to this moment. A fault line is explored between a Maghrebean, 
Mālikī, Shakirin Sufism on the one hand and a Turkish, Hanafī and Mujahaddah 
Sufism on the other.    	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Chapter 9 
 
A Maghrebi and a Turkish Islam 
The notion of a Maghrebean and Turkish Islam are connotative labels only and have 
been chosen as being representative of two types of ‘Muslimness’ that is emerging in 
the West and re-emerging in the Muslim homelands. These are by no means to the 
exclusion of other group such as neo-Salafīs, neo-Wahhābis, perennalists and 
universalist-Sufis49, to name but a few. The denotations of Maghrebi and Turkish, 
should not be viewed as fixed geographically based concepts corresponding to the 
named regional areas but rather more as dispositional, though they are attitudes that 
have arisen from historico-regional, socio-politico and religious influences (Nasr : 
2002; Yavuz : 2004). Some of the reasons for this has been indicated from the brief 
historical summary of Muslim thought and is a subject ripe for full scale research in 
its own right. For the purposes of this essay these labels are used only as a general 
indication to indicate a certain attitude and approach. 
 
The Maghrebean Way 
Modern Morocco or Maghrib, which pror to concepts of the modern state was know 
as al-Maghrib al-‘Aqsa (the Farthest West) was a region as opposed to a ‘nation’.  As 
Vincent Cornell (1998) points out, this region and its cultural proclivities have 
historically been more clearly delineated than most other regions of the Muslim world 
prior to the establishment of the ‘nation state’. To Morocco’s north lies the 
Mediterranean forming a natural barrier, as does Atlantic Ocean to the west. In the 
south lies the Sahara desert, yet another great geographical border. While there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  As in the Sufi Order International under the present Master Zia Inayat Khan.  
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naturally defined border to the east, a clearly defined political and cultural difference 
has existed from the sixteenth century. Despite many similarities, there remain 
distinct cultural modes and identities between Algeria and Morocco, something that 
has long been acknowledged. Turkish historical supremacy and influence in Algeria 
for over three hundred years did not spread to Morocco, which never came under 
Ottoman rule. Within this clearly defined region of Morocco, a potent mixture of 
cultural and historical events have resulted in it being strongly identified with Sufism 
and the presence of a number of famous saints (awliya) clearly attests to this.  
 
The explicit aspects of a Maghrebi Islam are loosely based on three fundamentals 
typical of what may be termed Idrisism. This is based on legitimisation of the Qur’an 
and Hadīth and then the consensus of the community and finally wirata, the principle 
of a combined spiritual and temporal succession of leaders.  The second of these; 
community legitimization, (based within the Mālikī  school of thought), is the canon 
referred in coming to legal decisions when required, i.e., when new issues arrive that 
neither the Qur’an or Hadīth deal with specifically. The interpretive methodology 
here will primarily not take recourse to anything outside the Muslim canon as 
opposed to a more dialectical approach characteristic of other madhāhib. The 
canonical community consists of the fuquha, (jurists scholars) who know the 
appropriate canonical texts for a given situation and the relevant legal dialectic (furu’ 
al fiqh or the branch of jurisprudence). The next level of referral is knowledge of the 
actions and legal decisions of the early Medinan community before and after the death 
of the Prophet known as ‘amal madina, (the actions of the people of Medina). Crucial 
to all this was the foundational knowledge and method of usul ul fiqh  (the method or 
roots of jurisprudence) based upon the al-Muwatta (1982) of Malik bin Anas, (who 
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we have encountered previously in regard to the naqli ) and the methodology thereof 
in the governing and application of law and establishing ritual within the community. 
In extension from this principle of ‘amal the Mālikī madhhab was particularly, but not 
solely, noted for the concept of maslahah – or concern for the needs and benefits of a 
society, involving things like the knowledge of ‘urf , (social habits and customs 
particular to a given culture but not contravening the principles of Muslim law) 
(Abdullah : 1978).  
 
The third and last aspect of the Maghribean way is that of succession, centred around 
the historical events of the arrival of Moulay Idris I in the Maghreb, (hence the term 
Idrisism). He was a direct descendant of the Prophet, as the great grandson of Hassan 
and as such accorded special respect (ahli al bayt). Fleeing the political struggles 
arising from attempts to overthrow the Abbasid dominancy and with the threat of 
assassination he eventually found a safehaven safe in what is now modern day 
Morocco in 757. His arrival resulted in allegiance (bay’ah) from the Muslim Berber 
tribes and acceptance of Islam by those tribes that had as yet not converted since the 
initial arrival of Islam in 518, thereby establishing Muslim governance in Morocco. 
Upon his eventual assassination in 762 by the Abbasids, his son Moulay Idris II 
succeeded him and eventually established a united Muslim caliphate within the 
Maghreb. A distinct concept of leadership evolved around both of these figures, 
which was consolidated particularly in Moulay Idris II who possessed the charisma of 
the Prophet which meant that his leadership involved both the worldly and other 
worldly.  This relates to the spiritual legacy of Muhammadan grace (baraka), which is 
believed to derive from the Prophet himself. As Vincent Cornell says ‘ …Idris II is 
more closely associated in the hagiographical and historical record with the innate and 
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personal aspects of the Prophets own uswa hasana’ 50 (Cornell : 1998 : 200). This 
‘Muhammadan tradition of leadership’ (ibid: 200) lies in the bay’ah or pact of 
allegiance, which can be either spiritual or political, though ideally these two would 
be combined as they are perceived to have been were with Moulay Idris II.  This is 
based on the historical pact of Hudaybah, when the companions swore fealty to the 
Prophet in all aspects of his leadership encompassing the inward and the outward. It is 
in this manner that any authority is passed on and the spiritual aspect of this authority 
includes baraka. Political authority is also passed on in this manner but ideally 
combining the both as it did with both Moulay idris I and II. The concept of baraka is 
both subtle and ineffable and endowed with a great deal of social and religious 
import. It is a type of spiritual energy in which the Divine is said to intercede in 
human affairs usually through the agency of individuals, places and objects but which 
originates in the temporal world through the auspices of the Prophet. It involves a 
certain aesthetic paradigm on an intellectual and emotional basis, which individuals 
are either granted or touched by in various degrees. The signs of baraka are a certain 
vibrancy, a willingness to engage and an abundance of adab (spiritual courtesy).  
Other qualities of baraka are that it translates itself into the characteristic qualities of 
the individual or place so that different manifestations of Divine grace manifest 
through various people, (living and dead) or places, sometimes a combination of both 
(Cornell : 1998) as well being in within objects or food. As evidence of this, people 
will visit specific people or tombs for specific cures or the resolving of particular 
problems. This is the point of contention dealt with previously regarding the Wahhābi 
and Salafī schools of thought who see this as a major bid’ah (innovation). Classical 
Islam insists on its permissibility as long as the one or place being venerated is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 uswa hasana meaning ‘aesthetic model’ 
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thereby accorded the power of granting the supplicant’s favours. Similarly, the role of 
the living saint and the manner in which he or she is revered also courts controversy. 
The ultimate source of this baraka is the Divine through the Prophet; acknowledged 
as the door between the Divine and the temporal world and one of the reasons why 
the Prophet is so greatly revered. By extension the awliya (the saints, both living and 
dead) are the inheritors of the Prophet and dispense baraka albeit not with the 
magnitude of the Prophet’s station. This sense of baraka is tangibly intertwined 
within the tenets of Sufism and Moroccan society combined effectively within the 
turuq, (the Sufi orders). The result of this is an orthodox, more earthy than 
esoterically mystical, classical, simultaneously urban and rural, yet literate Maghrebi 
Muslim position indistinguishable from Sufism (Wilson : 2003).   
 
It is interesting that upon the arrival of al-Ghāzali’s famous work Ihya’ ‘Ulum ud-Din 
(The Revival of the Religious Sciences)51 in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, the reaction 
to it by the Andalusian fuquha, (invariably of the Mālikī school) condemned the 
books and ordered their public burning (Fletcher : 1997; Ruano : 2006). Ostensibly, 
one of the reasons being that, in effect, al-Ghāzali’s treatment of Islam and Sufism as 
separate entities requiring justification was a requirement that did not exist in the view 
of the maghrebi or andalusi fuquha (jurists), for whom this was component parts of 
one reality.  Despite al-Ghāzali’s anti-rationalist stance, his ‘Eastern’ discursive and 
theoretical underpinnings of arguments were considered overly esoteric by the 
‘praxis-oriented Islam of early Mālikīsm’ (Cornell : 1998 : 33). Additionally, the fact 
of al-Ghāzali’s adherence to the Shāfi’ī madhhab resulted in his being prone to 
analogy (qiyās); thereby encompassing more of an aqli as opposed to a naqli 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Fons Vitae and the associated Islamic Texts Society are publishing different sections of the Ihya’ 
‘Ulum ul-Din  
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approach as favoured by the Mālikī position also played a part in these judgements. 
However, as in all things, the boundaries of this division are blurred as Abū ‘Imrān al-
Fāsī (974 – 1039) labelled as one of the ‘most important proponent[s] of 
institutionalized Malikism’ but also a saint of his time (Cornell : 1998 : 35) was 
known to have studied under al-Bāqillānī in Baghdad who had been the student of 
Abū Hassan al-Ash’ari of the Ash’ari creed. Al Fāsī also learnt the Shāfi’ī  ūsūl and 
found that these could ‘be harmoniously combined in a Maliki environment (Cornell : 
1998 : 35). On returning to Morocco and teaching his newly acquired views, he was 
imprisoned for his pains but eventually taught ‘his usūl-based version of Mālikī  
jurisprudence and Ash’arite theology for the remainder of his life’ (ibid : 35). His 
student, Waggāg ibn Zallū al-Lamtī (d.1053) was one of the early people of 
considerable influence on the murābitūn. Later the Muwahidūn (Almohades) who 
succeeded the Murābitūn in Andalusia by dint of military invasion was profoundly 
influenced by their founder’s shift (Ibn Tumart 1080 – 1130) from the Mālikī 
methodology to more of a Shāfi usūli methodology which in turn led him to the more 
esoteric thought of the Shāfite al-Ghāzali. The clear delineation between the outer and 
the inner made in the Ihya’ ‘Ulum ul-Din was seen to create ‘outward legalists’ and 
‘inward experience –ists’ (Murabit : 1982 : 135) which contravened the holistic aspect 
of Malik’s Medinan model. An example of this can be seen in the ilm al mukashafa 
(intuitive or mystical interpretation) as outlined in al-Ghāzali’s work which eventually 
allowed Ibn Tumart, the leader of the Muwahidūn to interpret verses of the Qur’an 
putting himself forward as the Mahdi, for which no contradiction was brokered. The 
concept of Mu’amala, usually denoting ‘business practice’, changes in meaning when 
mentioned in conjunction with mukashafa, which changes to referring to practical, 
phronesis type approaches to the refinement of character and the spiritually 
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enhancing. This dichotomy sums up the difference between these different 
perspectives of Sufism, in essence a Shāfi’ī type of Sufism and a Mālikī type of 
Sufism or perhaps and East / West division of Sufism.  The verses utilized by Ibn 
Tumart to put himself controversially forward as the mahdī had been considered by 
the Mālikīs to be muhakama (solely outward interpretation) verses. In summary, we 
have a somewhat confusing ensemble of al-Ghāzali‘s apparently anti-rationalist 
position, albeit theoretically expressed in a manner characteristic of Eastern Muslim 
rational thought combined with a more esoteric approach as opposed to the less 
rational and praxis based spirituality of the naqli-Mālikī position as outlined above.   
 
There is a homogeneous nature to the quality of relations between the spiritual master 
and disciple within the within the different turuq of Moroccan Sufism which has 
spilled over into general Moroccan society. The decoding of the individual disciple’s 
makeup and the master’s skill in addressing the particular egoistic traits to be 
overcome to awaken different the spiritual inspiration is not geared towards 
uniformity.  Quite to the contrary, the creating of rijal ul’llah (men and by extension 
women of Allah) in all the diversity that this entails. This is abundantly clear in the 
letters written by Mulay al-‘Arabī ad-Darqāwī (1760-1823), in the Letters of a Sufi 
Master (1969) and the Darqawi Way – Letters of the Shaykh Mawlay al Arabi ad 
Darqawi (1981). Here we see the Sheikh (Spiritual master) address the idiosyncrasies 
and peculiarities of individuals by presenting alternative views to their apparent 
spiritual dilemmas and prescribe actions designed to overcome such personal 
obstacles. These are expressed in a cascading mixture of direct, self effacing and at 
the same time rigorous tone.  An example of which is provided on the occasion of 
being asked by a faqīr (disciple or adept, literally meaning the ‘the poor one’) as to 
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what was the best profession for one on the spiritual path with the Sheikh replying 
that  ‘…the great profession is leaving professions’ (Darqawi : 1981 : 119). This 
particular tone and manner is rather typical of the relation between Sheikh and 
disciple of Moroccan Sufism. A modern day example, personally witnessed, wherein 
a Sheikh travelling with two fuqārā arrived at a cafeteria to have breakfast where the 
format was a buffet style of service. The three of them went to avail themselves of the 
food on offer. One of the fuqārā was of a delicate nature while the other was of a 
heartier disposition. As was his custom, the delicate faqīr put very little food on his 
plate while the other served himself generously. Upon arriving back at the table to eat, 
the Sheikh instantly switched their plates around.  
 
We see here an appreciation of human variance and characteristics, which is an 
essential ingredient of this way. The different hagiographies of the shayukh (plural for 
spiritual masters), the awlīyā (saints or friends of God) and the fuqārā (pl. of faqīr, 
disciples or adepts) display an enormous diversity of character (Cornell : 1998; Burke 
: 1993). While fraternal cohesion is an essential ingredient, nevertheless, the 
peculiarities of different human characters allow for something of a dynamic and 
organic interpretation of Islam as a committed personal path taken in commonality 
with others and based in the moment as opposed to a solely textual approach to 
learning. This varied idiosyncratic nature was witnessed during an invocation 
gathering personally witnessed in North Eastern Morocco, where one of the fuqārā, 
whenever spiritually overcome, would loudly repeat the words ‘Tide ! Tide !’ which 
is the brandname of a detergent sold in Morocco. Upon asking about this, it was 
related that the person in question sold such detergents off a roadside cart and this was 
 215 
his vendor’s cry. The Sheikh laughingly but nonetheless seriously commented that it 
was a call for a washing of his heart.   
  
These traits of Maghrebi Sufism and by extension Maghrebi Islam is one wherein a 
vigorous orthodox shari’a is balanced undifferentiatingly with the autonomous 
vagaries of an inner individual spiritual path. So all pervading is this that it influences 
the political and personal spheres of Moroccan society to the extent that it even 
legitimizes the structures ofpolitical power, (Cornell : 1998; Hammoudi : 1997). 
Thus.… ‘in and through the hegemony of sainthood, as has been noted, it seems 
logical to consider the master-disciple relationship in Sufi initiation as the decisive 
schema for the construction of power relations’(Hammoudi : 1997 : 75). 
 
The Turkish Way 
There is also sufficient evidence to argue for the concept of a Turkish Islam. While 
concepts of baraka and the relationship between spiritual master and disciple are also 
very much part of Turkish Islam there are significant differences. ‘We should accept 
the fact that there is a specific way of being Muslim which reflects the Turkish 
understanding and its practices in those regions which stretch from Central Asia to the 
Balkans’(Ocat : 2004 : 79). 
 
Whereas the three fundamentals of Maghrebi Islam were firstly; Qur’an, then 
adherence to the community legitimization and finally wirata (combined spiritual and 
temporal governance); the Turkish rendition differs in the second and third aspects. In 
the Turkish mode, as would be expected, the Qur’an is the first point of reference, 
then the deliberation of the ulamā’ based on their interpretation of texts and the third 
aspect of the Turkish version is the relationship between a centralized state and the 
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ulamā’.  Turkish Islam is forged out of various tensions existing between orthodoxy 
and heterodoxy within the rural and urban contexts. The orthodoxy has traditionally 
consisted of a powerful body of state based ulamā’ whose authority lay within its 
identification with political authority. For the ‘….Turkish solution to potential 
competition with religious power has been to incorporate, federalize and control every 
facet of religious life’ (Yavuz : 2004 : 221). The result being a sophisticated religious 
hierarchy evolving as the ulamā’ served the state, which in turn maintained and 
protected religious culture so that the state and Islam were different aspects of the 
same entity.   
Although there is no formal clergy in Sunni Islam, the Ottoman 
ulema functioned as a class with its own distinct sense of identity 
and common interest and remained loyal to the state as long as they 
were benefiting from such loyalty. State centrism was highlighted as 
a result of the consolidation of the central authority and the colonial 
penetration in the nineteenth century. 
                              (Yavuz : 2004 : 220) 
 
This state led legacy, as Yavuz (2004) points out, is a Turkish Islam based around the 
idea of Islamiyat or ‘Islamizing’, (Yavuz uses the ‘Islamicate’ 2004 : 218) 
institutions, conceptual frameworks and everyday minutiae as a result of this ‘state 
centric culture and religion’ (2004 : 220). In tandem with this, religious attitudes are 
textually prescriptive; ‘….in Turkey, print Islam or textual Islam is the dominant 
mode’ (idem : 220).  The general result is a highly structured and ritualistic religious 
presence, linked with the Ottoman Empire’s military apparatus, in the pursuit of a 
stable political life and the security of the state apparatus. Yavuz cites Ülken, a 
leading Turkish scholar who postulates that Turkish Islam and its Sufism is morality 
led, more tanzih (negative theology) as opposed to the more tashbih (proximity to 
God – immanence or positive theology) aspect of Islam (2004 : 219). Here the focus 
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is on countering the ego and disciplining it through increased piety and adherence to 
the moral code. 
 
The heterodox element was the result of Islam encountering ancient shamanic and 
Buddhist traditions and was accepted on the basis of its ability to build on these. The 
Turkish nomadic conversion of the Seljuks to a more sedentary lifestyle is identified 
closely with this conversion process to Islam. A great deal of tension lay in the 
struggle typified by the Royal Court culture of entities like the Ottoman Empire and 
the heterodox popular culture of ordinary folk. The more heterodox Sufi movements 
were considered out of the pale and on the periphery of society by practices 
considered outside the legal boundaries of Islam.  
 
Sufism has played an enormous role in the development of Turkish Islam on both 
sides of the ortho-hetero divide though even the orthodox turūq are usually 
characterized by a non-literal perspective wherein ‘traditions rather than doctrine 
define a religion’ (Yavuz ; 2004 : 219) and  concentrates on the more fantastical and 
miraculous phenomena of the Sufi saints, perhaps a residual effect of the shamanic 
traditions. 
  
The Mālikī Madhhab 
Much has been said already about this particular school of thought and its 
methodology in previous chapters. The famous collection of the Muwatta’ is said to 
be the first compilation of Hadīth52 and written by the famed Malik ibn Anas, (93 – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Though it is said that the Muwatta’ significantly differs from other collections of Hadīth and should 
not be categorized as such. 
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179H), known as Imam Malik53 after whom the madhhab is named.  The Muwattā  
(‘the well trodden path’) is the opus magnus of Imam Malik and is frequently 
mistaken for being a collection of Hadīth, whereas it is neither this nor a manual of 
jurisprudence (fiqh) as usually understood within the Muslim tradition. In fact, it 
combines to form more of a corpus juris (a body of law) as opposed to corpus 
traditionum (a record of past laws) insofar that it depicts and records the Medinan 
community’s legal precedents and rituals with the inherently accepted precepts and 
principles therein, all of which is summed up as constituting the ‘amal of Medina or 
the ‘actions of the people of Medina’.  It is interesting to contrast this with the 
description of the Hanafī madhhab as ahli ra’iy or ‘the people of opinion’, the former 
based on human action and the other on more speculative thought.  
 
Writing of the Maliki approach, Clarke, in the introduction to his translation of al-
Qayrawani’s (922-996) ‘Kitab al –Jami’ (literally ‘Book of Summary’ but in the 
English translation entitled A Madinan View (1999) says, ‘….it was abhorrent to the 
first communities [i.e., the Madinan community of the Muwatta’], to pose 
hypothetical questions’, (p15).  Much of the Muwatta’’s text is based on mu’amalat, 
(ordinary everyday transactions) and not just the devotional and seen as more 
grounded in active spirituality rather than prescribed actions.   
 
There are clear links between Maghrebi culture, its religious aspect in Idrisim and the 
Mālikī madhhab, whose root source was the earliest Muslim community of Medina. 
As has been asserted previously, the Mālikī position has possibly been misconstrued 
as prohibitively reactionary in being accused of a narrow fundamentalism, particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Imam Malik was the first of the four major mujtahids, (a highly rated scholar capable of independent 
ruling) 
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in conjuncton with the Mālikī fuquha position within the al Murābitūn. This alleged 
rigidity of the Mālikīs is frequently contradistinguished with the seemingly 
freethinking, historical creative trends of Muslim intellectual history. As has been 
argued, it seems possible that this may be a case of contemporary values being 
applied to a historical situation and some deconstruction of this has been attempted 
above and an alternative view presented; the desire to maintain a front against 
excessive rationalism and esotericism needs to be seen in a more objective light. Al-
Jabri (1999) in speaking of the historical Mālikī presence in the region weighs in 
against ‘…. [attributing] some ready-made qualifiers to these jurists, such as 
“rigorism” and […] not to accuse them of being responsible for the “stifling of 
freedom of thought” (1999 : 65). The fact is that some of the great Muslim mystics54 
thought to have embodied the spiritual profundity of the Muslim sacred texts in word 
and deed, lived and wrote during this time. If the modern day assumptions of 
illiberality in the religious and cultural ethos of these eras did actually exist then how 
would renowned Sufi figures appear and be accepted at that time? The rejection of 
what was perceived as an Eastern malaise of speculation and fanciful esotericism 
should not be mistaken for a wholesale rejection of an inner Muslim path.  The 
Murābitūn-Mālikī resistance to such ideas has no connection whatsoever with what 
have been labelled above as contemporary technists, modernists or fanatical Muslim 
elements; in short, the Murābitūn do not reflect the Khawārij impulse, in fact quite 
the reverse.   
  
There is something in the nature of the Mālikī madhhab that has parallels with the 
‘neo classical’ typology identified above and existentialism. Primarily by dint of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It may now be clear that the word ‘mysticism’ or ‘mystic’ used here does not refer to the ethereal or 
overly esoteric but rather to those dedicated to the inner expression of the outer. More on this will 
follow.  
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fact that traditional dialectical reasoning was considered inadequate in the 
methodology of Malik due to their stance on discursive and speculative approaches 
and insistence on human praxis : 
…Aristotelian logic was an inadequate tool for analysing certain 
parts of Maliki and Hanafi legal theory, because of the heavy 
reliance in classical logic upon the universal syllogism, which is 
poorly-suited for examining propositions that pertain to the realm of 
probable inference. Several fundamental concepts in Maliki and 
Hanafi legal theory, as I will show, pertain to the realm of probable 
inference. Hence, later Islamic legal theorists who were tied to the 
mode of syllogistic thinking and absolute deduction were unable to 
analyse and evaluate them properly.                                                                                        
                                                                          (Abdullah : 1978 : 19) 
 
In terms of the notion of taqlīd or the concept of adherence to one of the schools of 
thought; this is frequently misinterpreted to mean blind and unquestioning adherence 
to one of the schools of thought and settling this question of taqlīd is an important 
one. It is an aspect that was severely criticized by the likes of Muhammad ibn Abd’ 
al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), Jamal al Din Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad ‘Abdu 
(1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 -1935). In order to make taqlīd it is 
necessary to establish who is followed and what the following consists of.  It directly 
refers to some of the issues raised in the section concerning a Maghrebi Islam and 
contrasted with the account of the Turkish ulamā’.  
From the modernist perspective, the question of taqlīd is perceived as a blind 
adherence and formulates one of the main points of contention with the traditional. 
Yet, the muqalīd, (related to taqlīd), one who follows, must be assured of the 
qualifications and attitudes of a faqīh and thereupon voluntarily and autonomously 
decide to take on the teachings of the faqīh without reservation and without 
questioning. To often this is wrongly juxtaposed with ijtihād or (independent 
reasoning usually outside the madhhab). To some extent this is understandable, 
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insofar as there are verses in the Qur’an wherein taqlīd is inveighed against.55 
However, this is something of a misconception, as the taqlīd referred to in these cases 
refers to an unmindful adherence to core beliefs; as based solely on one’s culture and 
custom, etc. Whereas aspects of Muslim law and creed, do not challenge basic belief 
and are of such complexity that it falls out of this definition. When considering the 
enormous expectations and thoroughness of the faqīh’s erudition, in addition to the 
enormous body of accumulated wisdom, any reservations seem more akin to 
skepticism of a Cartesian hue.  
How unfortunate is it then that the most precious and delicate of 
subjects: Islamic Law, is being singled out as the one thing, 
concerning which every person is to consider himself an authority, 
no matter how deficient and defunct his or her abilities may be? In 
fact, tragically, it is said to be his duty to access and understand the 
Holy Qur’an and Hadith directly by himself. The arguments of this 
modernist movement are being loudly voiced, evermore frequently, 
in masjids, university Islamic societies and Islamic events. It is a sad 
development that increases the Umma’s disunity in addition to 
sapping its energies, diverting it from many higher and loftier 
plateaus of religious endeavour. The truth is that if a number of 
undeniable facts were to be considered with reason and objectivity, 
it would become quite clear that taqlīd must be obligatory for the 
non-scholar and even for those scholars who have not acquired the 
lofty qualifications of a Mujtahid scholar.  
                  (Sajaad : 2011 : 3-4) 
In contrast, taqlīd or even ultimately īman (faith) in Divine existence can be seen 
through a Kierkegaardian lens. An acceptance of the nature of things, that no purely 
objective confirmation of the veracity of the accumulated deliberations of the fuquhā 
will ever be arrived at through some quantitative or accumulated sensory data; for that 
matter, even the very existence of God remains unprovable through such means. The 
individual makes a starkly unmediated decision, a choice not totally devoid of proof 
or reasoning which satisfies them, but yet an entirely conscious and fully volitive act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Qur’an C.5: V104-105; C17:V36; C.21:52-54; C.43:V22-24 
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of commitment, far removed from a slavish adherence. It is a leap from doubt by 
virtue of the inherent paradox of the absurd (Kierkegaard : 1980). This is not a 
passive surrender of responsibility but rather a fully conscious act of responsibility 
(Murabit : 1982 : 67).  
In developing the notion of taqlīd further, it is important to look at the origins of the 
idea of the madhhab itself. The root of the word madhhab stems from the word 
dhāhabā meaning ‘he went’ and madhhab literally means ‘the way he went’ so that in 
the case of the madhhab al Mālikī  it is ‘the way that Malik took’ and in this manner a 
committed adherent to the madhhab would be one who partakes of the ‘way that 
Malik took’. Imam Malik, nor any of the other Imams, probably never envisaged a 
school of thought bearing their name and we can began to appreciate the matter from 
a different standpoint. Taking the ‘way that Malik took’ was formerly something that 
one decided to undertake or something that a group of people consciously undertook. 
If one were to argue that the concept of the madhhab has ‘…cyrstallized into a 
concept of academic schools’ (Murabit : 1982 : 42) this is a valid observation and if 
the objections of current reformist attitudes refers to this then there is some merit to 
their argument. In actual fact, there were several different ‘ways that people took’ 
without the objective of forming any official schools. The criticism of the Salafīsts or 
Wahhābis may be valid but only in that taqlīd is wrongly misconstrued as a regional 
cultural custom to be adhered to or a to blind obligation to follow one’s ancestors. On 
the other hand, not everyone is capable of following the detailed arguments and 
decisions of the fuquhā and the madhāhib. An otherwise devout Moroccan peasant or 
urban office worker may not necessarily have the time, the ability nor the inclination 
to delve into difficult matters of fiqh.  In contrast, the result of people making their 
 223 
own, perhaps un-informed decisions can cause social upheaval; something that can be 
seen to have already occurred.  
 
Whether the original methodologies of the renowned Imams has been pristinely and 
rigidly preserved within the various schools of thought adorned with their names is 
another question. To some extent these should be expected to evolve. In particular, 
the Hanafī madhhab, contained largely within the geographical borders of the 
Ottoman Empire, has had many common borders with non-Muslim lands and 
therefore greater shifts and adaptations from earlier positions were required. Despite 
this necessary historical evolving, the madhāhib have maintained distinct 
characteristics and methodologies. 
Ibn Rushd’s analysis of these different legal opinions indicated to 
me that there were patterns that recurred consistently and predictably 
in the differing conclusions of each of the major fuquha whose 
opinion he treated. Hence, it appeared to me that there was a real 
connection between the legal theory of their schools, even though in 
some cases that legal theory had not been written down until 
generations after the death of the early fuquha.  
 (Abdullah : 1978 : iv) 
 
That each madhhab has distinct characteristics cannot be disputed and most historical 
scholars perceive these differences as characterized from the angle of legal doctrine, 
either through the corpus of definitive jurist rules and decisions (furu' ul-fiqh) or the 
jurisprudential principles (usul al-fiqh). In How Hanafīsm Came to Originate in Kufa 
and Traditionalism in Medina (1999), Christopher Melchert states that the vast 
majority of historians of Islamic law consider legal doctrine as the determining 
element in the development of the different madhāhib. 
 
Perhaps out of all the madhāhib we can be fairly assured of the basis of the Mālikī 
position due to some of its earliest texts still existing: 
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The history of early Islamic doctrine is naturally complicated by the 
very uneven survival of texts. We are relatively well informed when 
it comes to the nascent Maliki school, particularly as it developed in 
Egypt and the West. On the basis of the Mudawwana of Sahnun, for 
example, Calder has clearly identified a stage in the formation of 
Maliki doctrine that focuses on Hijazi experts of the eighth century, 
by contrast with the sharp focus of the Muwatta' of Malik, 
(particularly the recension of Yahya ibn Yahya) on (1) hadith, 
Prophetic valued above Companion, and (2) Malik as their 
authoritative interpreter. For the Maliki school, then, Schacht's 
theory of a regional stage seems to be confirmed. 
                                                                (Melchert : 1999 : 320)  
 
 
The Mālikī method has something of the cyclical about it for despite not denying the 
veracity of a Hadīth the Mālikī faqīh will not use such a Hadīth in deliberation 
without there being any evidence of any past practical application (‘amal) of that 
Hadīth. This is the basic usul or basic methodological principle of this Mālikī s. The 
cyclical is manifested in the fact that a) the evidence provided for the usul does 
emerge from Hadīth but b) only when there is corresponding ‘amal and c) the manner 
of establishing what the ‘amal was, is arrived at through Hadīth or the sunna of the 
Prophet and the early community.  
The science of hadith cannot be separated from ‘amal because what 
is the use of a hadith if it cannot be acted upon ! Even if that hadith 
is acceptable, its significance is that people act on it, and it takes 
preference over the one that is not acted upon.                         
                                                                      (al-Murabit : 1982 : 58) 
 
Therefore the distinctive element of the Mālikī s lies in its connections to the actions 
of the people of Medina (‘amal madina) which holds great value in and of itself.  The 
connection is evidenced in the saying of one of the early companions, Zayd ibn Thabit 
who said, “If you see the people of Madina adhering to a matter then know that means 
that it is sunna”’. (Hadīth cited by Murabit : 1982 : 45). The import of Malik’s 
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concept of the ‘amal was that it constituted ‘a desired norm of social behaviour in 
Islamic society’ albeit not set out in any written theoretical form (Abdullah : 1978 : 
23) so that in Malik’s fiqh, non textual sources (the ‘amal) are prioritized to the extent 
that he would set aside textual evidences which were not seen to have manifested in 
the customs of the people nor those which contradicted the ‘amal (Abdullah : 1978 : 
33). As is common in all human groupings and societies there was also a variety of 
actions or ‘amal that could be performed in a variety of ways around a particular 
concept. Malik’s manner in dealing with such differences in the Muwatta’ which 
Sheikh Umar Faruq Abdullah refers to as ‘mixed ‘amal’ was in his characteristic 
phrasing; al ‘amr ‘indana or ‘that which we prefer’ which in no wise contradicts or 
criticises other actions but is that which Malik chooses to follow, which does not deny 
of the veracity of the other actions. In contrast, the methodologies, particularly of the 
Hanifī and Shāfi’ī schools of thought, rely upon accumulated analogies and previous 
analogical cases with established legal precedents requiring an encyclopaedic 
knowledge on the part of the scholars, less linked to human actions yet more based in 
the theoretical. A rather colourful and earthy response of the naqli scholar, Al-Shābi 
(d. 723) opposed to these more theoretical and speculative approaches is indicative of 
this, who when asked to formulate an opinion for a religious ruling replied; ‘What 
will you do with my opinion? Piss on my opinion’ (Melchert : 1999 : 329). 
 
 
The Muwatta, then, was written at a time when the concern to 
ascertain the basis of authority of the law had led to its growing 
expression, both by the majority of scholars as well as the 
oppositional group as precedents established by the early Islamic 
authorities and by the Prophet himself. Malik’s chosen method of 
composing his treatise was the first to report such precedents as were 
known, and then to consider them, interpret them, and accept them 
or otherwise in the light of his own reasoning and the legal tradition 
of Medina. His supreme criterion was the local consensus of 
opinion, and there was nothing so sacrosanct about Traditions from 
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the Prophet or other precedents that enabled them to override this 
authority in cases of conflict.  
                                   (Coulson : 1964 :46-47) 
 
The import of the Medinan connection cannot be over emphasized as there is 
enormous support for this position in the traditions due to the emphasis given to the 
excellence of its people and the baraka of the place itself, especially in light of the 
Prophet’s presence. For it was where Islam was established as well as the final resting 
place of the Prophet.   
What the messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him 
peace has said about Madina as a place does not constitute mere 
praise for a piece of land or a group of houses. On the contrary, it is 
but praise for the people of that land and those houses, calling 
attention to the fact that these attributes shall endure in them but 
shall vanish from other than them. 
                                            (Qādī ‘Iyād cited by Murabit : 1982 : 44) 
 
Whole chapters are devoted to the subject of Medina and its people in all the major 
classical collections of Hadīth. The fact that Imam Malik was a resident of Medina 
throughout his life only adds to the strength of this position within Muslim terms.   
 
The application of Mālikī methodology within contemporary society, remains 
primarily founded on human actions as opposed to the theoretical. The mufti or faqīh 
gives their formal opinion upon a given matter of law or the legal issues within a 
factual everyday situation. The response of the jurists is the crucial link between 
theory and everyday events and through this the vital relationship between the 
practical and theoretical is played out.  While the fuquha have always claimed their 
primary attachment to the basic tenets of the shari’a, modifications relevant only to 
the situation can occur as a result of local or current customs or even particularlties of 
the case. This is not a change of the law but rather seen as the development of the 
inherent principles of the basic law in application to the ‘facticity’ and particular 
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circumstances of an everyday event. In this manner, the faqīh based in the Mālikī 
methodology takes into consideration the social and cultural factors involved to arrive 
at a fair judgement, which is in contrast to the faqīh who applies proofs of a textual 
nature from past fuquha from different eras, geographical regions and social customs 
in place of immediate actuality and locality. As Dutton says, ‘the true corpus of the 
law is seen as being preserved not in a corpus, but in the actions, or amal of men’ 
(Dutton : 1999 : 3) An example of this is to be seen in modern Moroccan Mālikīsm, 
where the madhhab developed some features of its own while still maintaining its 
basic principles : 
Now in Morocco, from the end of the ninth/fifteenth century 
onwards, ‘judicial practice’ (‘amal) as opposed to the strict doctrine 
of the school, found a recognised place in the system, and it was set 
down in special works. The later Maliki school in Morocco took 
more notice than the other schools of law of the conditions 
prevailing in fact, not by changing the ideal doctrine in any respect, 
but by recognising that the actual conditions did not allow the strict 
theory to be translated into practice, and that it was better to try and 
control the practice as much as possible than to abandon it 
completely, thus maintaining a kind of protective zone around the 
shari’a. Later Maliki doctrine in Morocco upheld the principle that 
“judicial practice prevails over the best attested opinion”, and it 
allowed a number of institutions rejected by strict Maliki doctrine. 
This Western Maliki ‘amal is not customary law; it is an alternative 
doctrine valid as long as it is felt advisable to bring custom within 
the orbit of shari’a, and it mirrors, on a different plane, its 
predecessor, the ‘amal of Medina.  
                                                                       (Schacht : 1964 : 61-62)  
 
The Hanafī madhhab 
In its being closely identified with differing ruling dynasties, particularly the Seljuk 
and Ottoman, the Hanafī madhhab was able to extend far away from the central 
Muslim heartlands into areas like the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia (Turkey), 
Khurasan, Transoxania, and Afghanistan and even into China. Its influence in these 
areas is still strongly evident.  
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The Hanafī school of thought is named after its founder Abu Hanifa an Nu’man ibn 
Thabit (699 -767).  He is primarily known for the systemization of the theoretical in 
the technicalities of legal thought and is accredited with being the first to organise the 
writing of fiqh under various categories and sub headings (Haddad : 2007). His 
method is considered by many to have been more highly refined, with a broader base 
and more thorough than his contemporaries, one of who would have been Imam 
Malik.  On the other hand, Schacht rather controversially postulates that: ‘A high 
degree of reasoning, often somewhat ruthless and unbalanced, with little regard for 
practice, is typical of Abu Hanifa’s legal thought as a whole’ (1964 : 45). Though 
there are no extant manuscripts by Abu Hanifa himself which outline his legal 
perspective nor those expounded upon by his leading students; Muhammad al 
Shaybani and Abu Yusuf of whom Schacht says: ‘…the doctrine of Abu Yusuf often 
represents a reaction to Abu Hanifa’s somewhat unrestrained reasoning, although, in 
diverging from his master, he occasionally abandoned the more perspicacious or more 
highly developed doctrine’ (Schacht : 1964 : 45). 
 
The Hanafīs were at one time closely associated with the Mu’tazila (Stern : 2012) and 
in direct opposition to the Ash’arites which is evident in the context of the renowned 
Shāfi’ī and Sufi, al-Qushayri and the events surrounding his life in Khurasan : 
 
 
After the city fell under the control of the powerful Saljuq dynasty in 
429/1038 al-Qushayri was embroiled in the struggle between the 
rival scholarly factions of Hanafites and Shafi’ites which competed 
with one another for ideological ascendancy. In 436/1045 al-
Qushayri asserted his position as the leading spokesman of the 
Shafi’ite-Ash’rite party of Nishapur by issuing a manifesto in 
defence of its orthodoxy. His advocacy of Ash’arite theological 
tenets aroused the ire of its Hanifite opponents. When the powerful 
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Saljuq vizier ‘Amid al-Mulk al-Kunduri threw in his lot with al-
Qushayri’s Hanafite-Mutazilite opponents, he was arrested … 
(Knysh : 2007 : xxii : introduction to al-Qushayri’s Al-
Risala al-qushayriyya fi ‘Ilm al-Tasawwuf) 
 
The Hanafīs were also closely linked with the Ottoman Empire and its expansion 
from which there evolved an extremely complex and codified system of law due to 
the exercise of the Ottoman state across a range of different cultures and lands. In the 
early sixteenth century under Selim I (1512 – 1520) and Suleyman I (1520 – 1560) 
installed the Hanafī madhhab, ‘which had always been the favourite of the Turkish 
people’ (Schacht : 1964 : 88) as the effective and systematized administration of 
justice and civil affairs within the vast Empire. Ottoman Turkey was the only country 
to have codified the shari’a to the extent that it became the official law of the state. In 
establishing and maintaining this they provided a ‘uniform training of scholars and 
kadis and organized them in a graded professional hierarchy’ (Schacht : 1964 : 90).  
Out of this grew the position of the Grand Mufti who was at the head of the trained 
and schooled qādīs. This position became one of the highest offices of state 
responsible for seeing the sacred law upheld throughout the Ottoman lands and 
overseeing the qādīs. The efficacy of this legal and administrative system is renowned 
and contributed greatly to the growth and cultural flowering of the Ottomans. For this 
reason, the Hanafī madhhab can be said to be the fiqh of large scale governance and 
Empire.  Not only was authority given to the trained qādīs in all legal matters but they 
were also given charge of the supervision of public morals aided and supported by the 
subashi or police set up to carry out their decree on a given matter.   
 
The degree and role of speculative thought (ra’y) within the Hanafī madhhab can be 
identified in one of the earliest books of Hanafī fiqh currently known; the scholar, al-
Gassas set out an argument against those who criticized the use of rational argument 
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by turning it back to its critics. 
The best proof of this necessity is that one who denies the validity of 
rational argument is himself obliged to resort to reason to justify his 
denial. This assertion, which is typical of the ahl al- 'ilm wa-l-nazar 
argumentation against traditionalism and skepticism, appears in the 
chapter entitled Al-qawl fi wugub al-nazar wa damm al-taqlid, 
which precedes the chapter on qiyas. The chapter continues with a 
critical analysis of the notion of 'ilm, which strangely recalls early 
Mutazili arguments. 
                (Bernand : 1985 : 625)  
 
Mujahaddah and Shakirin Approaches to Sufism 
We have already dealt somewhat with al-Ghāzali above; we know that he was of the 
Shāfi’ī madhhāb and closely aligned with the Ash’ari position and a major opponent 
of the Mu’tazilah. We have also seen that in the eyes of the earlier Mālikī scholars 
particularly those aligned with the Murābitūn but also prior to that, he was regarded 
as embodying an ‘Eastern’ approach. In terms of spiritual teaching, one of al-
Ghāzali’s main spiritual teacher’s (Sheikh) was Abu Ali Farmadi at-Tusi (d. 1055), 
whose spiritual line descends from the Siddiqiyyah, (i.e., from the line of Abu Bakr 
Siddiq, one of the foremost companions of the Prophet). This lineage is significant as 
it was also the line which later evolved to Muhammad Baha’udin Shah Naqshband 
Bukhari, (1318 – 1389) who was the founder of the Naqshabandi tariqa, which similar 
to the Hanafī madhhāb, geographically pertained to the Seljuk and Ottoman domains 
around the central Muslim heartlands into areas like the Indian subcontinent, Central 
Asia (Turkey), Khurasan, Transoxania, and Afghanistan and even into China.   
The Shādilīyya way was founded by the Moroccan Abu Hassan Ash-Shādilī (1175 – 
1258) and was centred mainly within North and Saharan Africa and is descended 
through the Alawiyya line of spiritual transmission (i.e. through Alī Ibn Abī Talīb, the 
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young cousin of the Prophet) and through the Qādirīyyah spiritual chain of 
transmission (silsīla) founded by Sheikh Abdul Qādir Jilani (1077- 1166). In both 
cases, the geographical origins were long ago transcended and yet the contemporary 
manifestation of these turūq (plural of tariqā – path, order or way) retain some 
flavour of the intellectual and theological nuances of the cultural environment that 
they were founded in.   
Most Muslim scholars declare that in essence; there is little that divides either the 
madhāhib or for that matter the turuq. While this is acknowledged there are 
nonetheless, some differences and distinctions made between the way of spiritual 
exertion (mujahadah) and the way of gratitude (shukr). An example of the latter an be 
seen in the writings of al-Lamti (2007) in reporting the words and responses given 
under the tutelage of the famous Moroccan sheikh, Sidi Abdul ‘Azziz ad-Dabbhag 
(d.1718). The way of gratitude, usually identified with the Shādilīs, encompasses a 
less strident yet full and ecstatic disposition of gratitude to Allah. While the 
mujahadah way, frequently paired with the more Ghāzalian Naqshabandi approach, 
focuses more on rigorous spiritual exercises. The Shādilī tend to the more ecstatic in 
the performance of the hadra, a rhythmic communal swaying to and fro in rhythm to 
particular litanies and inspired poetry, while the Naqhshabandis are more prone to the 
more contained and silent dhikr. Al-Lamti describes this as the original way of the 
early Muslim community and the fact that he was Shādilī has to be kept in mind. In 
the way of gratitude, the way of the early community a thankful disposition in every 
moment brought people to high spiritual stations. Thereafter, with the best of 
intentions, people aimed for these high spiritual states and set out to gain these 
through rigorous spiritual exercises. The original aim was proximity to Allah and the 
Prophet in thought, word and deed and any spiritual openings were by-products, 
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whereas the later ones aimed at spiritual states and stations. Both ways are recognized 
as correct and yet in the perhaps biased view of al-Lamti, the way of shukr, (i.e., the 
Shādilī ) is the more authentic. The stress is said to be more on the cultivation of the 
inward and therefore great acts of enduring worship are not considered of primary 
concern and normal, eating drinking and enjoying of life in the continual and constant 
awareness (hudur) of the Divine Presence arrived at through gratitude.  
….. to be attached to the Real (al-Haqq) Most Glorious and Exalted; 
keeping ever at His door; taking refuge in Him with every motion 
and rest; fleeing from the moments of inattention that intersperse 
those of presence, and in short, disciplining oneself to hold ever fast 
to Allah Mighty and Majestic, and persisting therein—even though 
one is not engaged in a great deal of outward worship.  
                                                                          (al-Lamati : 2007 : 60) 
 
Spiritual openings can be sudden and not especially sought after. This to be contrasted 
with the spiritual strivings, often deprivations, undergone by mujahadah approach 
which focuses on the experiences obtained through such strivings and in a sense, 
these spiritual openings are obtained through secondary means.  
The Naqshabandi order, as we have seen, distinguished itself 
historically by an emphasis on sober adherence to the shari’ah as the 
indispensable concomitant of the spiritual path.  
                                                                                (Algar : 1990 : 43) 
 
Again it must be stressed that there is a great deal of overlap here and it should not be 
understood to suggest that the other turuq, in particular the Qādirīyyah or the Shādilī 
are in any way less exacting in their adherence to the shar’ria.  The one may be said 
to be based on disposition and the other on adherence. 
A well-known contemporary tariqa situated in and around Turkey and Syria is the 
Naqhshabandi – Haqqani path headed by Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani. In a website 
dedicated to his teachings and under the subheading ‘About the Most Distinguished 
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Naqshabandi Way’ the following is taken : 
The most distinguished Naqshbandi Order is the way of the 
Companions of the Prophet and those who follow them. This Way 
consists of continuous worship in every action, both external and 
internal, with complete and perfect discipline according to the 
Sunnah of the Prophet It consists in maintaining the highest level of 
conduct and leaving absolutely all innovations and all free 
interpretations in public customs and private behavior. It consists in 
keeping awareness of the Presence of God, Almighty and Exalted, 
on the way to self-effacement and complete experience of the Divine 
Presence. It is the Way of complete reflection of the highest degree 
of perfection. It is the Way of sanctifying the self by means of the 
most difficult struggle, the struggle against the self. It begins where 
the other orders end, in the attraction of complete Divine Love, 
which was granted to the first friend of the Prophet, Abu Bakr as-
Siddiq. 
        (Naqshabandi-Haqqani Sufi Order of America : 2011 : 1) 
 
 
This can be contrasted with a text from another well known and contemporary tariqa 
originating in Morocco, the Qādirī al-Boūtchīchī and highly characteristic of the 
Shādilī  way. The following is taken from the spiritual ‘will’ of the preceding sheikh, 
Sidi al-Hajj al-Abbas al-Qādirī al-Boūtchīchī, shortly before his death, which 
similarly indicates something of this way.  
Thus my relationship with you is rather a spiritual teaching based 
on :  
a) Companionship in Allah 
b) Love for his sake 
c) Gathering for his remembrance                                                                                 
e) Seeking the madam (assistance) of the Messenger of Allah       
    (Tariq al-Qādarī al-Boūtchīchī : 2003-2004)  
 
 
Summary 
In summation up to this point, inauthenticities within contemporary Muslim discourse 
have been identified through the application of social theories and reification. 
Rationalism has been identified as constituting a possible root cause for 
inauthenticity. To understand the effects of this within contemporary Muslim 
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discourse, the development of rationalism within Islam’s intellectual history has been 
also been traced and argued as constituting a possible basis for potential 
inauthenticities. Following on from this, a ‘Turkish’ Islam has been contrasted with a 
‘Moroccan’ Islam where it is postulated that the prolonged encounter with rationalism 
in the East has resulted in a more speculative philosophical tradition resulting in a 
more structualised, theoretical approach to Islam, (i.e. Turkish). Being less exposed to 
the speculative philosophies and esotericism prevalent in the East, the Greek sciences 
had longer to root and bear their own fruits unimpaired by the likes of the neo-
Platonic influences in the Western; i.e.; Moroccan intellectual tradition. It was 
demonstrated that this Western Islam places more emphasis on praxis as opposed to 
the more theoretical approaches of the East.  
 
On the back of all that has gone before, in the next Chapter we now turn to more of a 
philosophical approach to enquire into and survey the binary opposition of 
inauthenticity and authenticity within a more Sufic mode, though this will not always 
be made explicit.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
                 Living Without Why 
Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics (and metaphysics generally) affords a 
deeper perspective of the effects of rationalism and leads on to the question of 
personal authenticity. Though the ontologies under which Heidegger and Ibn ‘Arabi 
lived under are decidedly different, both are primarily philosophers of Being. While 
the modernist paradigm was not the context under which the medieval Muslim mind 
functioned, the codification of belief, under the yoke of rationalism, was something 
that Ibn ‘Arabi was concerned with. Hence, the propensity to rationalise and codify 
should be seen as less a question of Western metaphysics and more of a universal 
human tendency.  
 
The main focus here will be on a series of lectures by Heidegger published under the 
title, The Principle of Reason (1996) focusing on Leibniz’s56 principio rationis 
wherein ‘nothing is without reason’ (nihil est sine ratione) or ‘nothing is without 
ground’.  Heidegger sees the principio rationis as the over-determining of a concept 
unformulated prior to Leibniz, yet present in that epoch and eventually evolving into 
the foundation of Western metaphysics. In short, this is the demand that a rationale or 
a reason be brought forth for whatever is held to be true.  Heidegger holds this to be 
of great historical importance, in that this metaphysical tradition has mistakenly 
located the essence of ground in the idea of a fundamental principle, to enormous 
effect on a global scale.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Gottfreid Wilhelm Leibniz 1646 – 1716 was a famed polymath of enormous influence. He is one of 
the great rationalists in the History of Philosophy having made an immense contribution to modern 
logic and analysis. He is equally famed in the History of Mathematics and invented calculus and the 
binary system. 
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Critique of Axiomatic Structure 
Heidegger understands a principle as that which is the base for a series of 
propositions deriving their origin from that principle. The problem is identified as 
lying in the very nature of forming an initial, general principle designed to be the 
fundament of any subsequent propositions. Essential to this, would be a definition of 
the word  ‘principle’, as well as ‘ground’ or ‘fundamental’ and yet there is no 
definition for these words within the principio rationis. While the principio rationis 
may be the ground for all other principles, what grounds of definition is it based 
upon?  
 
The proposition must be ‘something’, in relation to ‘nothing is without reason / 
ground’ so according to its own definition it too must have a grounding. Yet, as ‘the 
first principle’ nothing should come before it and so it thereby negates itself. The 
alternative would be an infinite regress for each progressive grounding for a ground 
would require a ground itself. What is hereby revealed is that every beginning, every 
first principle is nothing of the kind but involves some kind of initial arbitrary 
assumption.  
 
Leibniz also formulated that ‘for every truth a reason can be given’ which is known 
as the ‘principum reddendae rationis’. Heidegger etymologically roots out the 
meaning establishing that reddere means ‘to give back’ rendering the principum as 
‘for every truth a reason must be given back’. The notion of ‘giving back’ gives rise 
to Heidegger asking three questions (1996 : 118), paraphrased here  : 
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a) If the principum claims to be the grounding principle for every other ground then 
on what grounds does the principum itself lie upon?  What does it give back? 
b) Why is there a constant imperative for grounds to be given for every occurrence, 
truth or thing?  
c) Why presume that any ground must be given back?  
 
One apparent cause in the presumption that grounds are provided for every 
proposition, mau have arisen as a result of some confusion as to the manner of being 
in the world. The Cartesian ontology separates the ‘knowing’ mind from the 
‘unknowing’ body.  In some form or other this lays stress on the human as observer 
on one side and the rest of the universe on the other. The physical body of the 
observer and the world it inhabits is somehow inferior to knowledge derived from 
observation. This observing and knowing ego is perceived as an ethereal and world-
less entity with the only means of relating to the world is through interacting via 
mental judgements and concepts. In this manner, it is reassuring to the ego when 
reason (or ground) is fed back (reddere) to guarantee to the ego that its interpretations 
and representations are real and correct. Heidegger points out that the reddere not 
only refers to the knowledge of the world but that all experience, even the emotional, 
demands a reason. This constant demand for reasons and grounds being delivered to 
the thinking subject easily subjects human beings to limitations formed by prevailing 
common attitudes. Heidegger sees the widespread upheaval in the human condition as 
having resulted from the principum in that our continual demanding for grounds 
ultimately reveals us as groundless and rootless. Thinking is employed for the 
purposes of ‘demanding reason’ and reduced to the ‘calculative’ resulting in the 
predominance of mathematical- technical sciences. We come full circle with 
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seventeenth century philosophy; ‘The common denominator was the confidence that 
each man was a rational individual who could arrive at autonomy in his intellectual, 
social, religious and emotional life. Mathematics was considered as the chief tools of 
reason’ (May : 1996b: 23).  
 
However, an alternative is provided. The structure of fundamental principle as the 
block upon with all following propositions built upon it is known as an ‘axiomatic 
system’. However, Heidegger revives an Ancient Greek understanding 57 of the word 
‘axioma’ as coming from the verb ‘axio’ meaning to value or appreciate something 
by virtue of it standing forth as something remarkable of itself, independently of any 
human evaluation. Thus the axiom provides a vantage point by virtue of its standing 
forth of itself from out of which other things are perceived. Heidegger understands 
Euclid’s Axiom Theory as more of an objective luminosity shedding light on related 
phenomena as opposed to the traditional understanding of two similar things being 
similar to a third rendering them all similar to one another and thereby constituting a 
proposition. By this, human thought is enabled to see what these objects mean in the 
light of that particular axiom and what other further undisclosed meanings exist in the 
light of that axiom.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Heidegger analysis of German and Greek words becomes more than just an instrument of his 
thinking but rather a major element of his thought. He finds long buried or eroded meanings in words 
that bring ideas to life. But not just that – it also actively demonstrates that the erosion of meanings is a 
manifestation of the erosion of Western thought. Additionally, Heidegger created a particular style of 
language in his philosophising based on this etymologising tendency. His use of neologisms has been a 
controversial issue and one of the mainstays of Heidegger’s critics, whilst others proclaim his style as 
significant which causes the reader to reflect deeply rather than blithely skim over the text. Ibn ‘Arabi 
and his spiritual successors were and still are very prone to this within the Arabic language.  
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Heidegger’s Without Why 
Western philosophers have tended to perceive mystics as irrational whereas 
Heidegger often expressed the view that the mystics were ‘astoundingly clear’ and 
expounded views characterized by ‘extreme sharpness and depth of thought’.  True 
mysticism is considered as rising above and transcending both the rational and 
irrational. (Heidegger : 1996 : 35-36; Caputo : 1986). Heidegger utilizes a poem by 
the mystical poet Angelus Silesius in direct contrast to Leibniz’s assertion that 
nothing is without why. Angelus Silesius’ poem is as follows (cited by Caputo : 1986 
: 61) 
Ohne Warum 
 
Die ros’ist ohn’ warum, sie bluhet weil sie bluhet 
                       Sie acht’t nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet. 
 
Without Why 
 
The rose is without why, it blossoms because it blossoms 
    It has no care for itself or whether it is seen. 
 
 
The poem seems to stand in direct contradiction to Leibniz’s principle that ‘Nothing 
is without why’ whereas Angelus Silesius seems to counter; ‘The rose is without 
why’. Heidegger argues that the common sense interpretation would be to establish 
the poem as being in error, but that our obstinate rationalising blinds us to the subtler 
meanings within the poem (Caputo : 1986). Common sense dictates to us that the rose 
blooms as a result of different climatic and soil conditions and therefore has very 
much of a tangible ground upon which it is based. Heidegger counteracts this by 
stating that the poem never says that the rose is not without grounds but that it is 
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without why. ‘The rose has a ground but it does not consider (achtet nicht) nor does it 
question (fragt nicht) it.’ (Caputo : 1986 : 62) 
 
Heidegger no longer perceived Leibniz’s principum in the same way but rather sees it 
as an oracular expression of Being unfolding within the Western tradition. Being 
speaks through Leibniz almost in the sense of an oracle and what Heidegger hears is a 
profoundly simple, even primordial statement, differing significantly from the 
original interpretation, (Caputo : 1986) . Heidegger sees Being as standing forth and 
disclosing itself though not having been properly listened to due to the fact that we 
are often thoughtless about things either familiar or close to us, as in the matter of 
existence itself.  Heidegger hears in the principum ‘Nothing is without ground’ 
differently as ‘no thing has no ground’ now more of an assertion rather than a 
negation, the assertion being that ‘Nothing (i.e. Pure Being) has no ground. ‘Nothing’ 
highlights its opposite, for it can be seen to reveal ‘something’ by the fact that there is 
anything at all (i.e. a being) to experience the nothing indicates that there is a being. 58 
The relation of Nothing to Being means that the principum is stating the opposite to 
what may seem its obvious initial interpretation, i.e. that in fact there is no ground to 
No-thing, like Siliseus’ rose it simply is and is without a grounding or a why. This 
does not mean that Heidegger disregards the concept of ‘grounding’ completely or 
that dasein has no base in the world. The individual project is the ‘world’ or the 
sphere wherein one projects oneself and one’s possibilities are realised and it is in this 
arena that the Principle of Ground as simply understood does holds relevance to some 
extent. Heidegger explains this in stating that it is only in the enlightenment of the 
dasein as to its own transcendence to the world that the Principle really holds forth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This relation between Nothing and Pure Being is dealt with on p247 
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the concealed meaning (Caputo : 1986). How? Dasein creates the foundation for itself 
in which it interacts with the world and the beings within that world but within that 
world there is no true grounding. The only true ground lies in the transcendent Being 
over all other existence but this only comes to light through the thought awareness of 
the dasein: 
Thus we see that the birthplace of the Principle of Sufficient Ground 
lies neither in the essence of the assertion nor in its truth, but rather 
in ontological truth, i.e. in transcendence itself.          
                                                                       (Heidegger : 1969 : 122) 
 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi’s Taqyid wal Hasr (Limiting and Restricting) 
Though Ibn ‘Arabi does not dismiss the appropriate use of rationality, he is 
disparging of this in matters pertaining to the Divine, seeing them, in effect, as 
nothing more than mental edifices in a vain attempt to appropriate Absolute Reality, 
‘When a person rationally considers God, he creates what he believes in himself 
through his consideration. Hence, he considers only a god that which he has created 
through his own consideration’ (Ibn ‘Arabi cited by Chittick : 1989  : 62). These 
‘Gods of Belief’, as Chittick (2005) refers to them, are built up around the disposition 
and tendencies of the individual and have something of the idolatrous. ‘In effect, 
everyone worships himself, because what we worship is what we conceptualize, 
grasp, believe and underdstand (Chittick : 1989 : 113).   In fact, God is known only 
by the fact that He is not known ! […..] The knower of God does not transgress his 
own level. He knows that he knows that he is one of those who do not know’, (Ibn 
‘Arabi cited by Chittick : 1989 : 154).  The main inadequacies of speculative thought 
and the rational faculties in approaching the Divine lies in three areas: 
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1. Finitude  
The finitude of the being compared with the infinitude of Being (God) renders the 
reasoning faculty woefully inadequate.59 Even then, Ibn ‘Arabi asserts that the 
Absolute Reality is even beyond descriptions of infinitude. However, the majority of 
people especially the philosophers, the scholars and thinkers randomly seize upon 
some relatively minute droplet from a ‘An Ocean without a Shore’60 delineating it as 
the Real, to the exclusion of anything else using these to form theories, world views, 
epistemologies and paradigms around this fixed concept of God based around their 
personal inclinations. Whereas the Real is not definable but is sirr (secret), not by 
dint of it needing to be kept esoterically hidden but secret by dint of its indefinability 
and inexpressibility.   
 
2. The Constant Flux of the Real and Différance 
Everything is in tanawwu’ or in constant flux (Almond : 2004 : 17) and nothing ever 
remains beyond the instant, nor is ever repeated ‘because of the Divine Vastness’ (Ibn 
‘Arabi cited in Chitick : 2004 :  104 - 105) and ‘God never discloses Himself in a 
single form to two individuals, nor in a single form twice’ (Ibn ‘Arabi  quoting Abu 
Talib al-Makki cited by Chittick : 1989 : 105;  Almond : 2004 : 17).  Attempting to 
select one instant using it to describe The Real is what Ibn ‘Arabi equates to an 
attempt at fettering of the change and flux, to hold it still, (ahli ‘aql wa taqyid wa 
hasr – the people of binding, limiting and restricting; Ibn ‘Arabi cited in Izutsu : 1993 
: 31). ‘To describe God is to restrict Him; to predicate his Essence is to constrain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This is aptly summed up in one of the famous aphorisms of the Kitab al Hikam of Ibn Ata’illah, 
‘What a difference between what He brings to you and what you present to Him!’ (Ibn Ata’illah : 
1973). Ibn Ata’illah was one of the spiritual successors of Ibn ‘Arabi. 
 
60 Borrowed and adapted title from Chodkiewicz, M. (1993), An Ocean without Shore – Ibn ‘Arabi, the 
Book and the Law, Cambridge, Islamic Text Society   
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Him. Whoever practices theology, in effect, forces God to repeat Himself, again and 
again, imposing a banality and a predictability upon God’ (Almond : 2004 : 18).  
Almond sees similarities in Derrida’s approach to the polysemic nature of text and 
that it is never interpreted in the same way by different people or in the same way by 
the same person. It is important to bear in mind that ‘text’ need not only refer only to 
literature. Almond (2004) points out that the unrepeatability aspect for Derrida lies in 
the unknown fate of the text, i.e., who will read it and what will they make of it and 
how will it be used; ‘…there are only contexts without any centre of absolute 
anchoring’, (Derrida cited in Almond 2004 : 21). Thus the possibility of infinite 
meanings of the text is linked to the limitless contexts that are possible. Also, in 
Derrida’s view the interplay of presence and absence, (as in différance) in each event 
of reading interpretation and the infinite number of outcomes and interpretations that 
can ensue from this has strong similarities with Ibn ‘Arabi.  In Derrida’s view there is 
a constant deferral of fixed meaning as the tensions of differences that determine one 
thing or another are in constant flux, a perpetual playing between presence and 
absence61 that never allows for a final definitive meaning to be chained down.   
 
3.    The Paradox of Concurrent Immannece (tashbī) and Transcendence (tanzīh) 
Ibn ‘Arabi includes both the Mu’tazilah (positive theology) and the Ash’arites 
(negative theology) in their differing attempts to intellectualize a limit to the 
unlimitable and that the unknowability of the Divine can be reduced to some binary 
opposition. In the eyes of Ibn Arabi the truth of this lies elsewhere, in that both 
Immanence and Transcendence co-exist simultaneously, ‘If you insist on His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In some ways it and in some way it is not and it is indescribable, the Syadvada. 
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transcendence , you restrict Him, and if you insist only on His Immanence, you limit 
Him’, (Ibn ‘Arabi :  1980 : 75) 
 
Almond (2004) sees similarities with Derrida’s thought insofar as he also was wary 
of such counterpoising and in his deconstruction is always able to perceive that there 
is some obscured hierarchy of values, privileging one side as above the other for 
theoretical justification or ideological reasons. This was demonstrated previously to 
some extent in Bewes (2002) use of Derridean deconstruction of the concept of 
reification (see p.81 above). Derrida’s has a nugatory perception of such oppositional 
duality, finding a meaningless, almost childish, mutual dependence on the opposite 
concept to negatively define itself. In demonstrating this, Almond poses 
transcendence as against immanence which ultimately ‘can only pretend to meaning 
through contrast with their opposites – in other words, the immanent can only be 
understood as the non-transcendent’ and vice versa (Almond : 2004 :25). What is 
finally at stake here is the question of the paradoxical and clearly both Ibn’Arabi and 
Derrida welcome the presence of paradox against stucturalism, something of an 
anathema to the rationalist mindset. The Divine Reality or Absolute Reality is, in the 
eyes of the Akbarian, an enormous paradox that is to be accepted and welcomed and 
yet it brings on a perplexity, also welcomed; as Ibn ‘Arabi pleads, ‘My Lord, 
Increase my perplexity concerning you’ ( Ibn ‘Arabi : 1980 : 79).  
 
In concluding this section, it is relevant to consider the major differences between the 
medieval mystic and the Philosophers of the Moment, who tend to negate universal 
theories or logicentricism. The nature of the metaphysics that Ibn ‘Arabi functioned 
under was different on a number of levels from the metaphysics which Heidegger has 
addresses above. The medieval metaphysics, particularly the one embodied by Ibn 
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‘Arabi, as opposed to theorized, was not the axiomatic structure that Heidgger 
challenges. Ibn ‘Arabi’s speaks of visions and dreams replete with experiential 
immediacy – with no trace of Cartesian objectivism. He did not believe, he knew and 
by this knowledge he did. As Claude Abbas says, Ibn ‘Arabi underwent ‘…visions, 
dialogues with the dead, ascensions, mysterious encounters in the imaginal world, 
miraculous journeys in the celestial spheres (Abbas : 1993 : 36).  There is no apparent 
structure to what Ibn ‘Arabi records and as Ian Almond notes the purpose of this 
seemingly haphazardly recording of thought , (organized more systematically after his 
death) is ultimately to do away with it; ‘…the intricate, hierarchical system that Ibn 
‘Arabi has constructed must be understood as a very Wittgensteinian ladder, one 
which can be kicked away out from under one’s feet after it has been climbed’ 
(Almond : 2004 : 14). At the same time, Coates (2002) suggests that the 
categorization of concepts has not been meant to be totally abadoned but recognised 
for having their place, function and limitations. Coates describes the Akbarian 
approach as a ‘dispositional ontology’ (2002 : 12) insofar as it has ‘a kind of 
tolerance, openness and metaphysically inspired generosity of outlook’  (2002 : 13).  
Coates quotes Ibn ‘Arabi ‘the person of knowledge (‘arif) does not get caught up in 
anyone form of belief’ (2002 : 14). The dispositional ontology entails primarily a 
metaphysics which fully acknowledges the perspectival, conditioned and relative’ 
(2002 : 15) and we are reminded again of the Syādvāda and différance for everything 
has its value and its place as within this metaphysic several different paradigmatic 
discourses, that on some levels may even seemingly discordant, may take place.  
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Knowledge of the Self 
Undoubtedly, the pursuit of self-knowledge is essential to the concept of authenticity 
and Ibn ‘Arabi frequently asserts that the only way of knowing the Absolute is for us 
to know ourselves. In obtaining self knowledge there is a distinguishing and shedding 
of accrued attitudes and dispositions that hinder our view of the primordial self yet in 
arriving at knowledge of the self one comes upon the Immutable and Absolute (Ibn 
‘Arabi : 1976).  From both the existential and Muslim point of view this is a 
ontological difference relationship between being / Being or created / Creator.  
Alienation from the self, perhaps one symptom of inauthenticity is something that 
Heidegger believes both can only be overcome ontologically. The ‘ontological 
difference’ is a major feature of Heidegger’s thinking and is best summed up in 
Wittgenstein’s saying, ‘How extraordinary that anything should exist! How 
extraordinary that the world should exist!’ (Wittgenstein : 1993 : 40). Heidegger 
establishes that ‘Being’ is distinct from existents or ‘being’ (or ‘beings’).  
 
In Heideggerian terms; the word ‘Being’ is that which supersedes all existence 
including ‘beings’. From here on,  ‘Being’ and ‘being’ will be differentiated by the 
use of lower case and higher case usage of the initial letter and dropping the quotation 
marks; with being referring to existent individual human lives yet only under the 
context of Being. However, in denoting beings, Heidegger also uses the term dasein 
and rarely uses ‘man’, ‘woman’ or ‘human’ in his writing. Nor should we understand 
either being or dasein as merely denoting human lives (existents) but also a ‘a pure 
expression of being’ (Heidegger : 1985 : 171), as an ‘existence’ embodying human 
potential or elsewhere as a ‘clearing’ wherein Being can emerge (Heidegger : 1962 : 
133). The word dasein stresses the connection with ‘Sein’ (i.e., Being). ‘The essence 
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of dasein lies in its existence’ (Heidegger : 1962 : 62).  
 
Each dasein has their own attributes and ‘facticity’ given to them in a given world 
context wherein their unique possibility of grasping experience is presented; the 
choice of attitudes and dispositions or the option of letting these pass.  The notion of 
dasein’s individuality as a dasein amongst others lies in taking possession of or 
recognizing one’s uniqueness. Dasein has the option of covering this uniqueness, 
despite its knowing itself to be different from other entities by chosing to avoid this 
responsibility, portraying itself as just another item in the world and conforming to 
mass conventions and pressures. For Heidegger dasein stands before two options – 
authenticity, a being conscious of its acceptance of its self and inauthenticity, one who 
conforms to conventional attitudes and behaviour and an unthinking participant in the 
‘public realm’.   
 
Heidegger admires the early pre-Socratic philosopher, Paramenides, due to his 
conviction that the question of Being and its relation to thought indicates a unique and 
extraordinary relation between beings and Being. Since the Socratic age there has 
been a move away from asking what Being is to questions defining what beings are. 
Whether or not there is a clear direct answer to the question, ‘What is Being ?’ is a 
matter of some vulgarity for Heidegger, As we have seen, the idea that everything 
must have an answer is not going to allow any clearing for Being to manifest. 
Heidegger asserts that beingness is only and always within and under the context of 
Being and as he says ‘a being is never without Being’ (Heidegger cited in George : 
2000 : 22). As Being transcends every being and being is dependent upon it for its 
existence, the temptation to equate this with an omnipotent, omniscient Divinity is 
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hard to resist yet there is nothing more than a likeness in the relationship.  
 
The Nothing  
One way that Heidegger approached the matter of Being was to formulate the 
question ‘What about the nothing?’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 95) as opposed to the more 
direct ‘What is the nothing?’. Meister Eckhart, the German mystic frequently referred 
to and quoted by both Heidegger and Derrida  (Caputo : 1986; Almond : 2004), 
stressed the absolute dependency of creatures upon God and saw creatures as 
consisting of ‘absolutely nothing’ and ‘pure nothing’ (Clark : 1957 : 173) and 
compares being in relation to Being as comparable to the way that air holds light, it 
does not own it rather it is bestowed upon it by the sun. The air is nothing in itself 
except by virtue of its being bestowed upon.  
The ‘nothing’ in this case should not be understood to indicate the null and void and 
Heidegger points out that we deny the concept if we think of it as such for ‘nothing’ 
is. ‘Nothing’ usually arises out of taking the totality of something and then negating 
it, so that the concept of ‘nothing’ arising out of the function of negation, whereas 
Heidegger sees the ‘nothing’ as a thing experienced and encountered in challenging 
our sense of ‘what is’ and thereby detaches us from the sphere of things. What is this 
experience? Heidegger believes that this can occur within boredom and anxiety. Daily 
existence can result in the individual becoming lost in the complexity of their lives. 
One is confronted by the ‘all’ insomuch as it is a lacking – a ‘nothing’, an ontological 
occurrence wherein the totality of our lives can be illumined before us and revealed to 
be without meaning. This experience of the ‘nothing’ highlights its opposite and can 
be seen to be revelatory of ‘something’, namely a being to experience the nothing. 
The ‘nothing’ is encountered through boredom or anxiety and not through the any 
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functioning in any logical sense whatsoever. In this sense, Heidegger sees the 
‘nothing’ as a process that only can only occur within the being. In and through 
anxiety we experience that the being is. ‘In the clear night of the Nothing of anxiety 
the original manifestation of being as such first arises: that they are beings – and not 
nothing’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 103). The being or object stands out like a star on a 
clear, dark night to a backdrop of nothingness. Heidegger sees this as further 
indication that the nothing and being are inextricably linked, as the nothing actually 
constitutes the essence of being and Nothing is Being itself, especially seen when the 
word is changed to No-thing; as Being is not a thing. 
 
Later Heidegger wrote of Ereignis, a sort of self-disclosure and self-concealing of 
Being, which he claimed has occurred since the early Greeks to our present epoch. 
This is the notion of a conscious; almost Loki62 like play of Being, a concept that 
provides ample fodder for critics of Heidegger who accuse him of being more a 
mystic than a philosopher (Rosenstein : 1978). His discourse is qualitative, resulting 
in an absence of precise definability as opposed to the concrete resolving of the more 
quantitive aspects of philosophical expression. Indeed, Heidegger's refuses to enter 
into the traditional arena of philosophical ‘as good a job of putting potential critics on 
the defensive as any philosopher in history’ (Rorty : 1982 : 39). Rorty also claims that 
attempting to categorize Heidegger as poet, mystic or philosopher only serves to 
confirm Heidegger’s theory all the more that ‘various distinctions are themselves 
products of metaphysical system-building’. Clearly, Heidegger sees the possibility of 
other types of discourse in that there are things that can only be apprehended by non-
rational or supra-rational means.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The wily trickster God of Norse mythology  
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The ontological difference can be found in the foundational declaration of Islam 
(shahada) in the formulaic words; lā ilaha illā‘llāh. The first part of the statement (lā  
ilaha…) signifies ‘There is no god’ and if we are to take this statement on its own 
merit it seemingly denies the whole grounding of existence from a doctrinal Muslim 
perspective for if there is no God there can be no existence. However, there is a 
deeper meaning to this quite to the contrary of this initial superficial interpretation. 
The Divine Essence (dhat); which is beyond any human comprehension and related to 
its Absolute Non Manifestation and Absolute Reality and as such; it is No-thing, far 
beyond and transcending the notion of God. As Abd al Karim Al- 
 says, in addressing the No-thing of Absolute Reality : 
Oh Thou who art neither quiddity nor name, nor shadow, nor 
contour, nor a spirit, nor body, quality, nor designation, nor sign, - to 
Thee belongs existence and non existence, (al wujud wa-l-‘adam). 
                                                                                  (al-Jīlī : 1983 : 5)  
 
The second part is an affirmation, …ilā’llāh, (meaning ‘…except God’). This is the 
unfolding descent of the Akbarian levels – Nothing necessitates Being. A clearing 
occurs through the No-thing / Nothing and in the clearing possibility arises. Once No-
thing / Nothing is determined or distinguished then the element of possibility (al 
imkan) comes into the play, i.e. the possibility of Some-thing. Thus Non-Existence 
transforms to Existence; Non-Being transforms to Being. In this secondary act, the 
distinguishing of Being or Existence means that the possibility of Non-Existence also 
comes into play again and in this manner Being and Non Being, Existence and Non 
Existence, Manifest and Hidden are but One. 
 
In looking at the next level; that of the Divine Attributes and Names or Manifest 
Divinity itself (uluhiyah) we see the total declaration,( la ilha ila llah)  to be the 
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perception of the Absolute through the relative (Being through being).  There are 
many meanings to be derived from this, such as ‘there is no reality except the Reality’ 
or ‘there is no truth except the Truth’. The first negational part of the declaration; (lā 
ilaha…) corresponds to stark statements of ‘there is no reality’ and ‘there is no truth’, 
‘there is no meaning’, etc.  The relative expressed is by neccesity finite; yet under the 
umbrella of an overriding, constant and infinite existence; to which the finite itself 
owes its existence.  Thus, in effect, statements presenting the finite can be seen to be 
non existent and by extention, the ‘truths’ that humans exchange in the everyday 
world are relative conversations and as reality is relative, being is relative and 
meaning is rendered arbitrary and so they have non-existence. Yet it is only when the 
second part of the formula is pronounced; (illā ‘llāh) that the first part’s true meaning 
is revealed as being the relative and the second part of the formula refers to Being – 
the all-pervading omniscient, omnipresent aspect of the Divine which throws the first 
part of the statement into proper relief – as the relative as from behind the no-thing 
emerges Being.  From this it may now be easier to paraphrase the shahadah to be able 
to declare something along the lines of ‘There is no reality but The Reality’ (Al-Haqq) 
or ‘There is no existence but the Existence’ (Al Wujud) or ‘There is nothing but No-
thing’ or in an all-encompassing definition, ‘There is nothing but Allah’.  
 
For Ibn ‘Arabi, the ordinary sensible world of every day existence, of which we are in 
the habit of regarding as a reality, is actually a sort of dream.  With our senses we 
construct the world around us by distinguishing one thing from another, co-relating 
them, ordering and categorising them thereby creating a seemingly solid and material 
world. This construction of ‘reality’ is not truly reality as pertains to Being (wujud) 
but has more to do with the world of dasein.  For Ibn ‘Arabi the world is an illusion, it 
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has no real existence.  We imagine that it is an autonomous world when in truth it is 
nothing of the sort.   
 
Know that you yourself are an imagination.  And everything that 
you perceive and say to yourself, ‘this is not me’, is also an 
imagination.  So that the whole world of existence is imagination 
within imagination. 
          (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1976 : 129) 
 
For Ibn ‘Arabi, this means that the world we perceive is a product of our personal 
faculty of imagination, which is active within the larger domain of an objective 
imagination.  However he does not see everyday existence in a negative temporal 
sense to be abandoned in the search for a real world as the imagination or dream does 
not infer valueless or even falsehood (Izutsu : 1984).  For Ibn ‘Arabi it simply means 
that our everyday world is a reflection of something else and that the apparent 
‘reality’ of the everyday is not the true ‘Reality’.  So in a sense his starting point is 
that our ordinary perception of the world is not a subjective illusion but rather an 
objective illusion as it constitutes an unreality that is yet founded on a firm 
ontological basis and which ‘is tantamount to saying that it is not an illusion at all, at 
least in the sense in which the word is commonly taken’ (Izutsu : 1984  11) and as 
such there is a doubtless correlation with Heidegger's view that being is not the true 
Being. This everyday ‘reality’ is an indication of a greater ‘Reality’ and Ibn ‘Arabi 
employs a Hadīth of the Prophet to explain this, ‘All mankind is asleep and when they 
die they wakeup’ (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1976 : 178).  In this sense death does not refer to 
the physical but to a spiritual breaking through, an individual throwing off the 
shackles of phenomenal sense and reason to pierce through its confining boundaries 
to the web of multifarious phenomenal things to that which lies beyond the veil of 
ordinary existence, which in the eyes of Ibn ‘Arabi, indicates the Absolute Reality. As 
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mentioned before, though Ibn ‘Arabi does not see the ordinary dream-like world as 
illusory but as a particular indication of the Absolute Reality. The temporal world 
consists therefore of various forms, properties and states all of which weave together 
to create life and existence as known through the physical senses. If one is able to 
understand these forms and properties as nothing (no-thing) in themselves but as so 
many manifestations of the Reality (some-thing) than they have attained to the 
deepest knowledge and understanding of the self and existence around them (Izutsu : 
1984). 
 
Ibn ‘Arabi perceived the Prophets, Saints and Gnostics as those who have arrived at 
such a fundamental understanding. Though they may perceive the Absolute Reality 
beyond the veil of the iconic, they have visions and dreams that are couched in the 
very forms, properties and states that ordinary people have but which for them are 
indicators of which they are able to interpret. For most of us we are too easily 
convinced that that the world is materially solid and are not amenable to the idea of 
its being any indication of anything beyond the immediate nature of our immediate 
world.  
 
It is God who made the world and endowed it with existence. The 
entire Universe is therefore supremely beautiful. There is nothing 
ugly in it. On the contrary, in it God has brought together all 
perfection and all beauty. The gnostics see it as being nothing other 
than the form of the Divine Reality, for God is he who is 
epiphanized in every face, He to whom every sign refers back, He 
upon whom all eyes rest, He who is worshipped in every object of 
worship. 
                                                        (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1972 : 449 - 450) 
 
Yet despite the extraordinary nature of those able to see beyond the immediate, Ibn 
‘Arabi refutes the doctrine of ‘unio mystica’ or mystical union with God so commonly 
understood in esoteric circles. With Ibn ‘Arabi, union with the Absolute Reality is an 
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impossibility as there must always be a distinction between creature and unknowable 
Creator. Ibn ‘Arabi is more existential than esoteric in his expression, something that 
is not immediately perceived by people unfamiliar with his work and there is a 
distinct matter-of-factness to Ibn ‘Arabi’s descriptions of the other-worldly.  
 
Despite his extensive writing, Ibn ‘Arabi himself did not layout any formally 
prescribed ontological theory or doctrine. However, those who followed in his wake, 
such as al-Qāshānī (d.1330) and al-Jīlī (1366 – 1424) did codify his thought 
somewhat. In this regard, Al-Qāshānī, outlined five levels of Being or the Reality 
which form an integral and organic whole; though each level (hadharat) represents a 
mode of self-manifestation of Being or Absolute Reality. These stages are as follows: 
 
1. The Level of the Essence (dhat) – which is at a level beyond any human 
comprehension. This is the Absolute non manifestation and Absolute Reality 
beyond comprehension.  
 
2. The Level of the Divine Attributes and Names, The Divinity (uluhiyah). 
 
3. The Level of Actions, The Lordship over all things (rububiyyah) 
 
4. The Level of Form / Images (amthal) and the Imagination (khayal). 
 
5. The Level of the Sensible Perception and Experience (mushahadah) 
(Adapted from :Izutsu : 1984 : 11)  
 
What can be confusing with Ibn ‘Arabi and many past and present people following 
his general mould, is in extrapolating a particular point they will move from one level 
to the other; i.e., from the level of dhat to the level of amthal within a single sentence; 
from an ontological discourse to the religious. Ibn ‘Arabi’s discourse takes place 
within the background of counterposing wujud, (Being or existence) as opposed to 
mahiyya denoting quiddity,’ thingness’ or ‘whatness’. We cannot determine wujud in 
itself or from itself but only through the manifestation of things emanating from 
wujud. The concept of wujud is identical to the Divine Essence in its Absolute 
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Reality, is sometimes described as that which is non manifest in itself while making 
other things manifest’ (Murata : 1992 : 66).  
 
For Ibn ‘Arabi, an initial requirement for taking up the spiritual path is a stripping 
away known as takhlli (stripping away of the self – a sort of deconstruction of the 
self).  He sees this as a return to a primordial state, a state of nothingness, an almost 
dumb animality to the most basic foundation of ‘humanness’, which he sees as a 
spiritual station, exemplified in the Prophet Idries, (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1980 : 235). The 
Muslim spiritual process (Sufism) can be summarized in three stages and is 
mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabi continuously throughout his works as well as by other Sufi 
masters both prior to and after him. This stripping of the ego, an annihilation of the 
subjective human attributes is the first stage. At the second stage, upon arriving at 
their nothingness they then realise that they are at one with the Divine Essence, 
through complete annihilation of the self, referred to within Sufi terminology as fana. 
The third stage is where the self is regained (baqa), what had been stripped away is 
now given back from nothingness; but it is not as it was before, for the self is now 
infused with the Divine and is able to see phenomenal things blurring at the edges of 
their forms, (so to speak) and mingling in the ocean of Divine Oneness.  The whole 
process can be viewed in terms of a purification of the ego, not particularly in any 
dualistic moral sense but rather as an annihilation of subjectivity which if left, 
detracts from pure being. An example of something to be stripped away could be the 
activity of reason, wherein the cessation of the ego (nafs) as the empirical subject of 
both reason and desire results in a transformation of a new ego aligned with the 
Absolute. This is seen as ‘knowing oneself’ as one really is and not the illusory 
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narrative that the ego has built up about its self. Similarily, in his Treatise on Being 
(1976) Ibn ‘Arabi says : 
And for this the Prophet (upon whom be peace) said: “Whoso 
knoweth himself knoweth his Lord.’ And he said (upon him be 
peace) : “I know my Lord by my Lord.” The Prophet (upon whom 
be peace) points out that by that, that thou art not thou : thou art He, 
without thou; not He by entering into thee, nor thou entering into 
Him, nor He proceeding from thee, not thou proceeding forth from 
Him. And it is not meant by that, that thou art aught that exists or 
thine attributes aught that exists, but it is meant by it it that thou 
never wast, nor wilt be, whether by thyself or through Him or in 
Him or with Him. Thou art neither ceasing to be nor still existing. 
                    (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1988 : 4-5)  
According to Ibn al-‘Arabi there are two different implications in asserting that the 
only way of knowing the Absolute is for us to know ourselves. The first is that we 
either consciously shed or authentically accept those subjective aspects of the self that 
we have been made aware of. The second is that, in knowing ourselves we come 
across the primordial self and in doing so we touch upon the immutable and Absolute. 
The desire to know the Absolute Being conceptually is humanly impossible, yet if we 
go into the depth of ourselves we perceive the Absolute within the self, albeit not 
through intellectualization but within the touchstone of our being. In finding the 
ultimate Reality or Being within the self, what is revealed is that there is no difference 
between ourselves and everything else in the world and so on another level of reality 
there is no ontological difference, despite having stated this previously. As there is no 
difference between things – there is nothing but One Reality. Only by going within 
ourselves; penetrating through the consciousness of the self can we discover the 
primordial nature of Divine presence within all things so that in ‘knowing ourselves’ 
we begin ‘to know the Lord’. It is when we become aware of ourselves as either a 
form or non-form of Divine self manifestation that we can start to see the blurring of 
outer forms melding into the One. A comparison of this is afforded in the example of 
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the candle in relation to the sun – the candle is absorbed and obliterated in relation to 
the light of the sun – the candle flame is a No- thing.  
In short summary, the wayfarer strips away till there is no-thing and a transformation 
takes place, from the no-thing, some-thing takes place. Even more concise; purified 
from being, (i.e., some-thing) one comes to no-thing, from the no-thing, Being 
emerges. How the no-thing results in some-thing can be seen in the more everyday 
and ordinary application of Heidegger’s ‘distinguishing’ or ‘naming’ of things. These 
could be previously undetected aspects the self has now identified and called into 
being through language. This is a sort of ‘self reckoning’, (muhasaba) a practical 
example of which may be afforded in the case of someone distinguishing that the 
mainstay of their interaction with others is based on maintaining a humorous and 
witty demeanour and that they habitually maintain to gain acceptance from others. 
When one is able to distinguish something like this then they are no longer 
completely compelled to do so and are freed up to consider either giving it up or 
consciously maintaining it. In distinguishing it, we create, in Heideggerian terms a 
‘clearing’ an empty space before us, a no-thing for something that could or might 
happen. Rather, it is used to represent a clearing for a transformation of being for the 
emergence of Being. It is a clearing distinguished in that present moment, not in the 
future and when the clearing is present, experience, expectations, rationality and 
perspective are stilled, opened and freed up.  
Ibn ‘Arabi believed that the only way of knowing the Absolute is for us to know 
ourselves as explicated in the Hadīth, ‘Whoso knoweth himself knoweth his Lord’ 
(Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1976 : 4). The pursuit of the Absolute in its unknowable non 
manifestation is futile and the pursuit of the Absolute in its manifested form is only 
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carried out by going profoundly into ourselves. Ibn ‘Arabi perceived both the 
animated and unanimated worlds as being so many forms of the Absolute 
Manifestation (God). This meant that ultimately and essentially there is no difference 
between living things and objects and is therefore the objective view. On a 
phenomenological level there are innumerable differences between the multifarious 
lives, beings and objects of the universe, which is the subjective view. In the nature of 
things, we do not have recourse to penetrate the outer realities to perceive the 
essential oneness of all things; to see the underlying unity of all existence. According 
to Ibn ‘Arabi it is only when we delve into our own interiors and actually experience 
within, the self manifestation of the Absolute that we come to any objective view. 
Therefore the ‘knowing of the self’ can be the beginning of ‘knowing the Lord’. For 
it is only when we experientially know and become conscious that our very being is 
itself a form of the self manifestation of the Absolute that we can begin to perceive 
the universe as essentially an the pervading Oneness of Absolute Manifestation. 
 
In the next Chapter we will begin to look at developing a combined view of certain 
aspects further relating to issues of authenticity and inauthenticity with a final 
rounding off these by couching these concepts in terms of ‘falleness’ and distraction 
to ‘other than Allah’, respectively Heideggerian and Sufi terms. These will lead on to 
other concepts to be looked at, namely the Clearing and the Opening (fātīh) that deal 
essentially with the event of and the implications of authenticity, in relation to the 
nature of Being and the Divine.  
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Chapter Eleven 
Aspects of a Path to Authenticity 
The ‘other than Allah’ and Falleness  
Many Sufi texts, both present and past, refers frequently to the concept of ‘..other than 
Allah’ which is explained further here. As mentioned briefly before, within traditional 
Islamic thought Existence (wujud) finds its opposite in the concept of mahiyya 
(quiddity). For classical traditional muslim scholars wujud lays beyond definition. 
Anything subject to space or time or delineated belongs to mahiyya and the quiddity 
of a thing can be known whereas this is not the case with wujud. As with existence, 
we can only know wujud in that it is determined by a thing – we know it because it 
exists. It is that which is non-manifest in itself but which makes other things manifest. 
The problem lies in getting caught in the illusory trap of duality and otherness without 
perceiving the Reality behind it. Ibn ‘Arabi directs himself directly to this question in 
Risalat ul Wujudiyyah. 
 
His Prophet is He, and His sending is He, and His word is He. He 
sent Himself with Himself to Himself. There was no mediator nor 
any means other than He. There is no difference between the Sender 
and the thing sent, and the person sent and the person to whom he is 
sent. The very existence of the prophetic message is His existence. 
There is no other, and there is no existence to other, than He, nor to 
its ceasing to be, nor to its name, nor to its named.  
                                             (Ibn  al-’Arabi : 1976 : 4 : italics added ) 
 
This ‘other’ here refers quite simply to all which is other than the Absolute 
Manifestation or the Divine in all the varying levels mentioned above. To be caught 
up with them is to be caught up with inauthenticity. This is the idea of giving reality 
to something ‘other’ which has no reality as opposed to recognising the Absolute 
Reality upon which the ‘other’ is contingent. It is seen as an almost natural decline in 
perception – the human reason insisting on having tangible and concrete forms to 
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focus and function with and also as a type of forgetting for it is believed that all 
humans consciously or sub consciously know the Reality – but cover it over. It is 
interesting to note that the word kufr commonly used to denote non-muslims, 
unbelievers or unfaithful in reality means ‘to cover’63 and the word insān; the word 
for ‘humans’ is based in the root concept of ‘to forget’.  
 
In his different works but particularly in Bezels of Wisdom – Al-Fusus al-Hikam 
(1980), Ibn ‘Arabi discusses the varying degrees of a possible inner transformation of 
man from Otherness to the Divine. This is none other than the transformation from 
materiality to spirituality or inauthenticity to authenticity. The ordinary person is seen 
to be in a state of ‘veiledness’ from true Reality as they are under the dominance of 
their senses and corporeality therein entailing their intellects as under the influence of 
the demands of the body and its relation with the material, (al nash’ah al 
dunyawiyah). Their understanding is thereby impeded and ‘veiled’ from the essential 
Reality of all things. Another word used for Sufism or tasawwuf is haqa’iq- meaning 
Reality and linked etymologically with the root meaning of ‘truth’, (i.e. the Reality or 
the Real).  
In order for those in the grip of worldly materialism, whom Ibn ‘Arabi calls ‘the 
people of binding, limiting and restricting’ or ahli ‘aql wa taqyid wa hasr (Ibn ’Arabi 
cited in Izutsu : 1993  : 31) perhaps well-suited to being linked with Heidegger’s 
‘calculative thought’ can be transformed to perceive Reality by developing  al ayn al 
basirah, (spiritual insight). According to him a person who has embarked upon the 
path of realization to the Divine must shed himself of the intellect – in a sense being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Some would say that such a definition is wrong. Someone may not be a Muslim and not consciously 
or subconsciously cover anything up.  
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almost animalistic and earthly – a sort of primordial existence by abandoning 
themselves to the elemental.  Essentially this must be considered to be the 
abandonment of reason and cessation of the thinking. It is claimed by the Sufis that 
this method is essentially the Prophet’s way, in primarily challenging people to think 
about the nature of the self, an existential confrontation - a confrontation with the 
reality of the self within the world.  
For Heidegger there is also a very clear distinction between the being who truly 
pursues a path to their own innermost and essential nature and those who become 
overly occupied with the business of everyday existence thereby forgetting the 
question of Being.  In Derrida’s Of Spirit – Heidegger and the Question (1987) he 
asserts that one of Heidegger’s major themes, though not mentioned much by him, 
nor by his admirers or his critics, is the question of the Spirit and the Spiritual. The 
presence of this is felt by its absence and Heidegger refers to the spiritual when he 
focuses on those who do not externalize, are not alienated and are present-at-hand.  
 
However, his approach must not be understood as any sort of judgemental issue 
though perhaps rather confusingly, Heidegger, with something akin to religious 
terminology describes such a person as ‘fallen’. Dasein has fallen, in this case, not 
from a state of grace to a state of sin, but out of its ‘innermost’ way to a public mode 
of existence. In later works he develops this theme further where the ‘fallen’ are those 
who are concerned with beings, with the rules that govern them (as in the sciences) 
and the way they are controlled and manipulated, (technology). This is contrasted 
with ‘thought’ a quiet, meditative state, which produces nothing tangible and is 
therefore easily superseded by that which seems to produce tangible things through 
actions. Heidegger sees a perpetual danger in man being exposed to getting lost in 
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beings, of being swept away by everyday concerns. He calls for a return to the 
forgotten essential ground within man, deeper than anything apparently human and in 
which man is exposed to the presence of something which transcends beings 
altogether (Caputo : 1986 ).  
 
Returning to Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of transformation from the Other to Reality the first 
step in from liberating the self from over dominating reason (‘aql), perceived as being 
intrinsically chained to the material world. At the next stage of ascent, another type of 
reason takes its place termed by him as ‘aql mujarrad which is free and pure of the 
corporeal and provides a perspective of the true ontological structure of even the most 
ordinary things in the world, such a person has attained a spiritual rank. The first step 
in Ibn ‘Arabi’s transformation from what he called Otherness to Reality lies within a 
liberation from natural Reason (‘aql) which is related to the larger aspect of the nafs, 
(egocentricity) perceived as intrinsically chained to the material world. Moulay al-
‘Arabi ad- Darqawi speaks of this divide thus: 
 
This is obvious for so long as you consort with (worldly) people, 
you will never smell the perfume of the Spirit in them; you will only 
smell the smell of sweat, and this is because they have been enslaved 
by sensuality; it has taken possession of their hearts and limbs; they 
see their profit only in it, so that they chatter about it, busy 
themselves with it, rejoice in it alone and can barely drag themselves 
away from it. And yet many are they who have freed themselves 
from sensuality in order to plunge into the Spirit for the rest of their 
lives, (may God be pleased with them and let us profit from their 
blessing, Amen, Amen, Amen). It is as if God (be He exalted) had 
not given them the Spirit (i.e. to worldly people) and yet each one of 
them is a part of it, as the waves are part of the ocean.  
                                                                       (ad-Darqawi : 1969 : 1) 
 
It is interesting to compare this with Heidgger’s discourse on inauthenticity and 
‘falleness’ (Verfall) translated here by George Steiner from the original Sein und Zeit. 
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Dasein has in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an 
authentic potentiality for being its own self. It has fallen into the 
‘world’. ‘Falleness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in being-
with-one-another, insofar as the latter is guided by idle talk, hunger 
for novelty and ambiguity…On no account however do the terms 
‘inauthentic’ and ‘non-authentic’ signify ‘really not’, as if in this 
mode of existence Dasein was altogether to lose its being. 
‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like no-longer-being-in the 
–world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the 
–world.  
                                              (Heidegger cited by Steiner : 1978 : 94) 
 
In Heidegger’s case it is not the overcoming of the nafs (ego) but rather what he calls 
‘subjectism’ (Subjectittat), (Heidegger : 1971b). This is where the given precepts, 
perhaps a theory, are imposed upon phenomena or reality. In other words, Being is 
expected to conform and adhere to the rules and principles laid down and created by 
the ‘thinking subject’. So it is not the nafs which is to be overcome but rather the 
setting up of the ‘thinking subject’ as the highest principle, even above Being which 
Heidegger calls ‘the absolutization of reason’ (Rorty : 1982 : 32). Heidegger clearly 
sees such renowned thinkers as Descartes, Leibniz and Kant as belonging to the 
tradition of subjectism. This bears a resemblance to the religious concept of pride; an 
essential element of the nafs’ feelings of self importance and for Heidegger 
detachment is not so much overcoming ‘self willing’ but to give up willing 
altogether. In this sense it is to transcend even attempting to stem willing itself; 
particularly in re-presentational thinking. Though Heidegger does not speak of ‘self 
willing’ in any moral or sinful context, nevertheless it does seem to strongly convey a 
sense of self importance. Heidegger sees the everyday world and its things as 
derivative, resting on deeper grounds than is immediately apparent but grounds that 
are not forthcoming to analysis but are perhaps more accessible through intuition. Yet 
nor does he deny the Aristotelian definition of the human being as a rational animal in 
the context of a representational thought process; but that there is a realm beyond 
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representational thinking. In this realm essential human nature is rooted in the essence 
of its relationship to Being and through this the grounds for one’s relationship with 
other beings. So while Heidegger does not discard ‘everydayness’ he does not wish it 
to be granted an absoluteness thereby eclipsing the deeper ground of one’s being.  
 
Another possible correlation in thinking is to be found by comparing the potentiality 
of al insan al-kamil  (the perfect human) to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity. Ibn 
‘Arabi’s perspective of the role of the perfected being easily runs parallel to 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. In Ibn ‘Arabi’s view; every aspect of the 
phenomenal world is an aspect of the Absolute Divinity in some state of 
determination but what role does the individual human being play in this? The Human 
being is clearly part of this determined material world – and yet constitutes a unique 
part of through the possession of consciousness. This unique aspect of being human 
allows at the every least a conceptual knowledge of the ‘theo - ontological 
difference’. Indeed, it is the extent to which an individual is conscious of this that 
determines the level or station (maqām) of his knowledge.  
The least of these are those who have no awareness of even the possibility of the ‘theo 
- ontological difference’ and see and grasp the material world giving it full credence 
in its density and materiality, with no thought of any possibility of anything beyond 
what they see and hear. It is worth bearing in mind that this not need be solely 
irreligious people, on the contrary – it could refer to those who aspire to piety and are 
‘religious’. They can be in the thrall of forms and not perceive the essence in the same 
sense as the more carnal might be prone to. A higher station might be those able to 
distinguish the Unity of Existence behind the manifold outer forms. Yet a higher 
station is attained by those who experience both the forms and the essence and yet see 
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them interrelated and originating from Divine Unicity. The highest are those who 
experience all dimensions, outer and inner, form and essence, as One Reality, 
recognising their domains, functioning simultaneously within them through the 
perception of there being no difference between them. 
The Clearing and the Opening (fātīh) 
We have briefly alluded to Heidegger’s concept of ‘the clearing’ but it would be 
interesting to expound further on this in relation to the Sufi concept of ‘the opening’ 
(fātīh) both of which refer to something akin to a type of epiphany. In Sufic terms, the 
event of fātīh refers to a momentary glimpse of the Truth (al-haqq) as in a moment of 
illumination;  referred to in a varety of ways, such as the ‘falling away of veils’, the 
‘opening of veils’ or the ‘ripping of veils’  between the creature and the Creator (al-
Jilani : 1999).  Something of a perception of The Real or Absolute Reality (haqā’iq) 
is made manifest to the individual, who as a result of this experience is momentarily 
or permanently stripped of all pretence, concepts and emotional constructs. These 
‘openings’ can be of a permanent nature or occur in a flash instant. It is related to the 
concept of hāl, a spiritual state, induced by such an opening but is perhaps better 
understood through Heideggerian terms, as the potential of dasein to be ‘the clearing’ 
for an involuntary taking on or appropriating of truth or where the event of truth can 
take place, (i.e., Being). Both Heidegger and Ibn ‘Arabi understood that the individual 
does not bring about such an event of their own accord and can only really provide 
the space or clearing for such a thing to happen in an unpredictable manner. Already 
mentioned, an important aspect of Sufi methodology is the concept of takhālli, which 
implies the stripping away of the nafs (ego). Once this the stripping away has 
occurred, soething called tahalli (embellishments) could take place. These are 
 266 
spiritual graces, insights and experiences of heightened sensitivities and an acute 
sense of awe and wonder previously discussed in reference to mysticism.  For while 
the first aspect of this (i.e., takhāllī), may be said to be initiated by the individual, the 
second aspect, tahāllī (embellishments in terms of spiritual or character) is 
engendered through the auspices of the Divine Will, yet even then, within deeper 
Sufic understanding, the initial motivation on the part of the spiritual seeker also 
emerges from the Divine Will, i.e., the seeker seeks by Divine Will. Heidegger’s 
perspective correlates this; for while the relationship of Being with being may be a 
subsistent relationship as seen as in the phrase ‘….des wesende verhaltnis zum Sein 
als Sein which translates in meaning to ‘…the unfolding relationship of Being to 
being whose nature it is to be related’ (Heidegger : 1959 : 177 : author’s translation). 
His later views were that genuine thinking does not proceed from dasein but as he 
says, ‘Being is no product of thought. On the contrary, indeed, essential thinking is an 
event of Being’ (Heidegger cited in Caputo : 1986 : 25)  The earlier Heidegger saw 
dasein’s relation to Being as originating and depending on dasein to both initiate and 
sustain it (Pattison : 2000). Whereas previously Being depended on man’s ability to 
break through assumptions and prejudices and to question Being from a new vantage 
point; the later Heidegger decisively shifted to the view that Being did not come as a 
result of questioning – in fact it was exactly this type of questioning that had to be 
given up (Heidegger : 1993 : 91-114). ‘Being does not come in response to a question 
but as a gift or favour bestowed on man’ (Heidegger : 2002 : 91 – 114). In making 
such ‘a clearing’ or ‘an opening’ both dasein and the murid (the Sufi student) are both 
by far the lesser in respect to Being or God.  
The other sense of ‘clearing’ can be see to be those referred to previously as those 
who experience the two dimensions; the outer forms and the inner realities as 
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stemming from one Divine Unity – and are referred to by Ibn ‘Arabi who are 
described in the famous hadith …. ‘draws near to me through voluntary devotion 
beyond the required until he becomes loved by Allah and thereby the eyes that Allah 
sees with, the ears that He hears with and the tongue that He speaks with and the 
hands that He holds with (Nawawi : 2004; Sahih Bukhari : 1997 : Hadith 509). They 
are no longer engaged with mental comprehension but rather they are; to coin an 
appropriate phrase from another Hadīth,‘…the Qur’an walking’ 64 and it is these 
people whom Al Jilli; termed ‘The Perfect Human’ – (al-insan al-kamil).  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Part of a famous hadith constituting the reply of the wife of the Prophet, who when after his death 
was asked about his nature and character. 
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Chapter 12 
Time and the Moment 
Al Waqt and the Øieblikket 
 
In discussing aspects of the Mālīki fiqh previously, an emphasis has been placed on its 
existential approach, situated in the actual as opposed to theoretical speculation, it is the 
situational versus the universal. It is argued here that was a fundamental characteristic of 
Muslim understanding, especially prior to the advent of speculative theology.  An 
example of this can be understood from the nature of the Qur’anic revelation itself, which 
was almost in its entirety based around the situational. Revealed verses would in the vast 
majority of cases, ‘descend’ on the Prophet usually in relation to something that was said 
or happening around or in relation to the Prophet and which are known as asbab ul-nuzul, 
literally the ‘circumstances / cause of the Revelation’. Something of this is also portrayed 
in the ethos of what will be called here a Medinan Islam, as expressed through Malik’s 
al-Muwatta’ depicted by Goldziher in reference to the Muwatta’: 
It is a corpus juris, not a corpus traditionum.... Its intention is not to 
sift and collect the healthy elements of the traditions circulating in the 
Islamic world but to illustrate the law, ritual and religious practice, by 
the ijma` recognized in Medinan Islam, by the sunna current in 
Medina.. 
                                                                          (Goldziher : 1978 : 198) 
 
Given this existential actuality, acutely manifested in Medinan Islam and then coupled 
with the phenomenon of asbab al-nuzul, it is not difficult to see the natural emergence of 
a concept known as ‘ibn al-waqt’ or the ‘daughter / son of the moment’ which 
corresponds to the Øieblikket, (Kierkegaard’s ‘blink of the eye’ moment or ‘instant’) and 
which will be explained here.    
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An essential part of the modern paradigm rooted in the metaphysical structures of 
rationalism and Cartesian doubt are the aspects of time and space. Yet in traditional 
societies time is regarded and measured differently as is evident in the Kāla Vyavahāra 
Hindu measurement of time, contained in the Vishnu Purāna, ranges from the smallest 
measurement of time equated to one blink of the eye, (1 blink = Nimeesa; 10 blinks = 
Kaasthaas) to a year and one day, (Ayana) and ultimately to a Muha Yuga which equals 
4,320,000 years. In the Muslim world time is understood in three dimensions, sarmād 
which is the changeless and perpetual, (i.e., eternity), dahr, the relation of changing time 
with the changeless and zaman, (i.e., ordinary time) (Nasr :  2007). What is evident in this 
is that there is no quantitative aspect in these definitions of time whereas ever since the 
Cartesian view has prevailed, time is generally experienced as a linear and quantitative 
commodity. The scientific view has divested time of quality and is what would have to be 
called ‘objective’.  This is something which Husserl spoke of in differentiating between 
the terms of Erfahrung (neutral / objective experience) and ‘lived experience’ or 
Erlebnisse  (Husserl : 1991). The latter perhaps being a more ‘subjective’ time which is 
not measured but experienced and would be more regarded as states of mood, feeling or 
passion. A particular state may take hold of someone for years or only seconds of linear 
time and bears no relation to any standardized unit or calculative method. The 
‘subjective’ experience of time also has a past, present and future but understood 
differently. The past could and can, from a certain viewpoint, represent the fleetingness 
of life, also highlighting the constant, less than an infinitesimal part of a nano-second 
shift that is immediate experience. The past can also bring forth considerations related to 
the origins from whence one came and related primordial questions. The future is that 
which is vague and unknown and easily forgotten or cloaked in anxiety but which can 
equally point to the end of life and perhaps to a return to the origin or Paradise, Hell, 
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eternal rest or oblivion. But it is the present moment or each successive moment as it 
occurs which has primacy above all else.  Ibn ‘Arabi defines the present moment thus:  
..by the convention of the Folk (the Sufis) – [it is] the state in which 
you are in the time being.  So it is a thing that exists (now) between 
two non-existents, (the past and the future); not as time but as things 
that have passed or are yet to come.                                                              
          (Ibn al-‘Arabi  cited by  Yousef : 2008 : 66 : emphasis added)  
 
Each individual is perpetually faced with the choice of living in the present, the past or 
the future. One option is to be totally in the moment, yet immersed and losing the self in 
the everyday world of Das Man with no thought of the past or the future which is the 
meaning of ghaflāh (heedless forgetfulness) an imperfect presence in senuousness which 
is limited in scope. Ensuing feelings of frustration or wasted time is down to the 
individual not understanding the nature of time and has more to do with attitude and 
disposition regarding the passing of time.  
Another option could be fretting about the past or worrying about the future. A third and 
final option is to recognize the possibility to be physically and mentally present in the 
moment as something connected to the unchanging eternal. The moment that stands 
before one is ‘…already outside of time and “is” in principle already in the Eternal 
Realm’ (Nasr : 2007 ).  All aspects of past and future are contained in the present 
moment, otherwise stated as constituting; ‘the point whereto all times are present’ (Perry 
cited by Nasr : 2007 : 167). For the ‘now’ is the only moment we can ‘be’ and to be now 
is to be in a constant ‘becoming’. This is time conceived of as a continual flux of 
instances and moments which can be called ‘momentary time’ (Bowering : 1997) . Being 
present in the moment, the past is irredeemably gone and rendered a place of no action 
and the future cannot be acted in as of yet and is therefore also an area of no action.  
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And now the moment. A moment such as this is unique. To be sure, 
it is short and temporal, as the moment is, it is passing, as the 
moment is, past, as the moment is in the next moment, and yet it is 
decisive, and yet it is filled with the eternal. A moment such as this 
must have a special name. Let us call it: the fullness of time. 
                                                                       (Kiekegaard : 1985 : 18) 
 
 
It is from Kierkegaard that the epitaph ‘Philosophers of the Moment’. Most 
commentators have suggested that Kierkegaard speaks here of the moment when the 
individual truly and fully encounters the paradox of the Christ (Watkins : 2001) and in 
that moment, there is the repetition (not the recollected theory) of the historical Christ 
actually re-enacted as entering into the world of events ‘now’ occurring, not in person 
but in phenomena. For him, if time is a flowing succession of the past, future and the 
present then identifying any ‘moment’ seemingly stops this sequential flow 
(Kierkegaard : 1980) and therefore for him the moment was a thing out of time, just 
as eternity is ‘no-place’ in the sequence of the three modes of temporality, so it is with 
the moment and this is their relation.  
 
Kierkegaard describes the moment as ‘time’s atom’ but cannot can be established or 
exist without eternity – much in the same relation between Being and being in the 
ontological difference, in like fashion but now in terms of space and time, eternity has 
No-place (Kierkegaard : 1996 : 207) just as Being is No-thing. Without eternity the 
moment cannot exist because time is by nature a thing that flows by and eternity is the 
unchangeable backdrop and this is the affinity that they have. ‘The moment is that 
ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other [….] whereby time constantly 
intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time’ (Kierkegaard : 1980 : 89).  
 
An encounter with the Divine ‘in the moment’ reflects the Muslim belief that within 
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the heart of each human being there is a common grounding or point of contact with 
the Divine and a option to understanding time can be found in the concept of hidra 
(conscious or mindful presence) wherein one is present to every passing moment, 
relinquishing one’s own will to the Divine will.  In addressing the question of 
presence or full awareness and mindfulness in the moment, Kierkegaard says, ‘Most 
men think, talk and write as they sleep, eat and drink, without ever raising the 
question of their relation to the idea; this only happens among the very few....’ 
(Kierkegaard cited by Ward : 2008 : 33). Similarly Ibn ‘Arabi spoke of certain kinds 
of people whom he called, ‘ibn al-waqt’,  ‘abu al-waqt’ or  ‘abd’ al-waqt’, (in order; 
son of the moment, father of the moment, and servant of the moment), all of which 
are variants on the theme; people who in one way or another are present-in-the-
moment. Such a person has arrived at a level of spiritual understanding wherein; 
…each instant is a glorious “time” of theophany. The Absolute 
manifests itself at every moment with this or that of its Attributes. 
The Absolute, viewed from this angle, never ceases to make a new 
self-manifestation, and goes on changing its form from moment to 
moment. And the true “knowers”, on their part, go on responding 
with flexibility to this ever changing process of Divine self-
manifestation. Of course, in so doing they are not worshipping the 
changing forms themselves that come out outwardly on the surface; 
they are worshipping through the ever changing forms the One that 
remains eternally unchanging and unchangeable.     
            (Izutusu : 1983  : 84 ) 
Yet there are other definitions of waqt or that which concerns those who inhabit the 
moment as ibn al-waqt. There is the concept of hāl (sudden spiritual state), which is 
the momentary flash of experiencing the Divine presence. This hāl is not reached by 
any efforts on the part of the individual but occurs through Divine intervention.  In the 
famous Kashf al-Majūb, al- Hujwīirī (990 – 1077) defines it thus; ‘something that 
descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it 
comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort’ (Al-Hujwīrī : 2000 : 181). As 
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such, the hāl is considered to be a Divine gift as opposed to the maqām (spiritual 
station) which comes about through the spiritual strivings of the individual (Snir : 
1999), though even this might be questioned. Both are given yet both usually require 
some effort.     
However, it is the idea of being present to and in each moment, which is worthy of 
attention here and seems to show some affinity with both Kierkegaard qnd Ibn 
‘Arabi’s thoughts on the subject. This is a heightened awareness or consciousness of 
‘being here’, involving an awareness of the circumstances, surroundings, the objects 
and the people present in a given moment bringing about a synthesis of thought, 
feeling and action within the individual. In Muslim terms it relates to the awareness of 
the Absolute Being which is reflected in the Hadīth that the Prophet’s response when 
asked to define ihsān was ‘It is to worship Allah as though you see Him, and though 
you do not see Him, you know that He sees you’ (Sahih Bukhari : 1997 :  47 : 1). The 
effect of this mindful presence ‘in the moment’ is clearly depicted in this well-known 
Hadīth, cited previously but now approached from a slightly different perspective.  
Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah's Apostle said, "Allah said, ….. My 
slave keeps on coming closer to Me through performing Nawafil 
(praying or doing extra deeds besides what is obligatory) till I love 
him, so I become his sense of hearing with which he hears, and his 
sense of sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he grips, 
and his leg with which he walks…                                                                                                                                                  
 (Sahih Bukhari : 1997 : Hadith 509) 
Within this quote it is possible to detect the elements of an aware presence so intense 
that the individual becomes virtually immersed in the Absolute Real, resulting in no 
pause between thought, will and action and is a thing more akin to inspiration. Such a 
person, Divinely inspired, in total awareness of the occasion, participants and objects 
present, would say and do the right thing at the right moment – in complete harmony 
with their surroundings, they are ibn al-waqt.  
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The question of temporality is central to Heidegger’s thought for he sees it is that by 
which Being is involved most closely with dasein (Heidegger : 2008 : 377). In doing 
so he also recognizes ‘the moment’ 65 as being of great import in the relation of Being 
with dasein. Yet he does not understand this to be a chain of sequential ‘nows’ but in 
a fluid spread of the three temporal modes, nevertheless, by being in the present we 
are already stand outside of this spread. He develops Husserl’s idea of felt experience 
of inner time as opposed to measured standardized time by understanding first of all, 
the centrality of lebensweld (the world as lived) for dasein and secondarily as 
something experienced through the three dimensions of time which he calls ectases 
(Heidegger : 2008 : 38) based on his understanding of human existence as Ek-sistenz, 
the etymological roots of which are related to the concept of ‘standing beyond the 
self’ (Heidegger : 2008 : 377). Ectases is also of a similar root, though in the case of 
the latter, Heidegger does not use this in ecstatic sense as commonly understood but 
as something which already ‘stands out’ as in standing out of the flow of time; an 
awakened emerging from the normal flow of linear time as commonly perceived.  The 
‘moment’ or ‘instant’ is where the ectases or temporal modes converge, yet not static 
but as a moving point. They are perceived as being of the utmost significance in 
determining what follows, (projected into the future) with possible far-reaching 
consequences for the individual, in the future, but also strangely with the potential to 
change the past. As the ‘now’ moment may be more significant than the next, one 
must be awake and aware for such moments. Nevertheless, despite this, Heidegger’s 
view of the moment is not so much that it will project one into the eternal but rather 
that it immerses one in one’s own-most being to thereby experience raw Being, which 
in itself encompasses the eternal.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Heidegger uses the same terminology as Kierkegaard, the Augenblick (in the blink of the eye) 
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Chapter 13 
A Concluding Chapter 
 
In many of the towns and cities of Morocco it used to be quite common to see the 
figure of the majdūb or the ‘Divine fool’ and throughout the Muslim world such 
figures existed. The majdūbin are said to be those who are overwhelmed by God until 
they are considered senseless and with no care for worldly affairs and as such they are 
often bedraggled and homeless.  To those unfamiliar with the majdūb such people can 
easily be mistaken for the mentally imbalanced and yet the majdūb is to be 
differentiated from the insane (majnūn) by an initially imperceptible difference. One 
of the most famous of these in Morocco was one Sidi Abdur-Rahman al-Majdūb 
(d.1568) and is credited with inspired sayings in rhyming couplets, which are still 
used and recited today. The majdūb (or majdūba fem.) is a revered figure and their 
words and actions are considered to be divinely inspired and unfiltered by social 
convention. They are seen to be indicators of the underlying reality of different 
situations or those who reveal the latent feelings that remain unsaid – as if they were 
walking ‘deconstrutors’ and have been known famously to cut through the pretence of 
civil society. Certainly they were symbols of the irrational element of the Divine and 
human interaction always ready to point to the absudities of the rational. 
Significantly, the figure of the majdūb is now a disappearing figure in the towns and 
cities of Morocco and this perhaps a barometer of an encroaching management 
culturalization of the country coupled with the rationalization and ‘sterilization’ of 
Islam. In many ways this is what this thesis has been about, the change from the 
unpredictable and unmeasured which mirrors the Divine, to the standardized and 
controlled, which in turn reflects the human endeavour, fruitless though it may be, to 
bring under control both the wild forces of nature and virtues and vices that rage 
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within the inner dimensions of the human. Ibn ‘Ata’illah al- Iskandari(d. 1309) says 
‘Let yourself be at rest from self-management. Do not undertake to do what someone 
else has carried out on your behalf’ (al- Iskandari : 2004). The majdūb could not 
possibly be further away from the global management culture as they are the exact 
antithesis. This is no call to bring back the majdūbs nor a call to follow their way. It is 
more about promoting an awareness of the possibility of an authentic path available 
within the beingness of being Muslim in the face of the inauthentic. It has been the 
quest for the meaning of being oneself in the context of being Muslim, an existential 
and intellectual journey in search of some solid framework for personal authenticity. 
The framework arrived at and loosely defined is the; Muslim, Classical, Maghrebean 
– Andalusi, Mālikī, Akbarian and Qadīriyyan ash- Shādhilīyan, judged capable of 
providing a setting for personal authenticity. However, nor is this framework set in 
stone and there is recognition that it equally any such positioning holds the potential 
for inauthenticity. Even the question of a framework can be questioned for ultimately 
it is only an outwardly prescribed positioning. When dealing with personal 
authenticity, the individual is the starting point, not the theories or theological 
positionings. The existentialism utilized throughout this research has been essential in 
helping to illuminate several aspects of the more personal quest for authenticity but 
this has been accompanied by the insight and accumulated wisdom provided by 
classical Islam. It is hoped that what has been covered demonstrates a manner in 
which to arrive at some authenticity based on sound reasoning and a strong 
theological positioning but also allows for the flexibility of different individuals to 
find their own way within this. It is not a recommendation to take these paticular 
views on as they are specific to me. Each individual must go through some process 
which has some affinity with this. 
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Residual Effects of the Research  
The research has changed much of the content and procceses of my own thought, in 
some places consolidating understanding and in other areas involving a shedding of 
some preconceived ideas in the place of new ones.  Things that stand out as having 
been radically revised would be my understanding of esotericism and the 
interrelational differences of the esoteric between western and eastern Sufism. The 
naqli position of the Hanbalī madhab also has undergone a significant change within 
my own understanding as a result of the work carried out here. The usual 
interpretation of the Hānbalī position is that of an anti-intellectual and inflexible 
entity that has probably evolved due to its historical identification with the Wahhābi 
movement. In fact, the Hānbalī position has been in some sense, a vanguard against 
some of the cognitive excesses within the Muslim world. At the same time it has 
afforded me a better understanding of such movements and while I may not agree I 
have been given a better understanding of how these have come about.  
 
Of the many ideas that have been abandoned, the main one is undoubtedly the idea 
that reason and rationality were mainly products of Western thought.  While the role 
of rationality within Muslim intellectual development has been acknowledged 
globally, the extent of its centrality to Muslim intellectual development was not 
something that I was previously aware of. Another area would be the reputation of the 
al-Murābitūn, depicted as as harsh and intolerant in their religious approach, which I 
have come to believe is an overly simplistic and ultimately fallacious interpretation. 
While their mysticism or intellectual pursuit was not of the speculative Eastern sort, it 
remained a conscious intellectual choice. Existential, passionate and tenacious 
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commitment when juxtapositioned with speculative thought and modernist Cartesian 
doubt should not be automatically mistaken for fanaticism.  
 
Another aspect, which has also come to light, has been a clear differentiation between 
esotericism and mysticism. On the one hand an Eastern Muslim esotericism with 
strong Neo-Platonic roots, contrasted with the Maghrabean, an earthy, praxis based 
mysticism, seemingly more directly related to the Prophet and the early community. 
This had not been quite so obvious previously and during this work I have been able 
to explore the variants of mysticism and esotericism, rather loosely identifying them 
as running parallel with Eastern and Western intellectual trends in the Muslim world. 
However, one particular anomaly to this is found in the work and experience of Ibn 
‘Arabi, who in many ways seems rather esoterically Eastern in much of his discourse 
and yet at the same time it is strangely not speculative, in that what he writes about 
was experienced by him and not arrived at through intellectual deliberations so that 
there is also a certain earthiness and sense in what he says. Nevertheless, what has 
come down from him to the Qadīriyyah ash- Shādhilīyah does not retain all aspects of 
his discourse (then again no one really could) but the presence of wahdat al- wujūd 
looms large in these Sufi cultures.  
 
Further Areas of Research 
One aspect that has been brought out by this research is that there is a great need for 
more thinking, in the Heideggerian sense; (i.e. not necessarily philosophy), about 
what it means to be Muslim and what the implications of this are in the world that we 
occupy. This thinking should be in and of itself Muslim and not, as is presently the 
case, in reaction to the non – Muslim. In particular, the implications of enframing, 
another Heideggerian concept which refers to our ontological mindframe and how this 
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directs us to inhabit our world, needs to be understood to thereby enable people to 
move on from this. For example, one aspect of this might be to look further into the 
role of technology. As we have seen, for Heidegger, calculative thought and the 
global management culture are things that are synonomous with a predominate 
technology that have brought with it a new and particular way of structuring the world 
(Enframing). Heidegger sees this as having direct relativity with any authenticity of 
being, insofar as we have seen that the concept of the ‘fallen’ was linked by 
Heidegger to the fact that much of our current beingness in the world is controlled and 
manipulated by technology. Thus perhaps, people in general, especially those who 
have a belief in the Divine, need to be enquiring into and engaging in a discourse with 
the role of technology into how it frames the view we have of ourselves and our 
world. Muslims are absolutely no exception to this.  There is no getting away from the 
inherent paradox of Muslims needing to engage in thinking and enquiring into the 
dominant paradigm and yet on the other hand accepting that rationality is limited and 
thereby learn to shed a relentless ‘Why’.  All of the above needs further thought and 
research as they have enormous implications on things like education, ethics and 
theology. There is a growing body of research making comparisons between various 
existentialists and this should continue and broaden out into the implacatory. 
Collectively and individually the Muslims need to work out a more thought out 
philosophy of being in regard to the modern world.  
 
In a more historical sense, other areas of research could be into much of recent and 
contemporary research on the al Murābitūn. I believe that their depiction as 
essentially anti-intellectual philistines says more about modern attitudes and 
enframing than it does about this particular dynasty. Related to this, another area 
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worthy of research could be a more thorough look into this historical western 
resistance towards eastern speculative philosophy.  There is an expansive amount of 
material waiting to be discovered of enormous importance regarding the relationship 
between Christians and Muslims in al- Andalus. Historically and theologically, there 
is a still a great deal of work to be carried out into differing approaches of Sufism, 
which will have direct implications on Muslims today. Frequently, when people use 
the word Sufi or its Arabic equivalent they are speaking at cross purposes by meaning 
different things rendering the conversation worthless and incinatory.  For Muslims it 
is time to put aside some of the notions propagated by extremists and yet others that 
should be taken up. It is time for Muslims to see Muslim history for what it is, both 
varied and valid. A great deal more research should be carried out on the Hanbalī 
madhhab, to distance it from what it is currently associated with, in terms of Saudi 
Arabian positions and extremism.  
 
Conclusion 
 Finally, it is hoped that this work will be of wider interest to people than may seem 
immediately apparent. Some of the issues raised here could be relevant to people of 
different faiths or even those with none. The process and method of a journey to 
authenticity undertaken in this work is meant to be the salient feature and the final 
position arrived at, is almost of secondary importance. The need for individuals to 
recognise inauthenticity within themselves as well as around them and from there to 
work through their beliefs and positions related to this, perhaps casting back into the 
past, essentially to discover ‘what it means to be me’ seems to be becoming a 
necessity rather than a luxury. The enframing that was spoken of previously, 
(something in which rationalism is strongly bound up in) needs to be, at the very least, 
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recognised if never completely shed. We must learn to live, not completely without 
why but to know, intuitively and aesthetically, when we should leave off asking why.  
Therefore if this work causes even one person to think and enquire (perhaps rather 
than question) into the possible options, perhaps even adopting some of the 
approaches presented here in working through the maze presented by the encounter of 
religion with contemporary life, then the effort will be doubly rewarded.  
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